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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines Atlanta’s role in the international anti-apartheid movement during 
the 1980s.  As the movement to end apartheid in South Africa intensified throughout the decade, 
Atlanta’s universities, government officials, and corporations came under pressure to respond to 
the mounting crisis. While the anti-apartheid movement was constructed on a global scale, in any 
given locality a transnational movement must intersect with a variety of unique political, social 
and economic forces. In Atlanta, grassroots activists worked through the Southern Regional 
Office of the American Friends Service Committee as well as through the Georgia Coalition for 
Divestment in Southern Africa to hold institutions accountable for their ties to South Africa. 
However, at the same time these efforts collided with a local political regime in which African 
American politicians eagerly partnered with corporate interests, resulting in anti-apartheid 
activism in Atlanta that was often less confrontational or radical than that found in other U.S. 
 
 
cities. Examining this moment in Atlanta’s history sheds light on the way that diverse groups 
jockeyed to shape metro-Atlanta’s political identity on both a local and a global scale. Further, 
examining the overlap, cooperation, and competition between groups with varying organizational 
scales and focuses contributes to the broader literature on social movements. This dissertation 
emphasizes the need for scholars of movement building to consider the influence of local 
dynamics when analyzing transnational social movements.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 My dissertation argues that global social movements cannot be fully understood without 
giving proper attention to the unique political, social and economic forces that influence 
movement building on a local scale. The anti-apartheid movement of the 1980s took on different 
characteristics in Atlanta than it did in London, New York, or Washington D.C. A narrative of 
anti-apartheid struggle in Atlanta would be incomplete without taking into account the historical 
context in which this struggle emerged. This introduction provides a brief history of Atlanta, 
giving particular attention to the way that that race and class have shaped the city’s political 
climate. The story of anti-apartheid activism in Atlanta during the 1980s must also be placed in 
the context of the long history of this transnational social movement. Thus, I provide a brief 
history of the anti-apartheid movement with a focus on events occurring within the United 
States. 
 Floyd Hunter and Clarence Stone have written the pivotal books on Atlanta’s city 
government. In his ground-breaking 1953 work, Community Power Structure: A Study of 
Decision Makers, Floyd Hunter examined the critical - yet informal – linkages between Atlanta’s 
elected officials and its business leaders during the 1940s and early 1950s.This business elite was 
a close knit group both politically and socially and made important decisions through informal 
negotiations. William Hartsfield was Mayor from 1942 to 1962 and consistently consulted local 
business leaders before making policy decisions. In Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-
1988, Stone picks up the story where Hunter left off. By Hartsfield’s 1949 reelection campaign, 
the number of black voters had climbed to 27 percent of the electorate, as a result of the supreme 
court striking down the state’s all-white primary three years earlier. This campaign marked the 
first time that mayoral candidates actively sought black votes. Stone argues that beginning with 
2 
 
the 1949 election, white business leaders allied with middle-class African Americans in a biracial 
coalition. He uses the word “regime” to refer to the type of informal collaborations that make a 
city governable. In Atlanta, this regime would survive several transitions to remain the dominant 
political force into the 1990s.
1
   
 In 1949 African Americans in Atlanta formed the Negro Voters’ League, an organization 
that would interview and endorse white candidates. In a trend that frightened whites, the city’s 
African Americans voted as a block, in an attempt to boost candidates that they felt would best 
represent their interests. The main impact of black votes in the 1950s and 1960s was to prevent 
openly racist candidates (like Lester Maddox) from winning.  As in 1949, Hartsfield won 
reelection again in 1953 and 1957 with the support of the city’s African Americans. Hartsfield 
considered his black allies the price of doing business, and was not one to advocate significant 
changes in the racial status quo. The trend continued with Ivan Allen’s election in 1961. Allen 
was only slightly more enlightened than Hartsfield on matters of race, but he won the election by 
emphasizing the need for moderation, in contrast to the race baiting of his opponent whose 
rhetoric alienated enough moderate whites to ensure his victory. At the same time, city 
government embarked on an activist politics that prioritized redevelopment of the central 
business district. Since then, the Atlanta regime has valued corporate development with almost 
no restrictions, as well as opportunities for minority-owned businesses. These values indicate the 
priorities of both partners of the governing regime. To a significant extent the white business 
elites and their new political allies from the African American middle class, continued to make 
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decisions in the fashion described by Hunter: through backroom meetings and confidential 
deals.
2
 
 By 1970, blacks made up a majority of the city’s residents. The mayoral election of 1973 
demonstrated the effects of the new racial demography: Maynard Jackson was elected as the 
city’s first black mayor. His election marked the second successive mayoral election in which 
black voters and white business leaders supported opposing candidates. Jackson was elected by 
African American voters, middle class white neighborhood activists and the city’s small liberal 
Jewish population.  At the beginning of Jackson’s administration it seemed that the governing 
coalition would not survive. Jackson was a political outsider and unfamiliar with the workings of 
the Atlanta regime. At first tried to govern without the support of white downtown business 
interests, relying instead upon the new alliance that had brought him to power.
3
 
Jackson entered office committed to an inclusive and pluralistic approach to governing 
and a desire to incorporate a wider range of groups into the decision making process. These 
tendencies and goals marked a significant departure from the characteristics of Atlanta’s 
governing regime over the previous several decades. Jackson explained to Atlantans that African 
Americans were “‘merely seeking their legal rights to inclusion in Atlanta’s politics and 
economy.’” His commitment to affirmative action programs and providing city contracts to 
minority owned firms provided tangible benefits for a segment of Atlanta’s African American 
community.
4
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 White business leaders resented these changes. Despite their long time alliance with 
middle class African Americans, Atlanta’s business elite still thought of their black allies as 
junior partners in the coalition. In Race and the Shaping of Twentieth Century Atlanta, Ronald 
Bayor describes white business leaders’ reaction to Jackson’s first years in office as “between 
serious concern and panic.” Business leaders accused Jackson of being “anti-white,” and 
threatened to leave downtown Atlanta for the rapidly growing northern suburbs. Jackson was 
accused of mismanaging the city’s affairs and was criticized by the Atlanta Journal and The 
Atlanta Constitution, the city’s mainstream news outlets that consistently championed the agenda 
of the business community.
5
 
 Jackson was not as anti-business as he at first appeared, and he made efforts to sooth the 
business community and sought reconciliation. As Stone argues, “an electoral coalition is not the 
same as a governing coalition.” Jackson soon learned that the electoral alliance of African 
Americans, middle-class white gentrifiers and liberal Jews which had put him in office was not 
helping him to run the city. As Larry Keating explains, in Atlanta: Race, Class and Urban 
Expansion, Jackson came to recognize that if he hoped to have success with major economic 
development initiatives, “he needed the cooperation of business leaders, not only because 
conflict with them made such projects much more difficult and cost too much politically, but also 
because the organized effort required for such projects would be much easier and more likely to 
succeed if he could rely upon the cohesiveness , the expertise, and the resources of the business 
elite.” These capabilities were the very reason for the existence of the governing coalition. By 
the time Jackson ran for and won reelection in 1977, he had gained a cautious endorsement from 
a significant segment of the business community. During his second term as mayor, Jackson 
backed off his reform agenda and began to embrace a partnership with business leaders. The old 
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alliance between middle-class African Americans and the downtown white business elite had 
changed in form now that African Americans were a majority of the city’s electorate, but to a 
great extent the city’s governing coalition remained intact. 6 
 In 1981, Andrew Young was elected as the city’s second black mayor. Although Young 
came to office without significant support from the downtown elite, he immediately worked to 
reassure the business community that he had their interests in mind by prioritizing downtown 
redevelopment. Despite his background in the civil rights movement, Young was a supporter 
laissez faire capitalism, and as mayor he pursued a business oriented agenda that re-solidified the 
relationship between the black controlled city hall and the white business elite. During the civil 
rights movement, as a close associate of Martin Luther King Jr, Young had often worked to 
negotiate with business interests regarding segregated facilities. Young had come to understand 
the power that business often had over local affairs and came to believe that business interests 
could be a force for progressive social change. Although Young was a Democrat, his views on 
the economy largely mirrored those of the concurrent presidential administration of Ronald 
Reagan. Thus, he ultimately gained support from many white Republicans in Atlanta.
7
  
 Unfortunately, the problem with Young’s model was that the interests and needs of most 
working-class black Atlantans’ were ignored. During the ‘70s and ‘80s the economic status of 
the city’s majority population – poor African Americans – continued to decline. Keating suggests 
that “class insularity and class bias may have been a part of the reason for this, but Young also 
believed that the economic development he sought was a partial antidote to black poverty and 
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that the issues of poverty, lower income housing, and social programs were largely national and 
not local responsibilities.” The economic growth which Young facilitated during his 
administration did nothing to shrink the income gap between the city’s majority population of 
impoverished African Americans and the small population of wealthy residents, black or white. 
Instead inequality worsened. Certainly racial factors continued (and continue) to shape Atlanta’s 
history, politics and culture. However, as Bayor argues, “After the election of black mayors…the 
class splits within the black community became sharper and illustrated more clearly the part class 
factors play in urban development.” 8 
 Despite Young’s close relationship with business interests, the urban regime as described 
by Stone had weakened by the end of the 1980s. While the coalition between black elected 
officials and white business elites was still the strongest alliance in Atlanta, the metro area had 
become so sprawling and diffuse that the downtown area held less importance as a business 
center. Also, as businesses increasingly became active participants in the global economy, 
executives tended to move frequently, and their engagement in the civic life of the city was less 
prominent. Finally, as Keating explains, “Another major reason for the diminished power of the 
governing coalition is the diminished power of Atlanta City government…Fewer resources have 
led to a lessened role for city government in economic development.”9 
 Despite the inattention of black elected officials to the plight of the urban poor, working 
class African Americans did work to organize politically and improve their status in society, 
while the globetrotting mayor attempted to sell Atlanta to the world. Two important works shed 
light on these local counter-movements. Winston Grady-Willis’ Challenging U.S. Apartheid: 
Atlanta and Black Struggles for Human Rights, analyzes the black freedom struggle, which 
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formed the backdrop to regime formation. Grady-Willis chooses not to use the term Civil Rights 
Movement, on the grounds that it elevates acts of Congress, such as the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
over the grassroots struggles that sustained the movement. Further, Grady explains that black 
activists did not think of their struggle in terms as narrow as those suggested by “civil rights.” 
Grady-Willis also rejects the phrase, “Jim Crow segregation,” as he believes it has a folksy 
connotation that masks its repressiveness. Grady explains that Atlanta is a perfect place to study 
the intersection of diverse ideas and approaches to human rights struggle. Because numerous 
organizations made their headquarters in Atlanta, activists from all over country flocked to the 
city.
10
 
 While the narrative of civil rights in the fifties is well known (Rosa Parks, Brown v. 
Board, etc), Grady-Willis chooses to begin his account of black human rights struggle in Atlanta 
in 1960. Grady discusses two publications of 1960, “Appeal for Human Rights” and “The Negro 
in Atlanta, A Second Look.” These works emphasized that the struggle for black equality had a 
long road ahead, as the city’s African American population faced discrimination in all areas of 
life. The early 1960s were characterized by the sit-in movements throughout Atlanta. During this 
time, ideological differences regarding tactics began to emerge, but activists were able to 
preserve a united front and achieve their limited objective of desegregating lunch counters.
11
 
 During the mid 1960s activists were influenced by the teachings of Malcolm X who had 
left the Nation of Islam to lead the Organization of AfroAmerican Unity. Sit-ins continued, and 
during this time the protests often lost their earlier civility that had been valued by the black 
clergy and Atlanta’s black elite. Grady Willis also examines the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee’s controversial Atlanta Project. This project is best known for the 
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debate over whether whites should no longer have voting rights in the organization. Grady Willis 
suggests that the reality on the ground involved more than just white voting rights within SNCC, 
and that the debates were shaped by an ongoing analysis of white skin privilege.
12
  
 Grady-Willis argues that black activism in Atlanta continued into the 1970s. The focus of 
the movement during the 1970s centered on improving wages and working conditions for poor 
blacks. Simultaneously, black women worked to assure that gender issues relevant to their 
experience moved to the forefront of the agenda. Also during the 1970s the Georgia State chapter 
of the Black Panthers worked to recruit young Atlantans to their organization which 
implemented local “survival” programs in several areas of the city.13 
 Finally, Tomiko Brown-Nagin’s Courage to Dissent: Atlanta and the Long History of the 
Civil Rights Movement, provides a unique “bottom-up” legal history of civil rights activism 
within Atlanta. Brown-Nagin strives to shed light on the ways that social movements respond to 
courts, the law and lawyers. She focuses on tensions between national and local activists and 
between African Americans of differing class backgrounds. The latter two-thirds of Courage to 
Dissent covers the same time period as does Challenging US Apartheid. While Grady-Willis 
focuses his coverage of the 1970s on the efforts of the local branches of SNCC and the Black 
Panthers to promote racial and economic justice, Brown-Nagin turns her attention to legal efforts 
to enforce Brown v Board of Education in Atlanta during the 1970s. Brown-Nagin’s account 
examines the contrasting interests of poor and middle-class African Americans and the often 
conflicting goals of national organizations, local black leaders and working-class activists. 
Although each group acted rationally and had the ultimate goal of improving educational 
opportunities for black Atlantans, their methods undermined one another, and ultimately the 
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Atlanta Public Schools serving African Americans on the south-side of the city would continue 
to decline.  
Like Challenging U.S. Apartheid, Courage to Dissent has much relevance for my 
dissertation project. Activists in the United States sought to influence the U.S. government to 
adopt sanctions against the South African apartheid regime. Local and national activists forged 
connections to transnational networks in their efforts to change US policy. This history lends 
itself to the sort of bottom-up marriage of legal and social history pioneered in Courage to 
Dissent. In addition, Brown-Nagin closes her final chapter by arguing that “legal and social 
movements fortify one another, regardless of whether the plaintiffs achieve victory in court.” 14  
  In conclusion, the biracial governing coalition in Atlanta is not as strong as it once was. 
However, this regime maintained its preeminent role in governing Atlanta into the 1990s because 
of a lack of viable alternatives. Business organizations like Central Atlanta Progress (an 
advocacy group for the central business district) and the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce 
continued to wield more power and influence than did neighborhood groups or labor unions, 
because they had the ability to organize funding for major development projects. Both lower-
class African Americans and middle class whites did not find their interests represented in these 
organizations, as neither group was part of the governing coalition.  Some researchers anticipated 
that changing demographics in Atlanta during the 1990s could alter the character of the 
governing regime as middle class blacks moved out of Atlanta and middle class whites moved in.  
An alliance between middle class whites and the remaining majority population – poor African 
Americans, could have potentially emphasized populist and neighborhood politics. Instead, 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, a modified black regime that could be described as 
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neoliberal continued to govern and to promote conservative, pro-growth policies while 
consciously ignoring black poverty.
15
 
 One of the unique qualities of Atlanta’s politics is that civil rights veterans of the 1960s 
have been incorporated into the local power structure. Andrew Young, Julian Bond, John Lewis, 
Hosea Williams, and Tyrone Brooks all held elected office during the 1980s. To a significant 
extent, even civil rights groups like the Southern Christian Leadership Conference under Joseph 
Lowery could be seen as part of Atlanta’s political mainstream. One of the ways that the black 
urban regime in Atlanta deflected criticism from politically aware, working class African 
Americans during the 1980s was by giving support to the anti-apartheid movement. The anti-
apartheid movement in Atlanta was thus managed in a political away. The fact that the black 
leadership in Atlanta held political power – in alliance with Atlanta’s corporate leaders, 
particularly those of Coca Cola - meant that the black leadership was constrained in its abilities 
to lead a militant anti-apartheid movement. The anti-apartheid movement in Atlanta was not 
severely limited by these characteristics; rather it survived and thrived with tacit support from 
Atlanta’s political regime and dedication from committed activists outside the mainstream.  
 
NARRATIVE AND HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-
APARTHIED MOVEMENT 
In 1948 the National Party of South Africa formalized the country’s defacto segregation 
with a series of laws that established apartheid, the world’s strictest system of racial segregation. 
While other countries around the world slowly began to moderate their approach to race relations 
in the aftermath of World War II, South Africa moved to solidify white political, economic and 
                                                          
15
 Manley Elliott Banks II, “A Changing Electorate in a Majority Black City: The Emergence of a Neo-Conservative 
Urban Regime in Contemporary Atlanta,” Journal of Urban Affairs, V22: 3, 265-278; Keating, Atlanta: Race, Class 
and Urban Expansion, 74-75. 
11 
 
social supremacy. Threatened by anti-colonial movements elsewhere on the African continent, 
the Nationalist party passed laws that severely oppressed over 80 percent of the population. 
Under apartheid black South Africans, who made up about seventy percent of South Africa’s 
population, were not considered citizens of South Africa, and thus could not vote. They also 
could not own land or live in cities without proof of employment. “Petty apartheid” laws affected 
every imaginable public space, and prohibited marriages between individuals of different racial 
classifications. Black South Africans were required to carry identification cards at all times as a 
result of the hated “pass laws.” These laws were accompanied by horrifying police brutality, and 
limited educational and work opportunities for black South Africans, Asians and mixed-race 
peoples classified as “coloured.”16  
Although protesting against the government could be considered treasonous, and the 
government ultimately banned many opposition groups, resistance to white minority rule was 
persistent. This resistance predated the formalization of apartheid. The African National 
Congress (ANC) established itself under the name South African Native National Congress in 
1912 to protest segregation laws under British rule. In its early years, the ANC was quite 
moderate in its tone and demands, which focused not on ending British rule, but instead on 
gaining equal treatment under British law for black South Africans. Historian Francis Meli, who 
has written a complete history of the ANC emphasizes the significance of the organization’s 
founding: “This meant the creation of a loyalty of a new type – a non-tribal loyalty…By forming 
the ANC, they established African political opinion as an autonomous factor in its own right in 
South Africa.” In 1944 Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and other young members of the ANC, 
created the ANC Youth League to provide an outlet for a younger generation of frustrated South 
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Africans. They introduced nonviolent civil disobedience and strikes to protest laws such as the 
Native Land Act of 1913, which reserved almost 90 percent of South Africa’s land for the whites 
who made up less than twenty percent of the population. In the late 1940s, distraught over the 
formalization of apartheid, the leaders of the ANC Youth League moved to take over the 
leadership of the ANC and to move the organization towards a more active stance. Under this 
new, invigorated leadership, the ANC adopted a “Program of Action” in 1949 to use mass action 
to challenge the implementation of apartheid.
17
 
During these years, South Africa’s mineral wealth enticed the United States and other 
western nations to maintain friendly relations with South Africa’s ruling party. Not only did the 
United States import gold, diamonds, and uranium from South Africa, but South Africans 
purchased $187 million in American products in 1947 alone. Also in 1947, as Cold War tensions 
began to intensify, South Africa became an important American ally in the effort to contain 
communism. As the Cold War political climate in the United States dampened the potential for 
radical critiques of domestic racism and economic injustice, the same influence was felt by those 
who spoke out against the slow pace of decolonization in Africa in general or the intensifying 
racism and segregation in South Africa in particular. Still, some Americans, including members 
of the NAACP and Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) began to correspond with ANC leaders 
and used leaflets and mass mailings to encourage Americans to stand up for equality both within 
the U.S. and throughout the world.
18
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 A new monograph by Rob Skinner discusses early anti-apartheid activism in Great 
Britain as well as the United States. The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid: Liberal Humanitarians 
and Transnational Activists in Britain and the United States, 1919-1964 is a ground-breaking 
work because it pays attention to the historical roots of what would ultimately become a mass 
movement. Skinner argues that in both Great Britain and the United States, anti-apartheid 
activism drew on a legacy of humanitarianism that had its roots in the abolition movements of 
the nineteenth century. The moralist tone of the anti-apartheid movement in both countries was 
connected to the heavy involvement of Christian missionaries and activists. However, Skinner 
explains that even in the early decades of the movement, the contributions of anti-colonial forces 
and leftist organizations cannot be ignored. Skinner emphasizes the importance of transnational 
networks with long historical roots, connected to those earlier organizations that formed in 
response to African slavery in the Americas or the horrors perpetrated by Belgium’s King 
Leopold in the Congo.
19
 
 Although Skinner’s coverage of Great Britain is more thorough than his analysis of anti-
apartheid activism in the United States, he describes numerous episodes of social activism and 
connections between the United States and South Africa that have not been analyzed by 
historians. First, Skinner discusses the travels of South African activist and intellectual Sol 
Plaatje. Plaatje journeyed to the United States between 1920 and 1922 where he met with Marcus 
Garvey and developed a relationship with W.E.B. Du Bois. Although Plaatje and Garvey had 
vastly different political views and rhetorical styles, perhaps the connection between Plaatje and 
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Garvey’s UNIA contributed to the influence of Garveyism in South Africa, which Skinner says 
was notable during the 1920s.
20
  
 During the 1940s the Council on African Affairs (CAA) was the most significant 
American organization focused on Africa. The CAA was founded in 1937, and was the vehicle 
through which radical African American leaders Paul Robeson and WEB DuBois collected funds 
for African liberation groups and organized demonstrations in hopes of influencing U.S. policy 
towards Africa. The CAA was shaped both by pan-Africanist thought and by Robeson’s belief 
that anti-colonial freedom movements were inextricably linked to class struggle, a stance that led 
Robeson to seek coalitions with white workers and leftists worldwide. The CAA lobbied the 
United Nations to pass sanctions against South Africa in 1946, two years before apartheid was 
formalized. Also, in a 1946, New York meeting attended by 19,000 people, CAA rallied in 
support of a South African Miner’s strike and against the South African annexation of Namibia. 
Cold War hysteria soon began to undermine the influence of the CAA, however. The CAA was 
included in a list of subversive organizations in 1947, and the NAACP published an attack on the 
CAA in 1950. Robeson’s passport was withdrawn shortly thereafter, and the CAA collapsed. The 
disintegration of the CAA is indicative of the extent to which both the black and the white left in 
the United States was marginalized in the early Cold War years. In the immediate aftermath, 
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anti-apartheid leadership in the United States would have to come from liberals, many of whom 
were motivated by Christian beliefs.
21
 
In the early 1950s, the ANC began to call for black South Africans to reject the 
segregation laws of petty apartheid. These efforts coalesced into the Defiance Campaign of 1952; 
by this point the ANC had over 100,000 members and was under the leadership of Chief Albert 
Luthuli. Thousands of participants broke apartheid laws in the name of the campaign and were 
arrested.  In 1955, representatives from the ANC and other community groups met outside of 
Johannesburg and adopted a document called The Freedom Charter, which would serve as the 
general policy statement of the ANC in the coming decades. The Freedom Charter called for 
South Africa’s definition as a non racial society and was part of a campaign to enlist the 
participation of the black masses, as well as to gain support from the outside world. This 1955 
meeting was broken up by the police, who recorded the names of all the attendees. The following 
year police used this information to arrest 156 leaders, who would be spend the next five years 
battling accusations of treason in court. The government also responded to the Freedom Charter 
by intensifying censorship.
22
  
Since anti-apartheid protest from the left had been silenced in the U.S. by anti-
communism, African American liberals formed Americans for South African Resistance 
(ASFAR) in 1952 to show support for the ANC’s Defiance Campaign. In 1954, ASFAR was 
renamed the American Committee on Africa (ACOA). The ACOA would serve as a critical link 
between African liberation movements and American activists, and would play a crucial role in 
the development of a mass American anti-apartheid movement over the following thirty-five 
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years. In 1957 Martin Luther King Jr joined the ACOA as a member of its national committee, 
and George Houser served as the Executive Director of the ACOA from 1955-1981. The 
character of the organization reflected Houser’s roots in the domestic civil rights movement and 
his commitment to nonviolent direct action. Founded during the height of the McCarthy era, the 
ACOA sought support from a racially integrated cohort of pacifists and liberal internationalists 
and walked a fine line to avoid the kind of attacks from the U.S. government that had brought 
down the CAA.
23
  
In 1959, tensions between the ANC leadership and a group of members who favored a 
strictly African (as opposed to multiracial) liberation movement led to the formation of the Pan-
Africanist Congress (PAC) under the leadership of Robert Sobukwe. When the ANC planned a 
mass demonstration against South Africa’s pass laws during the spring of 1960, the PAC tried to 
grab the momentum by planning its own protest for a week earlier on March 21. The PAC’s 
influence across South Africa wasn’t extensive, and in most towns the demonstrations were 
small and uneventful. However, in the small town of Sharpeville, where the PAC had focused 
most of their organizing efforts, about 5,000 protestors showed up at the police station. When a 
scuffle broke out, police began to fire into the crowd at short range. They continued shooting as 
the crowd ran away, shooting many people in the back. Sixty-nine people were killed, and 180 
were injured in what became known in the worldwide media as the Sharpeville Massacre.
24
  
Black South Africans responded to this outrage with demonstrations and strikes 
throughout the country. 50,000 people attended a funeral for the victims on a national day of 
mourning, and strikes shut down most major cities. ANC president, Chief Albert Luthuli burned 
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his passbook, inspiring thousands of South Africans to follow suit. The South African 
government responded by declaring a state of emergency, followed by brutal police raids, and it 
showed an increased willingness to detain people without trial. Perhaps most significantly, the 
government passed the Unlawful Organizations Act in early April, which banned the ANC and 
the PAC. The Sharpeville Massacre and the ensuing unrest was a critical turning point in the 
South African liberation movement. ANC leaders became convinced that nonviolent passive 
resistance would not end apartheid in South Africa. The ANC leaders believed that the South 
African government’s willingness to resort to violence and suspend the rule of law necessitated a 
new approach. The ANC established a militant wing called Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), which 
began to engage in acts of sabotage by bombing post offices, and other government buildings, as 
well as rail lines and electrical installments. Within several years, however, the MK had been 
infiltrated, and most of the ANC leadership was in exile or imprisoned.
25
  
The Sharpeville Massacre was also a watershed moment in South Africa’s relationship 
with the international community. In Great Britain and elsewhere in Europe, the boycott 
movement against South Africa intensified. On March 25, 1960 African and Asian member state 
petitioned the United Nations Security council to condemn South Africa for the massacre. The 
Council passed a resolution which condemned the violence and called for the South African 
government to abandon the policies of apartheid. The United States Ambassador to the UN, 
Henry Cabot Lodge II voted in favor of the resolution. Later that year, John F Kennedy was 
elected president, and it seemed that U.S. policy towards Africa might change for the better. Any 
changes proved to be mostly superficial, however, as the South African government continued to 
be seen as an important U.S. ally in the fight against communism for decades to come.
26
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Outrage over the Sharpeville massacre, as well as excitement over the increasing rapidity 
of decolonization in Africa, contributed to growing pan-Africanism and black nationalism within 
the United States in the early 1960s. A new generation of activists took a more serious interest in 
the history and culture of Africa. While some liberal African American activists found the shift 
towards black nationalism troubling, a diverse group of leaders, including liberals, radicals and 
black nationalists, came together to form the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa 
(ANCLA) in 1962. The media compared the conference to previous pan-Africanist gatherings, 
such as the 1919 pan-Africanist conference organized by WEB DuBois. The leaders at the 
ANCLA consciously emphasized the links between the American civil rights struggle and the 
independence movements in Africa. The conference focused on increasing the role of African 
Americans in shaping U.S. policy towards Africa, and apartheid in South Africa was a key aspect 
of the conference agenda. The ANCLA presented Martin Luther King Jr’s and Chief Albert 
Luthuli’s joint “Appeal for Action Against Apartheid” which “called on the U.S. government to 
support United Nations sanctions against South Africa; to impose a total arms embargo, and to 
discourage public and private investment in the regime.”27 
In fall of 1962, African nations presented the UN General Assembly with a sanctions 
resolution that the General Assembly passed with a large majority. The United States, under 
President Kennedy, refused to endorse the sanctions. Anti-apartheid leaders around the world 
were outraged and disappointed, and U.S. diplomatic relations with African countries became 
increasingly strained. President Kennedy did endorse a voluntary arms embargo on South Africa 
at the UN, and imposed a ban on the sale of U.S. military supplies to South Africa. This decision 
drew criticism from many members of the U.S. State Department, but was considered too little 
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too late by most African nations and anti-apartheid activists. The ACOA continued to urge the 
United States to pass comprehensive sanctions against South Africa and to support the existing 
UN resolutions. After failing to influence U.S. government policy, in 1966 the ACOA began a 
campaign which focused on U.S. banks that provided loans to South Afrca. The group urged 
individuals and organizations to withdraw funds from banks with close financial ties to South 
Africa. This effort was a precursor to the more widespread divestment campaigns of the 1980s.
28
 
By the mid 1960s both Malcolm X and Martin Luther King Jr were increasingly 
influenced by pan-Africanism, and both became more vocal on African issues. In 1964 Malcolm 
X twice traveled to Africa and spoke at the Organization of African Unity Conference. There, he 
urged African leaders to bring up American racial discrimination at the United Nations. Malcolm 
and young American activists were impatient with the ability of the old tactics of marches and 
peaceful demonstrations to yield further change, particularly in the Northern United States. He 
worked to build connections between black Americans and Africans through travel and study. 
Inspired by Malcolm’s advice, a group of SNCC workers also traveled to Africa during 1964. 
The group included Atlantans John Lewis and Julian Bond, and all the participants emphasized 
what a profound impact the trip had on their consciousness. By 1964 even King became 
sympathetic to the necessity of the armed struggle in South Africa, noting that South Africans 
did not have the protection of the Constitution that organizers in the American South relied upon. 
In 1965, King made an important speech on Africa at the Human Rights Day Rally in New York 
where he emphasized the connections between the American civil rights movement and the 
South African anti-apartheid struggle. King’s increasing radicalism coincided with the rising 
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popularity of black power groups in the United States and of the emergence of black 
consciousness in South Africa.
29
 
As SNCC and the Black Panthers adopted “third world ideology” and anti-imperialism, it 
became more difficult for white and multiracial organizations, like the ACOA to collaborate with 
them in the anti-apartheid struggle. These developments and tensions emerged at the same time 
that the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa filled the vacuum created by the 
banning of the ANC and the PAC. In 1969, Stephen Biko founded the South African Students’ 
Association (SASO). Biko and his fellow students were inspired by the Black Power movement 
in the United States, and intended for SASO to facilitate a renewal of black activism and pride 
throughout South Africa. Biko and his counterparts were deeply admired by the students of 
Soweto who would rise up in 1976. While the emergence of Black Consciousness in South 
Africa inspired radical African American anti-apartheid activists, at the end of the 1960s, many 
progressive Americans felt despair as they reflected on the recent assassinations of Malcolm X, 
King and Robert Kennedy.
30
  
One of the greatest successes of the American civil rights movement was the post 1965 
election of hundreds of African American officials at various levels of government. As more 
African Americans began winning election to the U.S. House of Representatives in the late 
1960s, they believed that their causes would benefit from creating a formal alliance. The 
Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) was initially founded and led by Charles Diggs, who also 
served as the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa in 1969. Diggs made apartheid a 
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major priority, and the CBC would take a leading role in anti-apartheid activism when the 
movement became more mainstream in the late 1970s.
31
 
If the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 became a watershed moment in the history of 
resistance to apartheid, the Soweto uprising of 1976 and the violent response of the South Africa 
government, must be viewed as a an equally important turning point. In early 1976, government 
officials announced that they would begin enforcement of an old law that required fifty percent 
of students’ courses to be taught in Afrikaans (previously most courses were taught in English). 
Standardized tests would also be administered in Afrikaans. Students were upset about the 
change, both because most of them had only limited knowledge of the language, and because 
they hated Afrikaans, and considered it the language of the oppressors. This shift fueled an 
already volatile situation. In Soweto, the townships southwest of Johannesburg, schools were 
horribly overcrowded. Government officials intentionally did not build additional schools in 
order to encourage children to leave Soweto and return to the homelands for an education. 
Estimates suggested that in 1975, 35,000 children in Soweto did not attend school at all.
32
 
After several weeks of walk outs and small demonstrations, on June 16 thousands of high 
school students and younger children gathered for a mass rally. Police threw tear gas canisters 
into the crowd, but the students refused to disperse. A policeman began to fire his revolver into 
the crowd at short range. A thirteen-year old boy named Hector Petersen was the first to die. 
While some of the children ran away, many held their ground and began to throw rocks at the 
police force. Mass chaos broke out; many government buildings were burned to the ground, and 
police behaved as if the area was a war zone. When students lit schools on fire, police shot at 
them. While two whites were killed by rioters, at least 176 black youths were killed. Extreme, 
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widespread violence lasted for weeks after the initial incident and spread throughout much of the 
country. Workers all around South Africa went on strike in support of the students. As they did 
in the aftermath of Sharpeville, the government again responded to the disturbances by banning 
resistance organizations and arresting and detaining thousands of protestors. In August 1977, 
police arrested Steve Biko for the third time that year. The following month, Biko died a slow 
and brutal death at the hands of interrogating prison guards.
33
 
Concerned observers around the world were shocked and horrified by Biko’s murder and 
the widespread violence. In the United States the Congressional Black Caucus formed 
TransAfrica, a group to lobby to shape U.S. foreign policy towards Africa. According to 
historian, Francis Nesbitt, “TransAfrica would become the most important lobby for Africa and 
the Caribbean ever created by African Americans. Its emergence marked a turning point in the 
anti-apartheid movement and signaled the coming of age of African Americans in foreign policy. 
Like the Council on African Affairs, TransAfrica combined educational and direct-action 
techniques to influence foreign policy.” The key differences between the CAA and TransAfrica 
allowed TransAfrica to have much greater longevity and influence than did its predecessor. 
While the CAA was a black radical organization, TransAfrica was shaped by liberal African 
Americans. Further, TransAfrica benefited from a higher level of black consciousness that had 
emerged by the 1970s, as well as the from the fruits of the civil rights movement, which resulted 
in a significant African American presence in Congress. TransAfrica’s would later be the force 
behind the launching of the Free South Africa Movement of 1984.
34
 
Calls for U.S. companies to withdraw from South Africa also heated up. Rev. Leon 
Sullivan, a Baptist preacher, civil rights leader and African American businessman, had an 
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alternative idea. During the 1970s, Sullivan was on the General Motors board of directors. From 
1971 to 1975, every year at the annual board meeting, Sullivan advocated that General Motors 
should withdraw from South Africa. The other board members refused to act. In 1975 Sullivan 
began to reconsider his demands. He decided to focus on workplace reforms rather than on 
corporate withdrawal. In March of 1977, Sullivan announced his “Statement of Principles of 
U.S. Firms with Affiliates in the Republic of South Africa.” The statements called for non-
segregation of workplace facilities, equal pay and fair employment practices, training programs 
that would prepare non-whites for supervisory position and technical jobs, increasing the number 
of non-whites in management positions, and making efforts to improve employees’ lives in areas 
outside the work environment.  Sullivan initially persuaded twelve companies to sign on, and 
many more would follow suit in the coming years.
35
 
Critics immediately pointed out the flaws in the Sullivan Principles. The ACOA called 
the principles “an exercise in triviality.” The principles did not call for any fundamental change 
in South African society; they did not address the fact that black South Africans had no political 
rights. Anti-apartheid leaders believed that American corporate presence in South Africa could 
have no positive impact. Many critics believed over the following years that the Sullivan 
Principles served as a distraction that took momentum away from efforts to convince American 
corporations to withdraw from South Africa. Other weaknesses of the Principles included the 
fact that there was no enforcement method, and that American companies in South Africa were 
subject to the laws of the land, and thus limited in the kinds of changes they could promote. 
Eventually over 140 companies signed the Sullivan Principles, and seven different task groups 
did gather and report information about compliance. However, by 1985 even Reverend Sullivan 
began to question the efficacy of the principles. In 1987, Sullivan made a public statement to the 
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media, acknowledging that after ten years of implementation, the principles had not influenced 
the South African government. As a result, he too began to call for immediate and full corporate 
withdrawal from South Africa.
36
  
President Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980, as well as the Republican takeover of the 
U.S. Senate, alarmed anti-apartheid activists. Soon after his election, Reagan appointed Chester 
Crocker as the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Crocker believed that the hostile 
language that the Carter administration had used towards the South African government only 
served to alienate the white South African leaders and to discourage the government’s 
willingness to gradually dismantle apartheid. With these beliefs in mind, Crocker created the 
Constructive Engagement policy. Constructive Engagement would involve friendly dialogue 
with between government representatives and a reduction of punitive measures, such as 
international sanctions. Once trust was regained, Washington could gently influence Pretoria 
towards gradual change.
37
  
J.E. Davies’ Constructive Engagement? Chester Crocker and American Policy in South 
Africa, Namibia and Angola, 1981-1988 analyzes both the explicit and the implicit aims of 
Crocker’s policies and provides a critique of the failures of Constructive Engagement. Although 
Crocker claimed that “persuading Pretoria away from apartheid” was a priority for the U.S. 
government, Crocker’s true intentions were to “enable Washington to preserve its beneficial 
relationship with Pretoria without public or political embarrassment.” Crocker’s policies were 
flawed in several ways. Constructive Engagement demonstrated that Crocker “did 
not…appreciate the extent of the desperation and anger in the black community. His insistence 
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on gradual, white-led change infuriated the black population.”  He also underestimated the 
determination of the white population to hold onto their power by preserving minority rule. 
Constructive Engagement failed in both its explicit and implicit goals. The relationship between 
Washington and Pretoria must be understood within the Cold War context generally, and as an 
aspect of the Reagan Doctrine, specifically. Reagan called for vigorous containment of 
communism and South Africa was the United States’ chief African ally in this endeavor.38   
With the Reagan administration pursuing Constructive Engagement, anti-apartheid 
activists focused on convincing individual companies to withdraw from South Africa – a difficult 
challenge made even more so by the fact that companies could point to having signed the 
Sullivan Principles as a way to deflect criticism. 1980 also marked the beginning of increased 
collaboration among anti-apartheid groups. The ACOA, American Friends Service Committee, 
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, TransAfrica and others came together in late 1980 
to launch the Campaign Against Investment in South Africa. The coalition would convene a 
national conference on public investment in South Africa the following spring. Over 200 elected 
officials from across the country attended the event in New York City where they were joined by 
grassroots activists, religious leaders and scholars. Georgia State Senator and civil rights veteran 
Julian Bond addressed the group on the urgency of acting on the local, state and county levels in 
the face of a hostile federal government:  
Among all of us who are gathered here, there is a particular group: legislators and 
council members, who are here…because we are all sworn to uphold the public 
good. There could certainly be no greater good than the cause for which we 
gather...We are here to complete the process of halting American complicity in 
the most hideous government on the face of the planet…In less than six months, 
the new government of the U.S. reversed even the halting Africa policies of the 
Carter administration and has embarked on a course of arrogant intervention into 
African affairs in the most hostile way…America’s policies towards Africa have 
changed…from benign neglect to a kind of malignant aggression…Our cause is to 
                                                          
38
 Davies, Constructive Engagement?, 198-199. 
26 
 
take whatever action we can to end American complicity with this international 
problem. Our contribution is to…facilitate the expansion of public prohibitions 
against the expenditure of public funds from inhuman purposes. In short, we 
intend to end American investment in evil.
39
 
 
 Many state and municipal governments did respond to Bond’s calls for divestment, which 
means to sell stocks and bonds because of ethical motivations. College students also responded 
to calls for activism on behalf of divestment. A few institutions had begun to divest in the late 
1970s. In 1978, student activists at Princeton University staged a twenty-seven hour sit-in at the 
campus’s main administration building, demanding that the university divest. In the early 1980s 
though, calls for divestment on college campuses shifted from occasional, isolated events to a 
broad based action representing every region of the United States, and every type of institution of 
higher learning, public and private. As historian of U.S.-South African relations Robert Massie 
writes, “More and more institutions came to view the question of divestment in South Africa not 
as something that the U.S. government should decide, but as a topic that could and should be 
discussed by the thousands of universities and other nonprofit institutions around the country.” 
Most universities came to this conclusion only under pressure from students. According to 
Massie, “Many of the students involved in the divestment debate came to see that their education 
was not only about courses and teachers, but about he structure of the institution itself, about its 
goals and values, its purpose and principles. Education, in other words, went beyond acquiring 
skills for personal advancement and encompassed understanding and creating a moral 
community.”40 
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Sociologist Sarah Soule published two articles and a dissertation in the 1990s that 
examine anti-apartheid activism on American college campuses, focusing on the popular tactic 
of building shantytowns in public spaces on campus in order to increase awareness of living 
conditions in South Africa and to convince their respective colleges to “divest of South-Africa 
related securities.” Between 1985 and 1987 divestment policies suddenly and rapidly spread 
across the country as seventy-five colleges agreed to divest in South Africa related companies. 
According to Soule, universities divested to “protect their public image as progressive and 
socially responsible.” Soule’s 1997 article, “The Student Divestment Movement in the United 
States and Tactical Diffusion: The Shantytown Protest,” discusses the way that an innovative 
method of protest spread among college campuses in the US. Beginning with Cornell University 
in 1985, student activists constructed shantytowns on campuses. Soule argues that the tactic 
spread among colleges of similar size and prestige. She explains that “social movement activists 
do not have to reinvent the wheel at each place and in each conflict. Rather, they often find 
inspiration elsewhere in the ideas and tactics espoused and practiced by other activists.”41 
In an article published two years later, Soule again discusses the shantytowns built on 
American college campuses during the mid 1980s. In “The Diffusion of an Unsuccessful 
Innovation,” Soule argues that the shantytowns were not effective at encouraging university 
divestment and examines the reasons why this tactic spread despite the lack of success. Soule 
explains that “colleges and universities that had shantytowns actually had slower rates of 
divestment than those that did not have them.” Soule does not suggest reasons for this trend, but 
rather focuses on why such an unsuccessful protest tactic spread so widely among student 
activists throughout the United States. Soule argues that the diffusion of the shantytowns was a 
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result of two factors. First, the mainstream media consistently made connections between the 
shantytowns and university divestment. Thus, the student activists believed that this method of 
protest was successfully influencing university policy. Second, the construction of shantytowns 
was compatible with student activist experience, as “the shantytown tactic evolved from the 
familiar tactic of the sit-in…that had been used on campuses in the US since the civil rights 
movement.”42 
 During 1984, resistance to apartheid within South Africa intensified. In 1984 the South 
African government introduced a new constitution that allowed for political participation by 
Indians and Coloureds, but not by black South Africans. The new constitution triggered 
widespread rebellion, as opponents of the apartheid system viewed the constitutional change as a 
way to co-opt the country’s minority groups and halt the momentum for completely 
overthrowing the apartheid regime. The grassroots rebellions coalesced into a new anti-apartheid 
organization called the United Democratic Front (UDF). The establishment of the UDF created a 
new political space for opposing apartheid, while rebellions and violence escalated. In September 
1984, the United Nations General Assembly voted unanimously to condemn a spree of political 
arrests in South Africa, but the United States abstained from voting, once again protecting the 
apartheid regime. In November of that year, President Reagan was reelected by an overwhelming 
majority, a major blow to American anti-apartheid activists, as well as black South Africans.
43
 
 In November 1984, the same month that Reagan won reelection, Randall Robinson, 
President of TransAfrica, was arrested at the South African embassy in Washington D.C., along 
with U.S. Congressman, Walter Fauntroy, and U.S. Civil Rights Commission member, Mary 
                                                          
42
 Sarah A. Soule. “The Diffusion of an Unsuccessful Innovation.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 566 (November 1999), 120-133. See also Bradford Martin, The Other Eighties: A Secret History of 
America in the Age of Reagan (New York: Hill and Wang, 2011). 
43
 Nesbitt, Race for Sanctions, 124. 
29 
 
Frances Berry. Robinson, Berry and Fauntroy met with the South African ambassador and 
demanded the immediate release of all political prisoners. They refused to leave the premises 
until their demands had been met.  The ambassador called the police, and Fauntroy, Robinson 
and Berry spent the night in jail. The next day, Fauntroy and Robinson announced that they 
intended to launch a national campaign, which was called the Free South Africa Movement. The 
prospect of four more years of a hostile federal government led by Reagan necessitated the 
change in strategy and convinced anti-apartheid leaders that it was time to begin using more 
confrontational tactics. Five days later, on November 26, 1984 a second group of demonstrators, 
including Rev. Joseph Lowery of the SCLC were arrested at the South African embassy.
44
  
 The leaders of the Free South Africa Movement planned for the demonstrations to go on 
indefinitely, and thus limited the number of participants to three a day. Celebrities, politicians, 
academics and other volunteers were arrested at the South African embassy on a daily basis. The 
arrests received substantial coverage in the press and soon spread to other cities throughout the 
United States. The sit-ins recalled the days of the civil rights movement, and attracted a large and 
diverse coalition of supporters.  According to David Hostetter, “Linking grassroots 
demonstrations to foreign policy legislation is a difficult and delicate business,” but the Free 
South Africa Movement saw remarkable success with this difficult task. The demonstrations 
coincided with increased violence within South Africa and even caught the attention of many 
Republicans in Congress.
45
 
 In 1985, the U.S. Congress passed a mild anti-apartheid bill which would have banned 
new loans to South Africa as well as ended federal subsidies to companies that did not support 
the Sullivan Principles. While this bill had support from a third of the Republicans in the House, 
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Reagan preempted it by signing an executive order in September of 1985 that banned the sale of 
U.S. computers to South Africa and the importation of Krugerrands. According to historian 
Francis Nesbitt, “Most of these actions were superfluous and clearly designed to save face for the 
White House and forestall congressional action.”  Members of the Congressional Black Caucus 
and anti-apartheid activists nationwide were disgusted by President Reagan’s scheme to avoid a 
showdown with Congress. Six months later, Congress again considered stronger anti-apartheid 
legislation when Democratic Representative Ron Dellums introduced a bill that required the 
United States to sever all ties with South Africa’s apartheid regime. The House passed Dellum’s 
version of the bill, but the Senate passed a more moderate piece of legislation. The House 
accepted a compromise bill in anticipation of Reagan’s veto. Reagan did indeed veto the bill. 
Congress overrode the veto with the support of thirty-one Republicans in the Senate, and eighty-
one Republicans in the House, along with an overwhelming majority of Democrats. This 
outcome was a major blow for the Reagan administration, and particularly significant in that 
Congress almost never overrides a Presidential veto on matters of foreign policy.
46
 
 To explain how the United States came to pass this legislation against the apartheid 
regime, Audie Klotz, author of Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against 
Apartheid, analyzes U.S. policy towards South Africa as well. Klotz argues that political 
theorists who assume “that individual states will circumvent sanctions in pursuit of economic 
gain” have been short-sighted in only acknowledging material costs and benefits. Klotz suggests 
that social benefits can accrue from supporting an international norm, such as racial equality.  
Klotz calls for more weight to be given to such norms: “a norm of racial equality plays crucial 
roles in defining identity and interest, rather than simply functioning as a weak constraint on 
more fundamental strategic or economic interests.” Traditionally weak, non-state actors in the 
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United States, were ultimately able to force the United States government to adopt sanctions 
against South Africa through their grassroots antiapartheid activism, and because of the salience 
of the global norm of racial equality.
47
 
 In United States Relations With South Africa: A Critical Overview from the Colonial 
Period to the Present, Y.G-M. Lulat provides a detailed account of the events leading up to the 
passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, as well as thorough analysis of what the Act 
did and did not do. The Act prohibited trade in most commodities between the U.S. and South 
Africa as well as new loans to and investments in both the government and the private sectors of 
South Africa. The Act stipulated that sanctions would not be removed until Nelson Mandela and 
other political prisoners were released, the state of emergency was repealed, the cornerstones of 
apartheid were removed, and negotiations with black leaders had begun. While Lulat 
acknowledges that some antiapartheid activists were disappointed that the Act did not go further, 
the passage of this legislation was still significant. The effects of the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1986, coupled with the impact of corporate disinvestments, and the passage of 
sanctions against South Africa by many countries around the world, began to have a serious 
effect on the stability of the South African economy.
48
  
 In the years following passage of the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, violence 
and rebellion continued in South Africa in the face of state sanctioned oppression. On the other 
hand, within the United States, fervor for continued action against the South African government 
waned. For a decade the movement had been focused on sanctions and divestment, with those 
goals achieved (for the most part), the anti-apartheid movement within the United States stalled. 
Lulat blames the movment’s faltering on the relative weakness of the U.S. antiapartheid 
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movement as a whole, which can be attributed to a combination of racism, ignorance, the weak 
foreign policy role of black Americans, the media strength of conservative forces and a lack of 
coordination between various activist groups. South Africa’s transition to democracy began 
under President FW de Klerk with the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners in 
1990. Mandela’s release and his subsequent travels in the United States will be discussed in my 
conclusion.  
 
PLAN OF DISSERATTION 
 My research focuses on the way that the unique history of Atlanta shaped that city’s 
response to the crisis in South Africa during the 1980s. This dissertation explores the ways that 
educational institutions, city government, transnational activist organizations, corporations, and 
local civil rights groups in Atlanta responded to the mounting crisis in South Africa during the 
1980s. With its central place in the American civil rights movement, Atlanta enabled 
experienced activists to borrow language, tactics and approaches from earlier decades of 
activism in their campaign against South African apartheid. No other study on anti-apartheid 
activism has examined an individual city as the nexus where local, national, and transnational 
organizations and tactics intersect and interact. While the anti-apartheid movement was 
constructed on a global scale, in any given locality that transnational movement must intersect 
with a variety of unique political, social and economic forces. During the 1980s this international 
human rights movement collided with a local political regime in Atlanta in which African 
American politicians eagerly partnered with corporate interests. Examining this moment in 
Atlanta’s history sheds light on the way that diverse groups jockeyed to shape metro-Atlanta’s 
political identity on both a local and a global scale.  
33 
 
Examining the overlap, cooperation, and competition between groups with varying 
organizational scales and focuses contributes to the broader literature on social movements. 
Often times, scholars writing about transnational social movements tend to lose sight of local 
dynamics. At the same time, Historians or Sociologists who examine movement building on a 
local level may not acknowledge the extent to which local actors are influenced by transnational 
organizations and national leaders. My project seeks to rectify this shortcoming in the context of 
one social movement in one city.  
34 
 
CHAPTER 1: ATLANTA’S UNIVERSITIES CONFRONT APARTHEID 
This chapter will discuss and compare the responses of the Atlanta University Center 
campuses, Georgia State University and Emory University to the crisis in South Africa during 
the 1980s. I use student publications, local newspapers, university archival records, and oral 
history interviews to reconstruct a timeline of events at these Atlanta universities when the 
intensity of resistance in South Africa increased to a point where the country was almost 
ungovernable and a simultaneous mainstream, nation-wide, anti-apartheid movement emerged in 
the United States. In Atlanta, the wide variety of universities, meant a wide range of responses to 
the crisis of South African apartheid. Internal dynamics at each institution shaped the type of 
student activism found on campus. 
Anti-apartheid activism on college and university campuses generally tended to focus on 
the role played by institutions of higher learning in maintaining or condemning the apartheid 
state, specifically in regards to university investments. Between 1985 and 1987 divestment 
policies suddenly and rapidly spread across the country as seventy-five colleges agreed to divest 
in South Africa related companies. Divestment means to sell stocks and bonds because of ethical 
motivations, and universities chose to divest to maintain their reputations as progressive and 
socially responsible institutions. This decade of activism culminated with a significant victory 
for Atlanta’s student activists when the Georgia Board of Regents – the governing body for the 
state university system – elected to divest its holdings under pressure from Student Coalition 
Against Apartheid and Racism.
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University students in Atlanta participated in campus protest that had much in common 
with the activism found at colleges throughout the Northeast and Midwest as described by Sarah 
Soule and Bradford Martin. Both of these scholars have analyzed the divestment movement on 
American college campuses during the 1980s. Soule, a sociologist, examines the popular tactic 
of building shantytowns in public spaces on campus in order to increase awareness of living 
conditions in South Africa and to convince educational institutions to divest. Soule argues that 
the construction of the shantytowns shared much in common with the sit-ins of the civil rights 
movement, and her analysis seeks to demonstrate the ways that such tactics diffuse between 
activists who are not necessarily in direct communication with one another. Martin emphasizes 
the extent to which the building of the shanties on campuses contested public space, which he 
views as a legacy of the 1960s campus free speech movement at the University of California.
50
 
The Atlanta University Center is the largest consortium of historically black colleges in 
the United States. During the 1970s and 1980s this consortium included Clark College, 
Morehouse College, Spelman College, and Atlanta University, a graduate school. In several 
ways anti-apartheid activism on the Atlanta University Center campuses differed from the 
campus anti-apartheid movements as they are generally perceived to have occurred throughout 
the United States. First, as early as the late 1970s student activists in Atlanta University’s 
Political Science Department were actively protesting South African apartheid, in contrast with 
most white American college students who would awaken to the situation in South Africa until 
the mid 1980s. Second and most significantly, while most campus protest nation-wide focused 
on university policies generally and divestment specifically, the student activists at the Atlanta 
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University Center looked beyond their campuses to participate in and influence the anti-apartheid 
movement emerging in various segments of Atlanta. 
 Throughout the 1970s Atlanta University Political Science Department graduate 
students, under the leadership of department chair Mack Jones, worked to bring attention to 
Southern African issues. One such student, Earl Picard, explained that he and his colleagues held 
a weekly “Black Issues Forum,” which focused on a specific topic for debate and discussion and 
hosted guest speakers. Picard said that Southern African issues probably made up about twenty 
percent of the issues discussed at the forum. Picard and his fellow graduate students handed out 
leaflets advertising the weekly events to undergraduate students. Attendance varied, and 
although sometimes the group would attract up to forty attendees, Picard said participation was 
never what they hoped it would be. At the same time that Picard worked to raise awareness 
among students, he attended meetings with leaders such as Joseph Lowery and Coretta Scott 
King to discuss the possibility of mounting protests against the presence in South Africa of both 
the Coca Cola Company and M&M products, a black owned hair-care company.
51
  
Throughout the 1980s, Atlanta University Center-based activists continued to engage 
with other socially aware Atlantans. Dr. Mack Jones and Father Issac Miller of the campus 
Episcopalian ministry, Canterbury House, established the South Africa Support Group by 1982 
which worked with local government officials, representatives from the African National 
Congress, and well known civil rights activists, including Julian Bond, John Lewis and Lowery 
to organize teach ins in both AUC classrooms and local public schools, as well as public rallies 
and workshops. Later, Jones became the co-chair of the Georgia Coalition for Divestment in 
South Africa which would become the primary anti-apartheid organization in Atlanta by the mid 
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1980s. Another Atlanta University Political Science graduate student, Adolph Reed, was deeply 
involved with the African Liberation Support Committee throughout the 1970s.
52
  
In July of 1985, AUC students moved to found a chapter of the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference on campus. This move was inspired by the crisis in South Africa, and 
SCLC representative, Rev Timothy McDonald, sought to explain to students the connections 
between South Africa’s apartheid policies and domestic racial oppression in the United States: 
“There are miners in Alabama who are unemployed because U.S. companies are buying cheaper 
coal from South Africa. And imagine the jobs that would be available for American workers if 
companies like GM, Coca Cola, Ford and others would close their South African plants.” In 
August 1985, the SCLC, along with the Young Democrats cosponsored an anti-apartheid prayer 
vigil at Morehouse, which was attended by nearly 2,000 students.
53
  
In October AUC students continued their relationship with the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference when that organization launched a protest against grocery store chain, 
Winn Dixie for selling of South African products. Among the Clark College students who 
participated in the picketing was Student Government Association President, Kevin Houston, 
who in the Clark College Panther stated: “Winn Dixie has been very blatant in their racism…In 
addition to having South African products in their stores, Winn Dixie has fewer than 100 black 
managers in approximately 1,200 stores.” This protest was considered significant enough to 
warrant coverage in the student newspapers of each Morehouse, Clark and Spelman Colleges. 
The following month students established the Atlanta University Center Students Against 
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Apartheid (AUCSAA) with the goal of educating students as well as the general public about the 
issues of apartheid.
54
  
The Atlanta University Consortium also participated in global social movement networks 
by hosting numerous South African leaders on campus and by publishing articles by leading 
activists in student newspapers. For example, February 1986, Randall Robinson and Walter 
Fauntroy, among others co-authored an article titled “Putting Our Country on the Right Side of 
History,” which appeared in Morehouse Tiger newspaper and explained the goals and methods 
of the newly formed Free South Africa Movement based in Washington, DC.
55
 By the following 
year, Leah Tutu, wife of Bishop Desmond Tutu, Reverend Allan Boesak, president of the United 
Democratic Front, and Oliver Tambo, president of the ANC had all visited campus to speak 
and/or receive honorary degrees. Granting these anti-apartheid leaders honorary degrees 
provided a highly visible platform from which the activists were able to address the American 
public.
56
 
On April 26, 1986, the Spelman board of trustees voted to divest from companies doing 
business in South Africa. The decision came as a result of student pressure, which continued 
even after Spelman officials had decided to sell stock in corporations that did not support the 
Sullivan Principles. Spelman sophomore, Yolanda Williams commented, “Had it not been for 
our expressions of dismay with Spelman dealing with racist companies…I don’t think today’s 
action would have happened…We definitely played an important role in the decision.” While 
some Spelman students patted themselves on the back for the work they had done, board 
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chairman Marian Wright Edelman worried about the financial ramifications for the college’s 
endowment. Other campus activists continued to voice their opinions after the divestment 
decision. In October of 1986, Spelman members of Delta Sigma Theta Sorority launched Project 
South Africa, a week-long event that included the construction of a shantytown and ended with a 
“well attended” vigil. Building a shantytown on campus after a divestment decision had already 
been made was certainly not the typical order of events among college anti-apartheid activists. 
However, the continued action on Spelman’s campus after divestment demonstrates an example 
of AUC students looking beyond their campus borders to the broader issues of injustice in South 
Africa. Instead of losing interest in the apartheid issue after Spelman divested, students 
continued to work to build awareness of racial injustice in South Africa.
57
 
 Meanwhile, Georgia State University had a very different campus culture from that of the 
Atlanta University Center just two miles away. During the 1980s, GSU was a large commuter 
campus serving approximately 21,000 students, many of whom were non-traditional and/or night 
students. While Spelman and other college campuses around the country became host to shanty-
towns and other indicators of student activists calling for University divestment from companies 
doing business in South Africa, Georgia State’s Student Government Association balked at the 
notion of such activity. Student activist Dwayne Redding commented,  
“Georgia State has never had a lot of students that were involved. I think because 
it’s an urban campus, and people really just scheduled classes around their work 
schedules…At that time, I think that a lot of students were involved (in student 
government) to build their resumes. They really didn’t have an interest in the 
issues…So that was kind of the mood of the campus; Georgia State was never 
really a hotbed of activism.”58 
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In April of 1985, GSU’s night student body vice president, Doris Taggart, did sponsor a 
resolution calling for the university to disclose all financial investments over $10,000; the list of 
investments would then be compared to a list of companies doing business in South Africa. The 
resolution was defeated in the student senate. Student senators expressed various reasons for 
opposing the resolution, including the thought that the senate should “not mix in international 
politics.”59 
 Undeterred by her unsupportive colleagues, Taggart returned with another resolution just 
over a week later. This time, in a nine-to-six vote the senate approved a her proposal to hold two 
referendums in which students would express their views on South Africa. The first would ask 
whether students supported a measure to call upon the University to disclose information on 
business transactions and investments. The second question asked students whether they 
supported or opposed divestment if indeed the University did have investments in South Africa. 
Despite the approval of the referendum from the Senate, six senators still voiced their opposition. 
One of them, Sarah King, who voted against the referendum, argued that since most students 
probably would not vote in the referendum, the results would not accurately reflect the wishes of 
the student population: “If it does go through, it could be national news, and I think it would be 
terrible if the vote didn’t accurately represent the student body.” King went on to reference the 
student protests and sit-ins occurring at other schools: “I wouldn’t want people to think of 
Georgia State the way I think of Columbia University.” Another student senator opposed to the 
referendum voiced the fatalistic opinion that “I don’t really think there is anything that we, as 
students can do about apartheid.” 60 
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 In the two weeks between the time that the referendum was approved and the scheduled 
vote occurred, Taggart and her supporters formed the GSU Coalition for Divestment and 
launched an educational campaign to inform students of the realities of apartheid South Africa. 
Additionally, several articles appeared in the Signal both supporting and condemning 
divestment. A letter to the editor by Brian Bowman presented the typical Cold War era argument 
that the United States must continue to support the apartheid government of South Africa 
because “South Africa is the only country which is even moderately pro-Western in the bottom 
third of the African continent.” Bowman argued that South Africa human rights violations are 
not as severe as those occurring in the Communist Soviet Union. Bowman concluded by stating 
that the United States cannot expect South Africa to change overnight, and that Americans 
should not dictate to South Africans what they should do.
61
 The following issue of The Signal 
included a rebuttal from Assistant Professor of History, Hugh Hudson. Hudson’s editorial was 
the first indication of the leading role that faculty would take in Georgia State’s anti-apartheid 
activism. Hudson refuted Bowman’s claims that the apartheid government of South Africa was 
not as brutal as the dictatorships in the Soviet Union, and goes on to argue that “Supporting 
Hitler, or South African imitators, is not necessary to preserve America. Allying oneself with 
Nazis is a poor way to defend democracy.”62 
 When the referendum occurred in late April 1985, the referendum passed with sixty 
percent of the vote, despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that only five percent of students 
participated. The bill called for “disclosure of Georgia state University’s and the Board of 
Regents’ transactions with banks and corporations doing business with South Africa,” as well as 
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disclosure of the Georgia Teacher’s Retirement Fund and to divest in all companies doing 
business in South Africa.
63
 
 In the six months that followed the referendum, The Signal published multiple articles 
and editorials on South Africa and divestment in almost every issue. The articles portrayed the 
wide range of opinion among students at Georgia State. Much of the coverage depicted the 
ongoing tension between students attempting to organize for divestment and the Student 
Government Association.  In a May 21
st
 letter to the editor, Ronaldo Karunungan, leader of the 
Committee on Apartheid education, claims that the Student Government executive committee 
was “in favor of the status quo – a white minority rule in South Africa” and that SGA “has 
attempted to gag the committee on divestment.”64   
 Meanwhile, SGA president Danny King disbanded the Committee on Divestment 
because the Committee had seven members who were non-students (including history 
department faculty member Hugh Hudson, acting as co-chairman), as well as two students whose 
low grade point average did not leave them in good standing with the university. The feud 
escalated when the administration provided the requested list of business investments as 
requested by the referendum. Roger Miller, vice president for Financial Affairs, turned the list 
over to the SGA. The SGA refused to allow the Divestment Committee access to the list. Hudson 
explained that the divestment committee needed access to the list to facilitate research. In the 
report released by SGA explaining the reasons for the disbanding the Divestment Committee, 
SGA accused the Divestment committee members of having “strong opinions.”65  
 Following The Signal’s coverage of the disbanding of the Divestment Committee, several 
students wrote letters to the editor expressing concern that the SGA did not seem to be 
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complying with the mandate of the referendum. One student lamented, “On April 24, like so 
many others, I took time out to vote for student government officers. I was led to believe that this 
would lead to representation of the needs and wishes of the student body. Imagine my surprise 
then to learn that these officers are openly defying the will of the majority which voted them into 
office by effectively killing action on the divestment issue.” Again on July 9, in a guest editorial 
sponsored by the GSU Committee for Apartheid Education, the authors claimed that the SGA 
action failed to fulfill the mandate for action provided under the terms of the student referendum.  
The committee demanded that the SGA open dialogue with the Board of Regents and that the 
investments of the Teachers Retirement System be investigated. The apartheid education 
committee followed this editorial with an announcement that the organization would begin 
publishing its own newspaper, to be called “Rights and Freedoms.” The publishers of “Rights 
and Freedoms,” including Andee Goldstein suggested that progressive students at Georgia State 
needed an “alternate place to voice their opinions.”66 
 When the SGA finally made public the results of the requested list it turned out that 
Georgia State did more than $10,000 of business with ten South African-connected companies. 
However, GSU financial officers immediately responded that state purchasing laws prohibited 
any divestment action. Because the University was required to award contracts based on 
competitive bidding, Roger Miller, vice president of financial affairs, claimed, “If you’ve got a 
problem with (the state laws), then you’ll have to take it to the legislature.” This answer seemed 
to satisfy SGA president Danny King, who responded “Sooner or later you’ve got to realize that 
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all this research doesn’t matter – it’s not that relevant b/c the university can’t do anything…I 
don’t think the referendum mandated us to go out and try to change the laws.”67    
 Also in July of 1985, The Signal posted six passionate editorials from students debating 
whether divestment would lead to a “bloodbath” in South Africa. The first editorial, written by 
attacked the divestment movement and even suggests that the SGA went too far in its efforts to 
follow through with the requirements of the referendum. The writer began her editorial by saying 
“the issue of the divestment of Georgia State University’s holdings in South Africa seems to me 
a tired one.” She went on to criticize Georgia State students for wanting to follow the example of 
“more liberal Ivy league” institutions. This editorial editorial elicited strong responses from those 
in favor of divestment calling her statements, “inaccurate” and “offensive.”68 
 In the Fall of 1985, GSU student activists, recognizing the limited autonomy of 
University officials, became more active in pressing the state board of Regents to make the 
decision to divest. The Georgia State students were joined in this effort by representatives from 
seven other state schools, and the group planned to attend the Board of Regents’ monthly 
meetings to protest the state’s investments in South Africa. In November, the students were 
disappointed when the Board of Regents voted unanimously to continue its South African 
investment in companies that supported the Sullivan Principles. The Sullivan principles were an 
employment code that called for desegregation of the workplace, fair employment practices and 
equal pay. Although these goals were admirable, many black South African leaders as well as 
anti-apartheid activists worldwide, increasingly believed American companies should use their 
leverage to force fundamental change in South Africa and that their continued presence in South 
Africa only served to preserve the status quo. Furthermore, the extent to which the endorsers of 
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the Sullivan Principles actually abided by them in practice, remained questionable. With this 
background in mind, Goldstein wrote in The Signal, that “the Regents endorse apartheid by 
endorsing (the Sullivan) Principles.” He continued with the following question: “Is it not 
apparent that the Sullivan Principles, authored by a Board Member of a large investor in the 
South African economy, are a means by which apartheid can continue under a guise of concern 
and petty reform?”69  
 When Goldstein departed Georgia State, he handed the reins on the South Africa issue 
over to fellow student, Dwayne Redding. Redding established the GSU Student Coalition 
Against Apartheid and Racism (GSU-SCARR) and sought collaboration with students at 
campuses throughout the city and beyond. Redding reminisced, 
That’s how we got our strength. When we went to Emory, Emory may have had 
two or three students that were organizing on divestment issues; Georgia Tech 
was the same way; Clark AU the same way; Morehouse and Spelman, there were 
always not more than four students who were on the frontlines. We grew because 
we shared ideas; we shared information, and that was how we established our own 
camaraderie…The most important thing that helped us with the GSU anti-
apartheid piece was that we began to travel to conferences across the 
country…And when we went to those conferences oh my God, that was just like, 
our gas tank went from empty to full. We learned from other student activists and 
it was always the same scenario, opposition from the administration and only a 
handful of students who were fighting it…So we drew our strength from attending 
those national conferences in New York City, and we got the knowledge and the 
tactics and the strategies, and we shared those, and we began to employ those at 
Georgia State. And the administration didn’t know this b/c we were not 
funded…So they didn’t know that we were traveling. They had no way of 
knowing that we were traveling because we were traveling on our own dime….I 
loved it. It was everything. It was knowledge; it was tactics, it was camaraderie. 
We had so much information…We could tell you how much the California board 
of regents had, how much the Oregon board of regents had, it was organized. It 
was a well oiled machine.
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Redding and GSU SCAAR began hosting weekly rallies and marches at the Board of 
Regents Office demanding that the Regents divest from companies doing business in South 
Africa. During 1986, the Chair of the Board of Regents was Dr. Eldridge McMillan, the Board’s 
first African American chair. On December 10, 1986, under continued pressure the Board of 
Regents voted to sell its interests in all companies operating in South Africa. Redding recalled, 
“Eldridge called me, and said we’re meeting in January, and I want you to be there because we 
are going to divest. I was just ecstatic…a part of me could believe it, and a part of me couldn’t 
because during the course of that campaign we would attend the regents meetings, and they are 
basically telling us, we will never divest.” McMillan stated to The Signal, “I feel reasonably 
certain that in time the decision would have happened anyway, but its far to say that (the student 
group at Georgia State was) instrumental in moving it to the front burner.” In 2014, McMillan 
downplayed the decision,  
If my memory serves me correctly, it was not a big discussion or a big issue on 
the board. There were discussions and pleas and requests from student groups and 
other organizations that the board would do that, but I think the impetus was 
already in place. Several of the major corporations…had done it…so it was not 
virgin territory for the board…The whole business of divestment in South Africa, 
a lot of that was led on the national scene…it became a thing to do, and there 
were no contentious discussions going on at the Board of Regents about it, at that 
time, it was the right thing to do. 
 
Redding further recalled that several months later, a representative from the Regents called him 
to explain the finances and specific transactions that had occurred to demonstrate that the Board 
had followed through on its commitment to divest.
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 This victory was followed by a resolution to divest retirement funds from corporations 
doing business in South Africa. The resolution was written by Hugh Hudson and Associate 
Professor of Sociology, Paula Dressel and sponsored by the Georgia State History Department . 
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The resolution was approved at a January 1986 faculty meeting. Hudson explained that during 
the mid 1980s, the dynamics in the History Department, the university administration and the 
student body were changing: “It is true that the student body was not particularly active, but 
there was a growing small segment of the student body that did understand, and this I think also 
reflected the growing small presence of African American students at Georgia State.” Hudson 
believed “that it would be useful if the students saw that the faculty were not just ignoring 
reality” and that “it was an opportunity for students and faculty to work together.” Hudson 
reflected on the bigger changes occurring at Georgia State during the 1980s:  
“There was an increase in the African American student population; Georgia State was 
ceasing to be just totally a conservative environment, so a lot of things were coming to a 
head, and the South Africa divestiture movement really was a symbolic act for many 
students that just reflected that they were sick and tired of the sort of Reaganesque nature 
of Georgia State, and the fact that they took a lead I think played a major part in the 
subsequent development where African American students said Georgia State’s not a bad 
place to go.”72 
 
 Following this success, the issue virtually disappeared from the Georgia State campus. 
During the 1987-88 academic year, not a single article appeared in The Signal about either anti-
apartheid activism in the United States or about any other topics related to the situation in South 
Africa. This absence is in contrast to approximately fifty articles that published during the 
previous two years. Perhaps because anti-apartheid activism at Georgia State was so narrowly 
focused on divestment, once this goal had been achieved students were unsure of where to focus 
their energies. Also between September of 1986 and March of 1987 the United States Congress 
had passed two rounds of legislation establishing economic sanctions against South Africa, a 
victory for anti-apartheid activists nationwide. However, white minority rule and human rights 
violations continued in South Africa. Georgia State students were apparently content with their 
successes in the divestment arena.  
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 Less than seven miles away from Georgia State, Emory University approached South 
Africa from a vastly different background. Unlike GSU, Emory was a private institution and did 
not require a mandate from the State Board of Regents to make financial decisions. However, 
Emory’s close and historical ties with the Coca-Cola Company shaped the university’s approach 
to the crisis in South Africa. As was the case at Georgia State, Emory’s student newspaper, The 
Wheel published frequent articles depicting a wide range of student opinion on the situation in 
South Africa. Like Georgia State, Emory had a small group of dedicated students who agitated 
for progressive change in South Africa, and also like Georgia State, as well as a number of 
students who wrote articles promoting a thinly veiled endorsement of the apartheid status quo in 
South Africa.  
 The most unique aspect of Emory’s response to the crisis in South Africa was that the 
initiative was taken by the faculty, rather than the students.  Associate Professor of Theology, 
Jon Gunnemann lamented,  
“We held public hearings, and almost no students would come. And I finally joked with 
them at one point. I said, ‘You know what we should do, we should have a faculty sit in. 
We’ll have the president of the university and various faculty members go to the student 
dorms and say, we’re not letting you out of your dorms until you do something.’ So 
reversing the 1960s sit-ins, where everyone was sitting in the administration buildings at 
Harvard, Yale, you name it. And here, nothing’s happening. That’s the big difference is 
that it’s top down.” 
 
While the apathy of the majority of Emory’s student body may have been surprising, the fact that 
the impetus for action on South Africa came out of Emory’s Candler School of Theology is less 
surprising. Emory has a strong institutional tradition of liberal Protestant theology.
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From 1977 to 1993, James Laney served as the president of Emory University. Like 
Gunnemann, Laney was a product of Yale University’s Divinity School and had been a faculty 
member in the Candler School of Theology. In September of 1985, Laney appointed a South 
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African Advisory Committee to research and make recommendations regarding how Emory 
should respond to the crisis in South Africa. To lead the committee, Laney chose Gunnemann, 
who had a long history of familiarity and involvement with issues regarding South Africa and 
American universities. As a graduate student at Yale in the late 1960s, Gunnemann and a fellow 
student created a South African study group and became concerned about the nature of Yale 
University’s investments in companies that did business with South Africa. With collaboration 
from a Yale Law School professor, this small study group grew into a year-long graduate level 
course, productive discussions with members of the Yale Corporation (the university’s governing 
body), and a book titled, The Ethical Investor. The book, coauthored by Gunnemann, John 
Simon and Charles Powers, was published by Yale University Press in 1972.
74
 
In The Ethical Investor, Gunnemann and his coauthors suggested that universities should 
continue to purchase stocks based on maximum return principles. However, the authors called 
for universities to take seriously a commitment to self-regulation, specifically requiring 
universities to use “shareholder action to deal with company practices which appear to inflict 
significant social injury.” The authors of The Ethical Investor did not believe that divestment is 
an effective technique. Gunneman reflected on these ideas forty years later: “One of the things 
we discovered, we had economists look at and say, if a major institution…did divest, would it 
have any impact on the company they divested from, and the answer, simply is no. And we also 
looked at, we had graduate students in economics run various equations regarding stock prices 
going up and down, and what happened if huge blocks of stocks were sold, and immense 
amounts of things like that.” Gunnemann and his colleagues concluded that even institutions that 
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held large amounts of stock in a given company, could have only an extremely limited impact on 
the prices of shares overall. Thus divestment was only recommended as a last resort: A security 
should not be sold unless a company’s violations were grave, and other methods of correcting the 
company’s practices had failed. Gunneman, Simon and Powers believed that colleges and 
universities must become committed to self-regulation, and in so-doing, these institutions could 
at a minimum play a role in the effort to “limit or halt the destruction of life, of opportunity, and 
of beauty.”75  
Under Gunnemann’s guidance, the Emory committee met frequently during the ’85-86 
academic year and again, Gunnemann took part in a serious study of the benefits, risks and 
limitations of divestment and the options facing university investors.  In a 1986 interview 
appearing in the Emory Exchange, the Candler School of Theology publication, Gunnemann 
voiced his genuine concerns about total divestment:  
“It’s highly ambiguous. Some forms of divestment might be effective in helping. Some 
might not. Blanket divestment or disinvestment tends to be a one shot deal. That is, you 
sell your whole portfolio, make a symbolic statement, and the most you can hope for is 
that…it might contribute to a snowball effect. But if none of that pans out, if Coca-Cola 
and others bow out, ending their involvement in South Africa, and if ten years down the 
road apartheid is still there, we’ll have to let whoever is running that country work on 
it.”76  
 
 When the Committee published a series of recommendations in May 1986, all 
participants agreed that Emory’s trustees had an obligation that went beyond making investments 
that benefited Emory financially, and that certain moral and social traditions and values must be 
upheld.  The bigger challenge was deciding how those moral obligations could best be met. The 
committee’s recommendations expressed the opinion that the Sullivan Principles could play a 
role in creating change in South Africa. The committee used recommendations adopted by 
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Stanford University as a guiding framework. The Stanford approach, articulated by political 
science professor David Abernathy called for trustees to commit themselves not to purchase 
shares in South African based companies which have not signed the Sullivan codes, or which 
have signed the codes but have a poor record of enforcement.  
The Committee’s final report stated that “We are convinced that no investment in South 
Africa can be ethically neutral.” The report called for companies with investments in South 
Africa to go beyond the Sullivan Principles to actively work to change the political and 
economic structure of apartheid. For example, companies should provide legal and financial 
support for employees arrested for violating apartheid laws and engage in discussions with major 
black leaders. The report argued that companies who made honest efforts to meet these goals 
might actually have “some creative role in the abolishing of apartheid.”77 
Yet it is necessary to acknowledge that however earnest Emory’s Advisory Committee on 
South Africa may have been in their belief that American corporations could have “some 
creative role in the abolishing of apartheid,” a year later in 1987, Leon Sullivan, author of the 
Sullivan principles declared his guidelines to be a failure. Sullivan admitted that although 127 
American companies in South Africa agreed to abide by the principles, in ten years they had 
failed to undermine apartheid. Therefore, Sullivan argued, it was time for a new strategy, and 
American companies should pull out of South Africa. 
 Some committee members dissented, refusing to approve the final report. These 
members, along with a small group of vocal students, strongly favored divestment as the path 
Emory should take. However, divestment was never a serious option for Emory because of the 
university’s extremely close historical relationship with the Coca-Cola Company. The Emory 
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Committee’s final report specifically addresses Emory’s relationship with Coke. The report has 
an upbeat tone toward Coke’s investments in South Africa stating, “The fact that several 
members of Emory’s board of trustees sit on the board of Coca Cola opens the door to long-term, 
fruitful dialogue. Even more, we hope that Coca Cola will be an exemplary corporate citizen in 
word and deed in its opposition to apartheid.” The report acknowledges that Coke’s ratings on 
the Sullivan Principles are “good although not the very highest in all categories.” These 
conclusions were made after meetings with Coke Vice President Carl Ware as well as Coke 
director, Donald McHenry. Although both men seemed to believe that Coke’s presence in South 
Africa was a force for good, not all Atlantans felt the same way. A Coke boycott led by groups 
including The American Friends Service Committee continued through 1987 and will be 
discussed in Chapter Five.
78
 
In addition to analyzing Emory’s financial ties to South Africa, subcommittees were also 
established to study Emory’s educational connections to Southern Africa. These subcommittees 
called for a renewed commitment to African studies and the establishment of funded programs 
that would allow qualified black South African students to study at Emory. These ideas were 
non-controversial and easily adopted by the committee.  
  Similar to the situation at Georgia State, interest in South Africa seems to have 
diminished at Emory during the 1987-1988 school year. While this change could possibly be 
attributed to the four year cycle of new students entering and leaving the university, I believe that 
after the US government passed sanctions, many American activists wrongly believed that their 
work was done. Unfortunately it would be another seven years before apartheid fell in South 
Africa when Democratic elections were held for the first time.  
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CHAPTER 2: JOSEPH LOWERY, THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP 
CONFERENCE, AND ANTI-APARTHIED 
This chapter will discuss the role of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in the 
anti-apartheid movement. Founded in 1957 to coordinate the political activities of black churches 
and maintain the momentum created by the Montgomery bus boycott, the SCLC declared that its 
primary mission was to promote social and political equality for African Americans. However, 
its commitment to justice in South Africa began with that of founding member and president 
Martin Luther King Jr. The SCLC continued to be a significant presence in anti-apartheid circles 
during the 1980s, and then-president Rev. Joseph Lowery’s personal advocacy, lobbying and 
civil disobedience contributed to the expansion of anti-apartheid activity within the United States 
as a whole and within Atlanta and the southeastern region in particular.  
Perhaps to a greater extent than any other American organization advocating for an end to 
apartheid in South Africa, the SCLC connected the plight of Black South Africans to the 
struggles of African Americans to achieve racial justice in the United States. By 1957, Martin 
Luther King had traveled to Africa and began to take seriously his role as an advocate for 
African peoples in general and black South Africans in particular. Beginning as early as 1962, 
King called for an international boycott of South Africa. Twenty-five years later in 1987, the 
American Committee on Africa (ACOA) published King’s speech in its entirety in honor of the 
National Protest Days for South African Sanctions and Divestment. Within the SCLC as well, 
King’s commitments to South African freedom continued to reverberate.79 
Because of the SCLC’s early interest in South Africa as well as the organization’s esteem 
among the African American community and the respect it garnered from liberal white circles, 
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leading national anti-apartheid organizations, such as the ACOA and TransAfrica, as well as the 
Congressional Black Caucus, all sought Rev. Lowery’s support for their anti-apartheid efforts 
and stayed in close communication with Lowery and the rest of the SCLC leadership from the 
late 1970s through the 1980s. In 1977 Lowery wrote to then Ambassador to the United Nations 
and former SCLC member, Andrew Young, pledging SCLC support for an arms embargo and 
economic sanctions against South Africa. That same year Lowery led the SCLC in protest 
against the Southern Company, an electric utilities provider for its purchase of South African 
coal. This move was particularly pro-active for the time, as it would not be until the following 
decade that terms like divestment and disinvestment would become part of the American lexicon. 
During the 1980s, when the anti-apartheid movement expanded its presence in the United States, 
the SCLC initiated a boycott against Winn Dixie Food Stores in response to their stocking of 
imported South African goods as well as their poor track record of promoting African Americans 
to managerial positions, again connecting local conditions to the international struggle for racial 
and economic justice. In November of 1984, Lowery was among the first people arrested at the 
South African Embassy in Washington DC, launching the Free South Africa Movement. This 
chapter will describe and analyze each of these moments in SCLC and anti-apartheid history.
80
   
During the late 1950s, King undertook serious study of the situation in South Africa. He 
learned that like the Southern segregationists, the apartheid government of South Africa often 
sought to tarnish the reputation of its critics by brandishing them communists. He realized that 
the lack of a natural rights tradition or constitutional protection in South Africa made the 
challenges in South Africa unique and even more daunting than those facing civil rights activists 
in the United States. King also contemplated the demographic differences between the US and 
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South Africa. He concluded that the racial make up of South Africa, where whites made up only 
a small minority of the total population resulted in an elite desperate and determined to cling to 
its privilege and power by any means necessary. (could add George Fredrickson secondary lit 
stuff here?). King read about – and was inspired by – the 1952 Defiance campaign led by Chief 
Albert Luthuli, a series of mass demonstrations against South Africa’s unjust apartheid laws. For 
his part, King became known and respected in South Africa following his leadership during the 
Montgomery bus boycott of 1956. In 1957, the same year that King and his associates founded 
the SCLC, King joined the American Committee On Africa as a way to expand his involvement 
in international issues. Throughout King’s life, the SCLC remained focused primarily on 
regional goals, while the ACOA’s mission was to support the anti-colonial struggles in Africa 
without isolating these concerns from civil rights activism within the United States. 
81
 
Despite the demographic and constitutional differences between the South African and 
American contexts, King continued to draw direct connections between the freedom movement 
in the southern United States and that in South Africa. He saw “the apartheid regime in South 
Africa as symptomatic of a world problem; namely the irrational preoccupation with skin color, 
the need for whites to dominate and control peoples of color, and the failure of persons to grasp 
the extent to which they are interrelated and interdependent.” With this focus on the common 
enemy of white supremacy, King co-sponsored the 1957 “Declaration of Conscience” calling for 
a Human Rights Day of Protest against the apartheid government of South Africa. 1957 also 
marked the beginning of King’s relationship with ANC leaders Chief Albert Luthuli and Oliver 
Tambo. When these men were among over a hundred South African activists arrested under 
suspicion of treason, King led fundraising efforts in the United States to support their legal 
defense and contributed to efforts to publicize and condemn the treason trials in South Africa. 
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Although King and Luthuli never had the opportunity to meet in person, their correspondence 
reveals two men with the upmost respect for each other’s work, philosophy and character. Until 
Luthuli’s death in 1967, King continued to believe that his leadership and vision represented the 
best hope for a nonviolent, multi-racial South Africa.
82
  
 The 1960 Sharpeville Massacre led many observers to conclude that non-violent protest 
would never work in South Africa. The following year the ANC subsequently launched its own 
armed struggle under the banner, Umkhonto We Sizwe, or Spear of the Nation. While King 
feared the prospect of race war in South Africa, he refrained from publically commenting on 
these new tactics. Instead, in 1962 King and Luthuli became the initial sponsors of the ACOA 
“Appeal for Action Against Apartheid.” World response to the appeal was overwhelmingly 
positive, and the document attracted the signature and support of over 150 world leaders and 
spurred a new period of interest in events in South Africa among African Americans. When King 
won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1964, he took the opportunity to bring his message and 
commitment to South Africa to an international audience. In London, King gave a speech titled, 
“Address on South African Independence.” On December 10th, 1965 the ACOA sponsored an 
event in honor of International Human Rights Day. Held at Hunter College in New York, and 
attended by 3,500 people, there King gave a speech, which would be reprinted and referenced by 
anti-apartheid activists and organizations for decades after his death. In this speech, King called 
for a major international boycott of South Africa and called out American corporations for their 
support of the South African economy and thus its apartheid regime.
83
  
During the last two years of his life, King’s commitments to struggles against racial and 
economic injustice within the United States provided him little time to actively contribute to the 
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anti-apartheid movement. At the same time, the SCLC began to struggle financially, in part 
because of potential donors’ rejection of King’s militant opposition to the U.S. position in 
Vietnam. During these years, King worried about the growing appeal of racial separatism as 
indicated by the rise of the Black Power Movement within the United States and Black 
Consciousness in South Africa. He attempted to get a visa to visit South Africa at the invitation 
of the Anglican Students Federation in 1966. As anticipated, King’s request for a visa was 
rejected by the South African government which labeled him a communist and a danger to 
stability within South Africa. Black South Africans grieved King’s death in April of 1968. For 
many of the more radical members of the ANC, this tragedy served as confirmation that 
nonviolent movements could not succeed in the face of a violent white society.
84
  
While King’s legacy within South Africa may have begun to fade during the 1970s as the 
armed struggle and Black Consciousness Movements gained increasing support, this trend did 
not replicate itself in anti-apartheid circles outside of South Africa. Instead, within the United 
States, activists used King’s legacy as a way to bring the civil rights and anti-apartheid 
movements together. This trend certainly held true within the SCLC. SCLC leaders, Jesse 
Jackson, Ralph D. Abernathy and Bernard Lee followed King’s lead in calling for international 
economic sanctions against South Africa throughout the 1970s and urged the United Nations to 
consider dispatching a peace keeping force following the Soweto Uprising of 1976. 
85
 
The SCLC promoted King’s legacy on South Africa more extensively during the 1980s, 
when the organization as a whole became more committed to the anti-apartheid cause during 
Reverend Joseph Lowery’s presidency. On Human Rights Day in 1983, the SCLC republished 
King’s speech from the 1965 Hunter College event. Pamphlets with King’s speech in its entirety 
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were widely distributed. Even though his words were spoken almost twenty years earlier, in 1983 
they still rang true: “We are in an era in which the issue of human rights is the central issue 
confronting all nations...With respect to South Africa, however, our protest is so muted and 
peripheral it merely mildly disturbs the sensibilities of the segregationists, while our trade and 
investments substantially stimulate their economy to greater heights.” The same pamphlet also 
quotes Joseph Lowery’s own Human Rights Day appeals to eliminate apartheid, as well as 
King’s 1962 joint statement with Chief Albert Luthuli, urging international sanctions against 
South Africa.
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Perhaps because of the SCLC’s direct connection with Martin Luther King’s legacy, from 
the beginning of Reverend Lowery’s presidency in 1977, the leading anti-apartheid organizations 
in the United States consistently sought his support and leadership, as did smaller grassroots 
groups. Lowery’s rise to the presidency of the SCLC coincided with a newly dedicated anti-
apartheid effort among African Americans in the wake of 1976 Soweto massacre and the murder 
of Steve Biko in 1977. Further, the election of many black politicians to the House of 
Representatives, made possible by the gains in the Civil Rights Movement, meant that for the 
first time, issues relating to Africa could expect more than just cursory attention from Congress. 
This resurgent effort was led by the newly formed TransAfrica, founded by members of the 
Congressional Black Caucus in 1977. Under the leadership of Randall Robison, TransAfrica 
began to influence American policy on South Africa through lobbying, educational campaigns 
and direct action approaches. TransAfrica would ultimately launch the Free South Africa 
Movement, and become the architects of the 1985 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act.
87
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Just as the ACOA sought support from Martin Luther King during the 1960s, TransAfrica 
called for Joseph Lowery to sign on to letters and lend his support to conferences and other 
events throughout the 1980s. In 1984 Lowery would become one of the first individuals arrested 
at the South African Embassy as part of the Free South Africa Movement’s civil disobedience 
campaign. In 1979 Lowery was invited to participate in the Summit Conference of Black 
Religious Leaders on Apartheid in New York City. Lowery attended along with Andrew Young, 
Jesse Jackson and Leon Sullivan, and served as “toastmaster.” The goal of the conference was to 
dramatize the plight of the victims of apartheid and raise awareness that “in many instances the 
oppressor is our common enemy – the machinery of multinational corporations based in the 
United States.” Increasingly, activists and concerned observers made the connection between US 
economic support of the South African economy and the ability of the apartheid government to 
continue its oppression of the black masses.
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In 1985, Lowery received correspondence requesting that he speak at an anti-apartheid 
rally and march in Atlanta organized by the Phi Alpha fraternity. More than 1,000 fraternity 
members gathered and heard speeches from Andrew Young, Coretta Scott King, and Maynard 
Jackson. The fraternity members marched carrying fifty empty coffins to memorialize the recent 
violent deaths of hundreds of South Africans under the apartheid system. This event was a 
particularly appropriate one to gain support from the SCLC. During the high point of the 
organization in the late 1950s and early 1960s, mass marches were the preferred method of 
protest as the SCLC challenged segregation in Alabama, Washington DC, and throughout the 
South.
89
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Lowery certainly recognized that his support and opinions could influence the anti-
apartheid movement. He used his position to undertake his own lobbying efforts, corresponding 
with many individuals in positions of power beginning in the late 1970s. Lowery sent at least 
two letters to Jimmy Carter during the President’s last years in office. In June, Lowery wrote 
Carter to show his support and commend the work of former civil rights ally, Ambassador to the 
United Nations, and fellow Atlantan Andrew Young. Lowery wrote, “We support and commend 
efforts to by Ambassador Young to sympathize our own nation, as well as the nations of the 
world to the entrenchment of racism, conscious and unconscious…The nations of the world need 
assurance of the US determination to identify and eliminate racism.” This letter on behalf of 
Young followed a period of controversy in which Vice President Walter Mondale had agreed to 
sit down for discussions with South African Prime Minister John Vorster, a vocal rejection to 
Young’s call for a more firm US and United Nations stance against the South African 
government.
90
 
The following year, Lowery again corresponded with Carter. Lowery wrote to urge Carter 
not to lift economic sanctions against Rhodesia in the wake of that country’s whites only 
elections. Carter generally agreed with Lowery’s sentiments that sanctions should continue until 
free elections occurred. Lowery’s correspondence with the President gained notice from the 
Congressional Black Caucus, which wrote in support of Lowery’s demands and urged fellow 
supporters to make their voices known “in light of the attacks by the conservatives and the 
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efforts that have already started in congress to reverse the president’s decision.” In April of 1981, 
Lowery spoke out against the U.S. veto of the United Nations condemnation of South Africa’s 
invasion of Angola. Lowery said that the decision was “an assault on the lives ans (sic) liberties 
of black Africans and places the United States government squarely on the side of racist 
oppression and military aggression in Southern Africa.” Lowery was the first American civil 
rights leader to comment on the veto and emphasized that “It seems obvious that…the 
administration’s conciliatory posture towards South Africa would encourage resistance to 
liberation and majority rule.” Lowery went on to call for US disinvestment from South Africa.91 
Under Lowery’s leadership, the SCLC became one of the first American organizations to 
respond to the ANC’s call for boycotts of South African products. An SCLC pamphlet honoring 
Lowery’s contributions describes that he “led attacks against US businesses having contracts 
with South Africa before it was popular to do so.” As early as 1977, the SCLC contacted the 
Southern Company, an Atlanta based utilities provider and parent of Georgia, Alabama, 
Mississippi and Gulf Power Companies, regarding its contract to buy 7.7 million tons of South 
African coal over a ten year period. The Southern Company’s Florida subsidiary, Gulf Power 
began purchasing low sulfur South African coal in 1974 in response to newly implemented air 
quality standards in that state. In a March 1977 mailgram to Southern Company president, Clyde 
Lilly Jr, the SCLC states “We call upon the Southern Company to cancel this contract. The South 
African coal may have a low level of sulpher but it contains the highest levels of human shame.” 
Articles in the Atlanta Journal and Atlanta Constitution quote Southern Company spokesmen as 
claiming that before the coal contract was signed a study was conducted and mines visited.  
Southern Company representative, Gale Klappa stated that labor conditions were “comparable to 
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those in U.S. mines” and that the contract specified that slave labor cannot be used. Southern 
Company president, Lilly explained that the prices for American coal cannot compete with the 
low priced South African product: “This is strictly a price arrangement.” The Atlanta Journal 
article concluded by stating that the SCLC was beginning a campaign to end South African 
apartheid, and that the protest of the Southern Company indicated the public launching of this 
effort. Dr. Lowery followed up the March communication with an additional letter the following 
month: “Our black brothers and sisters from South Africa insist that their plight will never 
improve under the present government and that economic support form America drives nails into 
their coffins.” In this letter, Lowery goes on to connect the plight of South Africans with racial 
justice within the United States, calling for the Southern Company to appoint a black 
representative to its board of directors and to provide information regarding how many black 
executives the company employs.
92
 
Joseph Lowery and the SCLC were not successful in convincing the Southern Company to 
break its contract with the South African coal mines. However, in the mid 1980s when that 
contract was nearing its expiration, and the anti-apartheid movement within the United States 
gained momentum, the SCLC renewed its efforts to convince the Southern Company to seek 
other sources of coal. In May of 1985, Lowery and over 1,000 picketers protested outside the 
Southern Company stockholders meeting in Biloxi, Mississippi. Lowery told the press, “This 
coal is dipped in the blood of blacks in South Africa.” Southern Company representatives 
continued to claim that South African miners were paid fairly regardless of race. However, 
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Lowery pointed out that black South Africans are not legally allowed to obtain the status of 
“miner,” and are thus limited to lower paid positions.93  
The Southern Christian Leadership Conference was joined in the Biloxi protest with 
members of a miners union in Alabama. A representative from the United Mine Workers of 
America explained that their protest was inspired by both humanitarian concern for the terrible 
treatment of black mine workers in South Africa, as well the fact that the cheap South African 
coal undermined the American mining economy. The United Mineworkers’ protest against South 
African coal went back to the mid 1970s. During the Fall of 1974, an organizing conference 
called Stop South African Coal was held in Atlanta and sponsored by the United Mineworkers, 
the African Liberation Support Committee, and the Southern Conference Education Fund. 
Nearly 200 people attended the conference, including representatives fromt eh Philadelphia 
Coalition to Stop Rhodesian and South African Imports. These representatives shared with the 
group information on their successful campaign to stop Southern African chrome from being 
unloaded on local docks.
94
 
As of June of that year, Southern Company president, Edward Addison still refused to say 
whether or not his company would renew their contract with the South African coal mine. 
Although company spokesman, Gale Klappa said that the contract would be reviewed, she 
emphasized that the deal with South Africa would be altered only if it became economically 
advantageous. In 1986 the SCLC continued to pressure the Southern Company not to renew its 
South African contract. By that point the Southern Company was purchasing about 800,000 
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metric tons of coal, worth $46.4 million from South Africa each year. The 1986 Southern 
Company stockholders meeting was held in Birmingham Alabama on May 28
th
, and again the 
SCLC led the protests outside the meeting, joined by members of the United Mine Workers. 
Southern Company leaders attempted to stop the picketing before it began by notifying Joseph 
Lowery a week earlier via letter that the South African coal would indeed be replaced by other 
sources when the contract expired. However, at the annual meeting, the stockholders rejected the 
adoption of a proposal to prohibit future purchases of coal from apartheid South Africa. The 
Southern Company continued to insist that its decisions were based solely on economics, as low 
sulpher coal from the United States had become more readily available in the ten years since the 
original contract had been in place. Lowery expressed his disappointment that the Southern 
Company refused to make a statement of moral disapproval of the apartheid system.
95
  
The SCLC’s most well-known boycott was of Winn Dixie grocery store chain. During the 
mid 1980s high point of American public interest in South Africa, the boycott of Winn Dixie 
again connected the plight of blacks in South Africa with that of African Americans. The SCLC 
called out Winn Dixie for selling canned peaches and pears from South Africa, as well as for the 
store’s poor record in hiring and promoting African Americans to managerial positions. Joseph 
Lowery explained “we believe the selling of South African products may be symptomatic of a 
deep insensitivity to the need for racial justice and equity in Winn Dixie employment practices.” 
The South African products were discovered by a member of the SCLC’s Women’s League 
while shopping at the store. The SCLC later learned that the stores within the Winn Dixie chain 
carried frozen fish from South Africa as well. While Winn Dixie claimed that the canned fruit 
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came from a one time purchase, frozen whiting fish from South Africa continued to arrive at its 
stores.
96
 
The boycott officially launched on September 24, 1985, less than three weeks after the 
South African products were discovered at the store, and two weeks after Winn Dixie president 
Dano Davis neglected to respond to Lowery’s request for a meeting. Davis did finally respond to 
the initial request, with an offer to meet with Lowery individually. A week into the boycott, on 
October 2
nd
, Lowery, accompanied by two other SCLC officials, traveled to Jacksonville, Florida 
and tried unsuccessfully to speak at Winn Dixie’s annual stockholders’ meeting. Despite having 
purchased stock in the company, Lowery was not allowed to speak, and the meeting was 
abruptly adjoined.  Also on October 2
nd
, Davis informed the SCLC office via telegram that he 
was no longer willing to meet with Lowery as long as the boycott remained in effect.
97
 
On October 22, 1985, Lowery sent a letter to all SLC board members and chapter 
presidents explaining the necessity of the Winn Dixie boycott. In addition to emphasizing that 
Winn Dixie’s sale of products from South Africa was harmful to the international anti-apartheid 
movement, Lowery stated that “Winn Dixie has a dismal history of negative labor and racial 
policies and practices. Numerous complaints of racial discrimination have been filed with EEO 
and in the courts. Win-Dixie has no Black directors or executives that we know of. They say they 
have approximately 70 Black managers out of 1,262. We have not located them.” Lowery went 
on to criticize Winn Dixie for doing very little business with black-owned companies. Lowery 
requested support from SCLC members in picketing and distributing information outside 
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selected Winn Dixie locations. The goals that Lowery outlined for the boycott focused on 
eliminating American corporate support for the South African apartheid government and at the 
same time expanding career opportunities for African Americans. These goals were 
characteristic of the SCLC’s focus and tactics of connecting domestic racism and inequality with 
international issues.
98
 
The boycott grew quickly. From its start at a few Atlanta-area stores, the demonstrations 
spread to Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Kentucky and Virginia. 
Support soon spread beyond the initial SCLC constituency. On October 23
rd
, SCLC 
representatives met with local labor leaders to educate them about the action against Winn Dixie. 
As a result of the meeting, the Georgia State AFL-CIO and the Atlanta Labor Council pledged 
their support and a labor-sponsored press conference was planned for November 22
nd
 outside the 
Monroe Drive Winn Dixie. At the ensuing press conference, Herb Mabry, president of the 
Georgia AFL-CIO stated, “The very nature of our organization dictates that if any of our brothers 
and sisters have a problem with any group or organization like Winn Dixie  that refuses to rid 
their stores of products being manufactured and processed in a country that denies civil 
rights...then we have no alternative than to join with SCLC and ask the people of this nation to 
boycott Win Dixie until they take these products off the shelves.” Al Keher, Associate Civil 
Rights Director for the AFL-CIO also spoke. Keher emphasized the common histories of the 
labor and civil rights movements and the value of coming together for a common cause. The 
SCLC’s Albert Love led the effort to increase the role of the labor movement in the boycott, and 
in a November 11
th
 memo Love urged union members to participate in picketing and to wear 
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caps and jackets with their union names and logos. By this point the boycott’s goals had been 
expanded to a demand that Winn Dixie begin to recognize unions.
99
  
The boycott also gained support from other organizations, including the Concerned Black 
Clergy of Atlanta. In addition to pledging his support for the SCLC-sponsored boycott, Reverend 
Cornelius Henderson, leader of this organization, made up of seventy-five Atlanta-area churches 
from thirteen different denominations, stated, “We further call upon the Black community to 
continue patronizing Black Minority businesses, particularly, those in plazas where Winn Dixie 
stores are being boycotted. We will not, we cannot be bought!!!” The Concerned Black Clergy 
was officially established in 1983 to organize black ministers to confront issues of homelessness 
in Atlanta. The roots of the group originate with meetings between ministers trying to provide 
leadership during the missing and murdered children crisis in Atlanta from 1979-1981.
100
   
In addition to the Concerned Black Clergy and the labor groups mentioned above, boycott 
leaflets also cited support from numerous other church groups and pastors, as well as from the 
Atlanta University Center Coalition Against Apartheid, State Representative Robert Holmes, and 
Mayor Andrew Young. The Charleston Chronicle out of South Carolina published a photograph 
of Mayor Young marching in front of a Winn Dixie, holding a poster that read “Winn Dixie Sells 
South African Products – Don’t Shop Here.” Supporting the anti-apartheid cause provided 
Mayor Young with an opportunity to deflect criticism of his conservative agenda as Mayor. State 
Representatives Mable Thomas, Georganna Sinkfield, Jim Martin, Billy McKinney, Douglas 
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Dean, Julian Bond, and Tyrone Brooks participated as well. District of Columbia Congressman, 
SCLC member, and well-known leader of the Congressional Black Caucus, Walter Fauntroy also 
lent his support.
101
   
From its origins during the Civil Rights movement, SCLC leaders often “relied on being 
arrested in order to draw attention and support to a particular cause.” The direct action 
campaigns during the anti-apartheid efforts were no exception to this tradition. In November 
demonstrators began to be arrested during the Winn Dixie protests. One of the first such arrests 
occurred in Greenville, North Carolina, indicating the geographic reach of the boycott. On 
November 14
th
, Joseph Lowery was among nine protestors cited for trespassing at the Greenville 
Winn Dixie. At that point demonstrations had been occurring at this location for six weeks. On 
November 27
th
, the day before Thanksgiving, arrests took place in Atlanta. Lowery and nineteen 
other demonstrators, including elected officials, students, and religious leaders spent 
Thanksgiving Day fasting in the Dekalb County jail. Less than a month later, on Friday 
December 20
th
, Fulton county police arrested four protestors outside the College Park Winn 
Dixie location. The four men arrested were all clergymen and were four of about thirty 
demonstrators picketing this Winn Dixie location. Most of the picketers left when being ordered 
to do so by Fulton County police, but the Reverends Lawrence Carter, Joseph Roberts, Clinton 
Marsh and James Milner refused and were charged with criminal trespass. Finally, on Tuesday 
January 7
th
, 1986 ten protestors were arrested at the Winn Dixie location on Martin Luther King 
Jr Drive. These ten picketers were among thirty people demonstrating outside the store that 
evening. The ten individuals arrested by City of Atlanta Police included three children of Martin 
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Luther King, as well as State Senator and civil rights leader, Julian Bond. Angela Farris, niece of 
Martin Luther King was also arrested and later gave a statement to the press emphasizing her 
confidence in the efficacy of non-violent protest and stating her disappointment in the Reagan 
administration’s refusal to impose strict sanctions against South Africa. As of October 1985, the 
Martin Luther King Drive Winn Dixie store was not a target for the demonstrations. This 
location was one of the few Winn Dixie stores with a black manager, and the SCLC “did not 
want to make the Black manager look bad.” It is not clear at what point the demonstrations 
spread to this location.
102
  
Very quickly upon its beginning, reports began to surface that the boycott was having an 
impact. By late October the Atlanta Voice newspaper reported that “at the Moreland Avenue 
Winn Dixie store, the number of cars in parking lots on heavy shopping days has dropped, as 
have sales on meat.” The paper followed up in early November by stating that “Winn Dixie has 
gone to the extreme of beefing up their ad campaign and even giving items away for free.” In 
January, the Atlanta Daily World quoted an SCLC spokeswoman as saying, “we’ve had people 
in Atlanta tell us that where there have been five cashiers during peak hours, there is just one or 
two now.” On the other hand, also in January, a Winn Dixie spokesperson painted a different 
story: “Overall there’s not been enough of an effect to even give a percentage…It’s not a 
measurable amount at all.” Either way, by mid January the boycott had met with some success 
and was officially called off by SCLC. Winn Dixie paid over $2,000 to print an ad in the Atlanta 
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Constitution emphasizing that the store no longer sold South African products: “In May 1985, 
Winn Dixie took voluntary action to discontinue the purchase of merchandise produced in the 
Republic of South Africa, and South African products have been liquidated from all Winn-Dixie 
stores. No South African products are offered for sale in any Winn-Dixie store.” Two days later 
the SCLC called off the boycott despite the fact that it does not seem that the other complaints 
against Winn Dixie in regards to domestic racism were addressed. The SCLC’s willingness to 
call off the boycott indicates that in this instance the organization prioritized a focus on 
contributing to the international anti-apartheid movement, rather than its historical focus on 
promoting racial justice within the United States.
103
 
As mentioned previously, Reverend Lowery’s name recognition meant that national and 
transnational anti-apartheid groups sought his support. The African American lobbying group for 
African and Caribbean issues, the Congressional Black Caucus’s TransAfrica took the leading 
role in escalating the anti-apartheid efforts of Americans in the mid 1980s. TransAfrica used its 
Washington-insider status to oppose the Reagan administration’s apartheid-friendly policies. 
Ultimately in late 1984 TransAfrica changed tactics, introducing civil disobedience as a way to 
make a strong statement against the apartheid regime. On the day before Thanksgiving 1984, 
three activists refused to leave a meeting at the South African Embassy in Washington DC.  
Randall Robison, the leader of TransAfrica explained to the South African Ambassador, 
Bernardus Fourie, that the group would not leave his office until the South African government 
released all political prisoners and publically committed to quickly dismantle the apartheid 
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government. The three activists were promptly removed from the building and arrested on 
charges of “unlawful entry of an embassy.”104 
The sit-in was planned for the day before Thanksgiving because the holiday would mean 
a slow day for political news, and TransAfrica hoped that media coverage of the protest would 
be substantial. When major news outlets released coverage of the events, their focus centered on 
the arrest of District of Columbia Congressman and SCLC member, Walter Fauntroy. Over the 
weekend, Fauntroy announced the formation of the Free South Africa Movement, which was 
necessary, he explained due to the failure to convince Congress to impose Sanctions on South 
Africa. Robinson made it clear that the abolishment of Reagan’s constructive engagement policy 
towards South Africa was a significant goal of the Free South Africa Movement. Robison 
warned that demonstrations would be held at the embassy in Washington as well as at South 
African consulates around the United States until these demands were met.
105
  
The next arrests occurred on the Monday after Thanksgiving. Joseph Lowery joined 
Illinois Representative, Charles Hayes in protesting at the South African Embassy in DC. 
According to Free South African Movement Steering Committee member, Sylvia Hill, Lowery 
and others who participated in that first week of protests “were people we knew and could call 
on quickly.” Lowery and Hayes were denied their request for a meeting with Ambassador Fourie 
but refused to leave the building. They were arrested by Secret Service officials and taken into 
custody. Upon his release from jail, Lowery stated that protestors "are prepared to have people 
arrested every day to raise national consciousness about this problem."
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The following month Lowery wrote an editorial in the Atlanta Constitution titled, 
“Morality Demands Change in South Africa.” In this essay, Lowery explained to readers the 
“ugly truth about racist oppression in Southern Africa overall and the Republic of South Africa 
in particular.” After describing apartheid laws, citing examples of brutal violence from the South 
African government, and lamenting the possibility of race war in South Africa, Lowery goes on 
to urge Americans to “refuse to become partners in apartheid” and to “use our moral and 
economic authority to minimize the loss of human life.” His particular focus in this editorial is to 
emphasize the role of U.S. corporate activity in South Africa. He argues that “corporations must 
demand that the South African government enter negotiations with South African black 
leaders…to write a new constitution. A timetable must be adopted and a deadline must be set for 
a long mutual agreement. Failure by the South African government to cooperate with the 
deadline would automatically initiate divestment procedures.”107 
Also during December the SCLC sponsored boycotts at the South African consulates in 
both Mobile, Alabama and New Orleans. Joseph Lowery and Walter Fauntroy traveled to New 
Orleans to lead the efforts. From the consulate in New Orleans the protest moved to the Southern 
Coin Exchange in an attempt to get the store to stop selling Kruggerands, gold coins from South 
Africa. Local SCLC official, Reverend James Livingston believed that presence of the SCLC’s 
national leadership in New Orleans greatly increased enthusiasm for anti-apartheid efforts in 
New Orleans: “There was an interest in organizing protests against South Africa but not much 
was happening…Now various groups have been meeting around the city to escalate the 
protests.” 
As has been demonstrated in this chapter, in some instances Reverend Lowery and the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference did not shy away from controversial politics and took 
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bold actions to promote justice. However, by the 1980s, the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference could be seen as a part of Atlanta’s political establishment. Some more radical anti-
apartheid activists were suspicious of Lowery and the SCLC. Georgia State University student 
activist, Dwayne Redding said: 
They went from issue to issue, whatever was hot at that time. Whatever was in the 
news, that’s what they were involved with…But they weren’t gonna put anything 
on the line that would challenge their position at that time or at the future to really 
fight these… battles. And Joe Lowery…he didn’t fight this battle. I can’t point to 
any tangible victories he ever produced…These people are hungry for the 
media.
108
 
As will be discussed shortly, Lowery’s unwillingness to challenge the Coca Cola Company 
during the second half of the 1980s compromised the SCLC’s ability to claim a prime leadership 
role in the anti-apartheid movement as this period of American activism reached its climax.  
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CHAPTER 3: THANDI GCABASHE AND THE AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE 
COMMITTEE: BUILDING A GRASSROOTS ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT IN 
ATLANTA 
The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) led the way in creating an active and 
influential anti-apartheid movement within the city of Atlanta. The leadership and dedication of 
South African exile Thandi Gcabashe is a primary reason for the AFSC’s position in the 
forefront of Atlanta’s anti-apartheid scene, but this Quaker organization took an interest in 
promoting racial justice in South Africa before Gcabashe’s involvement began. This chapter uses 
archival materials from the American Friends Service Committee’s national headquarters in 
Philadelphia, newspaper articles, and oral history interviews with Gcabashe, SERO director 
Elizabeth Enloe, as well as other Atlanta activists to analyze the AFSC’s tremendous role in 
creating an anti-apartheid movement in Atlanta and the southeast.  
David Hostetter’s Movement Matters: American Antiapartheid Activism and the Rise of 
Multicultural Politics features a section analyzing the history of AFSC involvement in South 
Africa, which explains the forces that shaped AFSC’s action regarding South Africa and 
provides a great background for understanding the decisions that the Atlanta leaders confronted 
during the 1980s. The American Friends Service Committee is a Quaker organization established 
during World War One to provide pacifist Quakers and other conscientious objectors 
opportunities to serve through relief work. The organization continued to work for peace and 
social justice after the end of the First World War and through World War Two, earning a Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1947. As the American Civil Rights movement escalated in the South over the 
next two decades, the AFSC became vocal in its support for racial justice. In 1963, the 
organization published and promoted Martin Luther King’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail.” 
75 
 
Radicalized by experiences during the Vietnam War, many AFSC staffers became increasingly 
critical of U.S. Cold War interventions and support for corrupt anti-communist regimes around 
the world. By the 1970s AFSC was calling for economic sanctions against and divestment from 
South Africa and focusing on educating the American public on the horrors of the apartheid 
system.  As the AFSC became increasingly vocal about these issues, the organization faced 
accusations that it was too sympathetic to left-wing governments and liberation movements, and 
that it had strayed from its initial emphasis on relief work and reconciliation and had abandoned 
its commitment to nonviolence.
109
 
Critics included right-wing journalists and politicians, but questions also arose within the 
ranks of the AFSC. Some Quakers called for the AFSC to resume its traditional role of a neutral 
broker urging reconciliation. These critics questioned AFSC’s support for revolutionary 
liberation movements that resorted to violence against their oppressors. Hostetter acknowledges 
that “AFSC’s search for the means to show support for the aspirations of liberation movements 
while maintaining its commitment to nonviolence proved arduous.” The AFSC’s national 
leadership, including Bill Sutherland, Stephen Cary, Michael Simmons and Jim Bristol took such 
accusations seriously, but ultimately believed that a commitment to nonviolence did not preclude 
providing active support for anti-apartheid groups within South Africa and argued that the 
situation in South Africa necessitated taking sides.
110
 
The AFSC’s South Africa Program came to exemplify the concept of liberation pacifism 
by combining nonviolent action with support for African based groups fighting for an end to 
apartheid. Bristol, director of the AFSC’s Southern African Program articulated these ideas in a 
1972 article titled “Non-Violence Not First for Export.” Emphasizing the influence of Gandhi 
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and Martin Luther King’s teachings and lives of non-violent direct action, Bristol goes on to 
explain the ANC’s reasons for establishing an armed liberation wing and states: “We cannot 
prescribe for people in a situation totally different from our own, no matter how sincerely we 
may believe that we can see a better way for waging a revolutionary struggle than the one they 
have chosen…Certainly we dare not judge the morality of their choice.” Bristol urges white 
Americans to acknowledge and accept that they themselves are part of the white status quo and 
that their actions come from a position of privilege. He called on Americans to focus their efforts 
on lobbying the U.S. government to end their support for the apartheid regime.
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Significant, if not overt, racial tensions also existed within the AFSC and among 
Quakers. In 1978 the AFSC launched a program called South Africa Summer which focused on 
educating the public about South African apartheid through workshops, films and 
demonstrations. The program involved student volunteers who worked with the staffs at the 
various regional offices.  Some Quakers voiced criticism about the militancy of some of the 
volunteers, many of whom were African American. In Chicago the volunteers were not 
welcomed to eat at the Quaker meeting house.  Deliberate affirmative action in AFSC hiring 
practices led to increasing numbers of non-white non Quaker staff, a demographic shift which 
likely contributed to accusations that the group had lost sight of its original purpose. In 1980 
AFSC representatives undertook a trip to South Africa. The trip was controversial from the 
beginning because African American participants would have to take on “honorary white” status 
to travel with the group in South Africa, and because many AFSC representatives felt like they 
needed to join the international boycott on travel to South Africa. Indeed during the trip, one 
African American participant lamented that “they (white South African Quakers) would be 
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receiving me as a guest in their home yet speak or act in a racially insensitive way toward their 
black hired laborers or servants.”112 
Tensions between the AFSC and South African Quakers had already emerged before the 
1980 trip. The South African Friends saw divestment and boycotts as “institutional violence 
aimed at destroying the South African economy and thereby the power of the white regime 
without any accompanying efforts to provide for constructive measures for the future.” While the 
South African Quakers remained skeptical of the ANC, the AFSC commented that these white 
Quakers “do not see themselves as part of the problem.” South Africa Program Director, Michael 
Simmons articulated the divide: “How many Quakers in South Africa refused the privileges of 
their race? Can we distinguish the lifestyle and character of South African Quakers from other 
whites in South Africa…Why does AFSC continue to focus on the messenger, rather than the 
messages? Are Friends concerns coming from a Quaker context or a white context? Why would 
some view the two as synonymous?”113 
Within the United States, the AFSC played a leading role in increasing public awareness 
of apartheid and the mounting crisis in South Africa as well as in promoting divestment and 
general economic withdrawal from South Africa. In 1965, after many conversations with Chase 
Bank regarding the bank’s loans to South Africa, AFSC became one of the first organizations to 
withdraw its balance from the offending bank. Two conversations with Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu during the late 1970s reaffirmed the AFSC commitment to advocating for economic 
sanctions. During the 1980s the AFSC coordinated communication between the various anti-
apartheid groups to organize collaborations avoid overlapping efforts. As a long established and 
well known organization in social justice circles, the AFSC was able to supply the “resources, 
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staff and expertise essential for a foreign policy dissent movement to function and flourish.”  The 
AFSC in general, and the South African staff in particular demonstrated that it was indeed 
possible for advocates of nonviolence to create solidarity with armed liberation groups without 
compromising their principles.
114
  
Hostetter’s piece provides an excellent background for understanding AFSC anti-
apartheid policies on a national level. However, he neglects to analyze the activities of the 
Southeast Regional Office in Atlanta. The wealth of archival materials at the Philadelphia AFSC 
headquarters demonstrates that the Southern Africa Peace Education Project in Atlanta, led by 
Gcabashe and supported by SERO director, Elizabeth Enloe, was incredibly active and 
influential in promoting education and activism throughout the Southeast. As Hostetter 
emphasizes, the AFSC provided education and support in regions of the United States that were 
underserved by other anti-apartheid groups. This chapter will confirm that assertion by tracing 
the history of the AFSC’s South African peace education division in Atlanta.   
As mentioned previously, the role of Thandi Gcabashe in building an anti-apartheid 
movement in Atlanta cannot be overstated. Gcabashe did much of this organizing work through 
her position as Director of the SERO’s Southern African Peace Education Program. Gcabashe 
arrived in Atlanta in 1970, a political exile from South Africa. Gcabashe was born in 1934 in 
Groutville, South Africa, a town located in an area set aside as a reservation for black South 
Africans under the 1913 Native Land Act which reserved 87% of South Africa’s land for whites. 
Both of Gcabashe’s parents worked at Adam’s College, one of the oldest schools for black South 
Africans, established in 1853. Gcabashe attended an all-girls boarding school, and received the 
best education possible for a black child under South Africa’s segregated education system. 
Gcabashe’s father, Chief Albert Luthuli became Chief of Groutville in 1936 and President of the 
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ANC in 1952. In 1960, Luthuli was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his contributions to the 
nonviolent struggle against racial injustice in South Africa.
115
  
Like her late father, Gcabashe engaged in anti-apartheid activities within South Africa 
through the ANC, earning her the antipathy of the South African government. During the 1950s 
and ‘60s, she was arrested numerous times for participating in anti-apartheid demonstrations. 
Gcabashe made the decision to flee South Africa after working underground within the country 
for ten years. She made her decision both because she worried about her childrens’ safety and 
education within South Africa, and because she believed that she could be more effective 
working outside the country. A friend of her father’s worked for the American consul and was 
able to obtain passports for Gcabashe’s family by claiming they were his domestic workers and 
would be traveling on holiday with his family.
116
 
After researching several cities in the United States, the Gcabashe family – Thandi, her 
husband Thulani and four children – decided to settle in Atlanta. They were drawn to the city by 
the majority black population, the presence of the King Center, and the city’s history in the Civil 
Rights Movement. Gcabashe – a nurse and a midwife by training – was quickly able to find work 
in Atlanta, both practicing nursing as well as educating future nurses. However, she continued to 
have a desire to work for change within South Africa. Gcabashe saw a sign calling for volunteers 
to help with the American Friends Service Department’s welfare program, working on local 
domestic issues. She became a regular volunteer with the AFSC. At the beginning of the 1980s, 
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the Southeast Regional Director told her about the AFSC’s South Africa Program based in 
Philadelphia. He asked her if she would like to direct such a program in Atlanta. She agreed and 
was hired on as an AFSC employee.
117
  
Shortly thereafter, in the Fall of 1981, Gcabashe placed an advertisement in local 
newspapers, calling for a meeting of people who were interested in issues regarding Southern 
Africa and the United States’ role in that region. The meeting was held at the First 
Congregationalist Church in downtown Atlanta, a denomination that was at the forefront of anti-
apartheid activism nationally.  The meeting was attended by at least twenty individuals, and 
Gcabashe was thrilled with the response. Gcabashe said that the core group of attendees were 
people from the Atlanta University Center, including Mack Jones and Earl Picard. Gloria Gaines 
was also present at this first gathering, and she and Mack Jones were elected co-chairs of the new 
Southern Africa Support Committee. Later the group was renamed and became The Georgia 
Coalition for Divestment in Southern Africa. The Coalition’s purpose was to support and 
enhance the work of the American Friends Service Committee’s Southern Africa program by 
advocating for Atlanta-based companies to fully withdraw from South Africa.
118
 
One of the Georgia Coalition’s first targets was Atlanta-based M&M products, a black-
owned hair-care company and fourth largest black owned company in the United States.  During 
the early 1980s, M&M expanded its market into Southern Africa. While the company claimed 
that their Southern Africa business was located solely in Swaziland and Botswana, Gcabashe 
responded that “they are trying to circumvent the divestment issue – they do very little business 
in Botswana and Swaziland.” According to Earl Picard, active member of the Georgia Coalition 
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and a PhD student at Atlanta University’s Political Science Department (at that time), prominent 
local African American leaders including Coretta Scott King and Joe Beasley were actively 
involved in the discussion with and regarding M&M Products. M&M Products contracted with a 
Swaziland-based company called Vivid Distributors to market the products throughout Southern 
Africa. Finally, during the summer of 1985, M&M Products announced “its decision to sever all 
ties with Vivid U.S. Distributors…M&M has taken the step of terminating this distributor in 
order to end the perception that M&M’s relationship is inconsistent with its stand against the 
reprehensible system of apartheid in South Africa.” Gcabashe praised this decision and 
confirmed the company’s withdrawal as legitimate and suggested that M&M Products be asked 
to be a part of a boycott against Coca Cola that was just in its fledgling stages. Activist, Earl 
Picard confirmed that “The Atlanta black leadership also endorsed M&M for its actions.”119 
In 1985 the Georgia Coalition sponsored demonstrations against Holiday Inn, Westin 
Hotel Company, General Motors and IBM. All of the demonstrations intended to bring attention 
to the fact that these U.S.-based corporations sustained the South African apartheid government 
with their investments and thus “continued to “profit off racist tyranny.” For example, Holiday 
Inn licensed with Rennies Consolidated to open twenty-two hotels within South Africa which 
would, of course, carry out South Africa’s segregationist policies. General Motors was allegedly 
the second largest U.S. employer in South Africa. It was particularly offensive to anti-apartheid 
activists because the company sold vehicles directly to the South African police and military 
“allowing those used to transport prisoners to jail.” Further, according to a Georgia Coalition 
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flyer, “GM has admitted that because of the strategic importance of their facilities to the 
apartheid economy, GM plants could be converted to wartime use if the government so ordered.” 
Anti-apartheid activist and union organizer, Dianne Mathiowetz, commented, “By that time I 
was working at GM, on the assembly line…I would be outside passing out flyers to my 
coworkers that said, ‘What Every Worker Should Know About South Africa.’”120 
At an April 1985 protest outside an IBM stockholders meeting, Gcabashe was arrested 
for trespassing, along with State Representative Tyrone Brooks, then City Councilman John 
Lewis, Georgia Coalition Chair Mack Jones and five other demonstrators. The Atlanta 
Constitution article that covered the demonstration and arrest explained, “literature from the 
protesters claims that IBM is the largest computer supplier in South Africa, with annual sales 
estimated at about $215 million.”  A Business Week article from March of the following year 
confirmed this estimate, citing IBM’s annual sales in South Africa a value of $200 million. 
Ironically, despite IBM’s willingness to continue trading with the apartheid regime, the computer 
giant began to lose business in South Africa, as South African companies shifted their computer 
purchases to Japanese brands in anticipation of sanctions laws from the U.S. government. While 
Japan banned direct investment in South Africa as early as the late 1960s, companies such as 
Hitachi got around the laws by sending their computers to South Africa via West Germany. By 
the end of 1986, IBM was one of many U.S. companies who claimed to have withdrawn from 
South Africa immediately following the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act over 
President Reagan’s veto. However, IBM products continued to be available in South Africa 
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through new local marketers. While IBM proudly announced that it had turned over its South 
Africa operations “to a new company created for the benefit of employees,” anti-apartheid critics 
considered this type of divestment to be a sham, allowing IBM to retain access to the South 
African markets and profits.
121
 
As early as 1978 the AFSC had called for a boycott of the popular South African gold 
coins, called Krugerrands. A 1978 flyer emphasized that “every ounce of gold that South Africa 
can sell abroad enriches the white regime. It adds up to more arms, more repress, more poverty, 
more deaths for hundreds of thousands of black Africans.” The flyer called for Americans to 
urge local retailers to stop selling the Krugerrand. By 1985 this protest had reached Atlanta. On 
May 22 a demonstration was held at Georgia Stamp and Coin in downtown Atlanta. A flyer 
advertising the demonstration informed Atlantans that “Black miners dig the gold that makes 
South Africa rich…However, black miners are not receiving the benefits. Black miners are 
prevented by law from occupying highly-skilled and highly-paid jobs.” The flyer also makes the 
connection that the Krugerrand is named after Paul Kruger, a nineteenth century white South 
African leader who called for the black South African “to be taught that he came second and that 
he belongs to the inferior class that must obey.”122 
In 1986, the Georgia Coalition and the AFSC joined the NAACP, AFL-CIO, United 
Mineworkers and leaders of the Washington DC-based Free South Africa Movement (FSAM), in 
boycotting Shell Oil Company. Shell was chosen as a target because of the “parent company’s 
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heavy involvement in the South African economy,” in regards to its petroleum and mining 
operations. With this boycott, the demonstrators emphasized the connections between apartheid 
in South Africa and labor conditions in the United States. The flyers pointed out that by taking 
advantage of cheap labor in South Africa, Shell could export inexpensive products to the United 
States and other nations, undercutting American workers. While most of the AFSC and Georgia 
Coalition boycotts took place in downtown Atlanta, the Shell Retail Training Center was located 
in Smyrna, and the demonstrators met downtown to travel together to the west-side suburb. 
Randall Robinson, FSAM co-chairman stated: “Shell is the first company on our list…it is not 
the last.” He warned that demonstrations against Shell would take place throughout the United 
States “with the same efficiency and consistency that we’ve seen for over a year at the South 
African Embassy. As did the leaders of other multinational corporations, a Shell spokesman 
argued, “By being there we are doing the right thing, helping bring about change through our 
social and employment policies, and by speaking out against the apartheid system.” Anti-
apartheid activists, of course were not convinced, and Shell did not provide details regarding its 
alleged history of “speaking out against the apartheid system.”123  
Ken Martin of the AFSC Philadelphia headquarters wrote a 1987 essay titled, “Economic 
Non-Cooperation: Some Thoughts on Boycotting,” which addressed criticisms over the types of 
activity described above. Martin emphasizes the long history of economic sanctions as a tool of 
government diplomacy, but makes a clear distinction between the morally driven call for 
sanctions against South Africa, which “emerges from a grassroots determination not to 
contribute the continuation of that regime” in contrast with historical U.S. government usages of 
sanctions to “coerce other nations to conform to the foreign policy objectives of the strong.” 
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Martin suggests that the efforts to discredit sanctions may emerge from the fact that divestment 
is at the expense of powerful multi-national corporations. Further, Martin argues against those 
who believe that U.S. corporations can use their influence in South Africa to advocate for social 
change, and emphasizes that a stronger statement would be “a refusal to supply South Africa’s 
economy with further means to afford to make warfare upon its own citizens and the peoples of 
surrounding countries.” Finally Martin responds to those Quaker critics who worry whether 
economic disengagement is a legitimately nonviolent strategy, as opponents argued that a 
weakened South African economy would hurt the black masses. Martin believes this type of 
reasoning is not valid. By the late 1700s Quakers were encouraged to “manage their money in 
ways that did not bear the seeds of war.” A 1986 AFSC memo with the subject line, “Definitions 
and Talking points on Corporate Withdrawal from South Africa,” further elaborates on the 
intentions of the AFSC-supported divestment movement:  
AFSC’s purpose in divesting and in promoting disinvestment and corporate 
disengagement is to cease profiting from apartheid, to withdraw its economic 
support from apartheid, and to exert moral and political pressure in support of 
apartheid’s abolition. The efforts are not intended to threaten South Africa’s 
government or people or cripple their economy. They are motivated by a desire to 
communicate support to those who, at great risk, are resisting apartheid and 
seeking to build a just society.
124
 
 
Also during 1986 the Georgia Coalition for Divestment in Southern Africa began taking 
steps to become “legally independent from AFSC.” The proposed breakup was an amicable one, 
and SERO director Elizabeth Enloe helped Georgia Coalition co-chair, Gloria Gaines, through 
the process as the group sought to incorporate as a nonprofit, establish bylaws and a new 
organizational structure, and fill out the necessary paperwork to gain federal tax exemption. 
Throughout this process, the AFSC continued to provide the Georgia Coalition with financial 
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and institutional support. It appears that the motivation for the Georgia Coalition’s independence 
was so that this group could take on full leadership of the Coke Boycott. Gaines wrote, “We have 
formed a committee which is moving fairly rapidly on the major issues required to become 
legally independent from AFSC and, therefore, to implement the agreement reached between 
AFSC and the Coalition some time ago regarding the administration of the Coke Campaign.” 
The Coke boycott will be discussed in depth in a later chapter. It is not clear if the Georgia 
Coalition ever did establish complete independence from the AFSC.
125
 
As its name suggests, one of the primary goals of the AFSC’s Southern Africa Peace 
Education Program was “educating Americans on Southern Africa issues and the U.S. role in 
supporting apartheid…making oppressed people in the U.S. aware of oppression in South Africa 
and U.S. business  involvement in that oppression.” To this end, much of Gcabashe’s time was 
spent traveling around Atlanta, the Southeast and beyond, speaking to groups about the crisis in 
South Africa. From the beginning of her employment with the AFSC – and perhaps before – 
Gcabashe gave frequent talks to “civic, cultural and educational institutions” on apartheid. 
During October and November of 1982, Gcabashe spoke at Spelman and Emory Universities in 
Atlanta as well as traveled to Florida State University, University of North Carolina, Duke 
University and Davidson College.
126
 
Again in the Fall of 1984, Gcabashe had a particularly busy schedule of speaking 
engagements. During September, she traveled with an eighteen member tour to Midwestern 
states, including Minnesota, South Dakota and Wisconsin. The following month, after 
coordinating a Student Divestment Conference at Atlanta’s Interdenominational Theological 
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Center, Gcabashe and thirteen other activists divided into four teams and traveled to a total of 
twenty-six cities across nine states. The tour involved “speaking, showing films and slides and 
doing TV and radio shows” for student, community, church and labor groups. On October 16, 
1984 Archbishop Desmond Tutu was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work promoting 
racial justice in South Africa. This award increased American public awareness of the crisis in 
South Africa, and according  to Gcabashe, “media interest was stimulated by Bishop Tutu 
winning the Nobel Peace prize plus the increased resistance to apartheid by the masses inside 
South Africa.” During this same month, Gcabashe accepted invitations to speak at several 
Protestant churches. Perhaps American Christians began taking a greater interest in events in 
South Africa in the wake of Bishop Tutu’s Nobel Prize. Gcabashe was later invited to speak to 
the Atlanta Archdiocesan Council of Catholic Women as well. By the end of the month, Gcbashe 
had also done appearances at Georgia State, Spelman and Morehouse. Finally, she also spoke at 
Harper and Wheeler High Schools, both located in Metro Atlanta.
127
 
These visits to local high schools in 1984 were a precursor to a more concerted effort to 
reach younger students by 1987. An AFSC Southeastern Regional Office memo lamented, “It 
has been found, through our speaking engagements, that elementary and high school teachers are 
often as uninformed as the students.” Gcabashe planned a teacher training seminar to be held at 
the Georgia Association of Educators Headquarters. The one day seminar would address the 
concepts of disinvestment and economic disengagement, U.S. foreign policy towards Southern 
Africa, current divestment legislation, and the history of churches and religious groups in the 
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anti-apartheid movement. The AFSC representatives were confident that “By empowering the 
educators it will be possible to reach a vast student population.”128 
Beginning in December of 1980 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a 
resolution calling for entertainers to protest South Africa’s apartheid government by refusing to 
perform in that country. The AFSC and Georgia Coalition for Divestment took a leading role in 
promoting the cultural boycott locally. In October of 1983 the UN released a list of 211 singers 
and groups who had violated this boycott. This statement from the UN included particular 
condemnation of Frank Sinatra: “While some of the collaborators may have visited South Africa 
out of ignorance of the situation of lure of exorbitant fees, others have shown deliberate 
insensitivity or hostility to the legitimate aspirations of the oppressed people of South Africa.” 
Sinatra visited South Africa twice in the early 1980s despite the appeals and protests of anti-
apartheid groups. His actions were particularly offensive because on his second visit he played in 
Bophuthatswana, one of the areas designated as a Black Homeland in South Africa in an effort 
by the apartheid regime to maintain the large majority of valuable South African land for whites 
and to promote the government’s goals of “separate development.” Sinatra accepted an award 
from the “president” of Bophuthatswana, and his press spokesman stated about the trip, 
“We…were entirely satisfied with the conditions of civil rights, integration and the like.” Before 
Sinatra came to Atlanta to perform at the Fox Theatre in 1984 he received a letter from Bill 
Withers, Chair of the Cultural Boycott Subcommittee of the Georgia Coalition for Divestment in 
Southern Africa. The letter was printed on AFSC letterhead. In the letter, Withers urged Sinatra 
to denounce the apartheid regime and to apologize for having performed in South Africa. 
Withers explained that “Bophuthatswana is not an independent nation; it is the result of a racist 
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and genocidal policy of the white minority regime in South Africa to forcibly remove black 
South Africans into controlled areas called ‘homelands.’” Withers warned Sinatra that if he did 
not respond to this letter, and make a public apology, the group would proceed with plans to 
picket outside of the Fox Theatre during his performance. Sinatra did not respond, and the 
demonstration did occur, though it was not covered by the Atlanta press
129
. 
When singer Helen Reddy came to Atlanta to perform at Chastain Amphitheatre, 
Gcabashe issued a press release stating that because Reddy had performed in South Africa during 
November of 1982 in violation of the United Nations sanctions, the event would be protested by 
the Georgia Coalition. In the release Gcabashe explained, “By performing in South Africa artists 
give support and credibility to the racist system of apartheid.” According to the press release, the 
planned picketing was “intended to show Helen Reddy and others that enlightened public 
opinion will not tolerate their indifference to the struggling people of South Africa.” By 1985 the 
cultural boycott had achieved some success locally. Minutes from the Georgia Coalition’s 
monthly staff meeting revealed that radio station “WRFG has agreed to discontinue playing 
music by entertainers who have performed in South Africa.” The group planned to lobby other 
stations to make a similar declaration.
130
 
During November of 1985 Gcabashe coordinated a visit from Leah Tutu, wife of 
Archbishop Tutu and Director of the Domestic Workers and Employers Project in Johannesburg. 
The trip was funded by the American Friends Service Committee. During her time in Atlanta, 
Tutu gave a talk at Morehouse College, during which her message emphasized one particular 
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point, “Apartheid is evil; please help us destroy it.” Attendees at the event included most of the 
city’s African American leaders and anti-apartheid activists including, John Lewis, Julian Bond, 
Andrew Young, Coretta Scott King and Joseph Lowery. At the event, Mayor Young declared 
November 7 Leah Tutu Day in Atlanta. Before the public address, Tutu attended a fundraising 
reception which supported the AFSC’s Southern Africa Peace Education Fund. On the following 
day Tutu met with a group of invited activists and students at the King Center to discuss the anti-
apartheid work being done in Atlanta.
131
 
The Atlanta Journal Constitution covered the Leah Tutu visit with surprising detail given 
that publication’s frequent neglect of anti-apartheid demonstrations around the city.  In addition 
to the speech at Morehouse discussed above, Tutu also participated in a press conference at 
Atlanta’s City Hall. Her comments during this event are described in a November 6 article with 
the headline, “Mrs. Tutu: Soviet Help is Acceptable, South African Leader Refuses to Deny 
Possibility of Black Communist Rule.” Despite the alarmist title, the content summarizes Tutu’s 
statements in a fairly neutral tone and includes lengthy quotes in which Tutu explains that she 
believes that it is unlikely that Black South Africans would choose to create a communist 
government once the apartheid system was abolished. The article also quotes Tutu’s concerns 
regarding South Africa’s ban on photo coverage of violence as an attempt to prevent the outside 
world from learning the true brutality of apartheid South Africa. On November 8, the paper 
printed coverage of Tutu’s appearance at Morehouse. As mentioned above, Tutu’s speech 
emphasized that apartheid is an evil system. According the Atlanta Journal, Tutu, “assailed 
Western government leaders who refuse to repudiate, protest and place sanctions on the ‘evil’ 
minority rule of whites over blacks in South Africa.” Tutu also met privately with AJC editors 
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where she discussed her work with domestic workers in Johannesburg and stressed the growing 
anger that she has witnessed brewing among Black South Africans as violence and unrest have 
increased throughout the country. Finally, Tutu addressed the alleged concerns of American 
business interests who have argued that it is the black workers who would be hurt most by 
sanctions and divestment from South Africa: “Blacks are being hurt now and hurt very badly. 
We don’t care for people’s concern for our future miseries when they don’t care for our present 
miseries.”132 
Ironically, Leah Tutu’s time in Atlanta coincided with a visit from Chester Crocker, 
architect of Reagan’s failed Constructive Engagement policy towards South Africa. Crocker, 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs traveled to Atlanta as a guest of the Southern 
Center for International Studies. Despite the escalating turmoil in South Africa, as of 1985, 
Crocker continued to attempt (unsuccessfully) to keep focus on the positive changes coming 
from the apartheid government, claiming that “Pretoria has made more reforms in the last four 
years than in all the previous forty.” The AJC ran an editorial by staff writer, Tom Teepen which 
criticized Crocker’s stance and Reagan’s intransigence, pointing out that even if Crocker’s 
statement was true, “it is a very small brag, when offered of a country where almost no reforms 
were made in forty years.” Teepen attributes “all the dithering by the Reagan administration” to a 
“pathological fear of even titular communism” and the fact that “America’s South Africa policy 
has always been uniquely caught up in our own racial psychodrama.” Teepen closes by 
connecting Crocker’s presence in Atlanta to Tutu’s. Tutu spoke about the daily funerals of young 
black men killed in South Africa and buried by the forsaken wives, while Crocker and Reagan 
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continued to urge Americans to understand how difficult change is for white South Africans. 
“No doubt,” Teepen writes, “But, more difficult than it is for the young widows of black South 
Africa?”133 
The volume of archival sources and newspaper articles on anti-apartheid activism seems 
to peak around 1985 or 1986 and then decline in the latter years of the 1980s. I believe this 
decline can be attributed to the fact that the U.S. Government passed sanctions against South 
Africa in 1985 and 1986, so perhaps some activists felt that their work was complete, or more 
likely, they did not know where to focus their concerns following their successes with Congress. 
Certainly, the horrors of the apartheid system lived on in South Africa until the 1990s, and some 
groups within the United States continued to work to raise awareness. The Coke boycott was a 
huge part of the AFSC’s work in the latter half of the 1980s, and this campaign will be discussed 
in depth in a latter chapter.  
Throughout the late 1980s, AFSC continued to host events designed to raise awareness of 
the struggles of South Africans. These events included a March 1987 tree planting in honor of 
Nelson Mandela in front of the Atlanta University Center’s Woodruff Library. The event 
coincided with the publication of Nelson Mandela: The Struggle Is My Life as well as the United 
Nations-declared “International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.” This date, 
March 21 also commemorated the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre in South Africa. In addition to the 
tree planting, a press conference and book reception were held as well. Several months later, on 
June 4, AFSC again sponsored similar event, honoring Mandela and calling for his freedom. This 
event was held downtown in Woodruff Park, and included a speech from Gcabashe and the 
presentation of a sculpture to Mayor Andrew Young. Also in 1987 AFSC sponsored a “South 
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African Awareness Week,” in February. The week featured events everyday, including a play, a 
rally, speeches and films.
134
  
David Hostetter argues that the AFSC’s relationship with liberation groups in Africa and 
beyond was strained. He emphasizes the tension between the AFSC’s role as a pacifist 
organization and the armed liberation movements such as the ANC. Gcabashe’s life and work 
indicates that this relationship did not necessarily have to be difficult. A lifelong ANC member, 
Gcabashe began to work towards starting a local chapter in Atlanta in 1981, the same year she 
was hired by AFSC. The chapter sought to overcome apathy among local South Africans and 
focused on educating new members regarding the history of the ANC and the organization’s 
struggles against the apartheid system. In July of 1982, Atlanta hosted the ANC Annual 
Conference, which was declared a success. Gcabashe addressed the relationship between the 
AFSC and the ANC in a February 2013 interview:  
It was really a delicate balance as you can imagine. Within the AFSC there was a 
long discussion about whether they should even have this Southern Africa 
program with South Africa on it because they could not support any people who 
were at war within their own country, with the authorities in that country. But it 
helped, I think that at the same time, the World Council of Churches, as well as 
the South African Council of Churches, they were beginning to discuss the issue 
of what means can justify the ends. They were discussing the role of armed 
struggle in South Africa and…Some of them were saying…Jesus, in his preaching 
he stood for the oppressed, for the poor, for the down trodden, and sometimes he 
was very forceful in the way he went about doing that…So some of those 
arguments helped eventually to soften the position of the Church as a whole from 
South Africa to the World Council and to other churches as well…And the other 
argument from the ANC side, which I really pushed with the AFSC was, look at 
the history of the ANC. We did not just wake up one day and say, hey this 
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oppression is painful, it’s hard, it’s difficult, we need to pick up arms and fight. 
We had a long history of non violent struggle.
135
 
 
Gcabashe’s former boss, Elizabeth Enloe, Director of the AFSC’s Southeast Regional Office 
took Gcabashe’s position a step further, she emphasized that the AFSC’s long history and 
commitment to nonviolence combined with Gcabashe’s unique personal history “allowed people 
to continue to discuss what nonviolence meant in terms of revolution, in terms of oppression and 
in terms of its counterpart in the violent struggle.”136 
The AFSC’s Southern Africa program experienced nationwide struggles in the late 
1980s. A June 1987 letter from Southern Africa Staff around the country to the AFSC’s 
Philadelphia leadership expressed “deep concern about the status of AFSC Southern Africa 
Programs nationwide.” Writers of the letter were outraged that “several (4) Southern Africa 
programs had been placed at risk, due to budget shortages and regional prioritization decisions.” 
The letter’s authors believed that the AFSC’s stated affirmative action goals were not being 
fulfilled and that “substantial Third World program termination point to deficiencies in the 
processes of evaluation, oversight, and accountability on the local, regional and national levels.” 
These accusations point to the types of tensions described in Hostetter’s analysis of the AFSC’s 
Southern Africa programs.
137
 
The Atlanta office was not immune from these challenges. Gcabashe’s Quarterly Report 
for the Fall of 1988 stated several concerns. Malkia M’buzi had been a part-time AFSC 
employee working within the Southern Africa program, but by the late Fall 1988 was “no longer 
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available because we were unable to raise the funds necessary for her continued employment.” 
M’buzi was particularly involved with the Coke boycott, and Gcabashe reported that volunteers 
were being recruited to fill the gap left by M’Buzi’s departure. Further, Gcabashe reported that in 
regards to the Georgia Coalition for Divestment, “membership of this group has greatly reduced 
overtime.” Despite these difficulties, Gcabashe herself was quite active throughout the Fall of 
1988, traveling to Nashville, Boston and North Carolina for various events and speaking 
engagements. She also spoke at Atlanta area high schools, churches, the King Center, Georgia 
State University, and the Carter Center during October and November.
138
 
As has been demonstrated in this chapter, within Atlanta, the American Friends Service 
Committee took a leading role in creating an antiapartheid movement that gained a visible 
presence in the city. Gcabashe herself can take a significant portion of the credit for the level of 
influence and visibility that this movement achieved in Atlanta.  As Elizabeth Enloe emphasized,  
The role that AFSC was able to play because of Thandi, because of who she was, 
her credibility, her really remarkable ability to work with all people across the 
political spectrum, and to be understanding and respected for who she was and 
what she represented was really extraordinary. And that made it possible for an 
organization, in this case the AFSC to remain at the nexus of a great deal of the 
organizing…It was Thandi still being able to sit with people and understand what 
they were thinking, but talk with them about other perspectives in order to move 
the bigger picture forward. So it’s an individual capacity; not all people have it, 
but she certainly had it in quantity. 
 
The AFSC’s influence, as well as that of the Georgia Coalition for Divestment, will become even 
more evident in future chapters on the campaign for a divestment bill in the Georgia State 
legislature and the nationwide Coca-Cola boycott. 
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CHAPTER 4: WHAT THEY CALL POLITICS: ATLANTA’S POLITICAL 
ESTABLISHMENT AND SOUTH AFRICA 
After Reagan’s election as president in 1980, anti-apartheid activists in the United States 
realized the immense challenge they would face in getting the Republican-controlled Federal 
Government to take action against apartheid South Africa. In response to the changed political 
situation, activists began to focus on local and state governments. This chapter puts efforts to 
promote city and state level divestment in Atlanta and Georgia into a broader context of city and 
state divestment campaigns nationwide. Atlanta Mayor, Andrew Young was a key figure in 
mediating the connection between Atlanta and South Africa. Because of his personal connections 
to the civil rights movement and his subsequent rise to international political prominence as 
Ambassador to the United Nations under the Carter administration, Young characterized the 
combination of possibilities and limitations of the anti-apartheid movement in Atlanta. On the 
other hand, the experiences and contributions of Tyrone Brooks, also a civil rights veteran, 
former Southern Christian Leadership Conference organizer and elected official, offer an 
alternative vision of how an African American political leader from Georgia could influence the 
anti-apartheid movement. Brooks’ more activist approach to divestment legislation, however, did 
not yield success in a resistant State House of Representatives.  
During the late 1970s and early 1980s anti-apartheid organizations in the United States 
increasingly worked together to build coalitions to unite diverse constituencies and to educate the 
public about the ways that corporate and government action continued to support apartheid. 
More and more Americans learned about the presence of foreign capital in South Africa through 
these campaigns and through improved media coverage. After the Soweto uprising of 1976, 
European enterprises began to take the initiative to pull out of South Africa, in contrast to the 
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decision of American corporations to increase their presence in South Africa. In order to achieve 
their goals of influencing corporations to withdraw from South Africa, activists made use of both 
assimilative and confrontational approaches. This chapter examines both assimilative, or “inside” 
approaches, which include lobbying, election campaigns and petitions, and the complementary 
confrontational, or “outside,” activities, which include demonstrations and civil disobedience.139 
By the end of 1980, the AFSC, American Council on Africa (ACOA), TransAfrica, and 
the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), among other groups had come 
together to create the Campaign Against Investment in South Africa.  One of the key players 
behind this coalition was the Connecticut Anti-apartheid Committee, (CAAC) a group 
established in 1978. The CAAC was largely responsible for, Connecticut leading the way in 
state-level action. In June 1982, Connecticut’s governor signed into a law a bill that “required 
that the state divest all companies that were not in the top two Sullivan categories; all companies 
that made strategic sales…and all companies that refused to recognize the right of South African 
employees to organize and strike.” Although the law was not as stringent as the one CAAC had 
initially proposed, its passage was still significant. By the end of the year three cities and three 
states had approved divestment bills, and similar legislation had been filed in twenty-three other 
states.
140
 
In the months leading up to the passage of the Connecticut bill, the governor appointed a 
task force to research the impact that divestment would have on the state economically. After 
consulting several sources, the task force determined that shifting funds into a portfolio that did 
not include countries operating in South Africa might actually result in higher returns. In the 
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early 1980s, smaller corporations were growing more rapidly than the huge multinational 
companies that were likely to have a presence in South Africa. This data gave activists a new 
advantage in their efforts to force state pension funds to divest. Pension funds were a favorite 
target because of the huge sums of money they contained – often billions of dollars. The 
Massachusetts state legislature was the first to approve a full divestment of state pension funds. 
As in Connecticut, this legislation was made possible by a small group of committed activists. In 
1979, activist and state representative Mel King filed divestment legislation in the Massachusetts 
General Assembly. King and his allies realized the need to raise awareness of the situation in 
South Africa and to create an umbrella organization to unite potential supporters. The resulting 
MassDivest coalition launched a public education campaign in 1981 and achieved success in 
early 1983 when the state legislature overrode the governor’s veto, and passed a full divestment 
bill into law.
141
 
Later that year, New York City led the way in municipal level divestment as attention 
shifted to city pension funds. By 1984 New York was pursuing selective divestment and 
attempting to avoid purchasing products from businesses still maintaining their South African 
ties. These efforts had an immediate impact – both Kodak and Motorola responded first by 
ceasing sales to the South African military and police and then by selling their South African 
subsidiaries so as to maintain their profitable relationship with New York City.  Other cities 
throughout the United States observed the effects that New York’s divestment had on Motorola 
and Kodak and sought to pass their own divestment legislation.
142
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During the 1980s, Atlanta’s city government was led by Mayor Young. On the surface 
Young seemed like a prime candidate to lead a city to take an activist approach on international 
issues in general and against apartheid in particular, as he had gained much personal experience 
in Africa and beyond during his tenure as United States Ambassador to the United Nations from 
1977-1979. President Jimmy Carter, a fellow Georgia Democrat, chose Young because of his 
history of civil rights work and close personal friendship with Martin Luther King Jr. Carter 
wanted his administration to create a foreign policy with an emphasis on human rights and 
believed that Young’s connection to King’s legacy and philosophy made him the right person to 
represent the United States at the UN. Young’s appointment was initially a source of hope for 
black South Africans. According to Mark Mathbane, author of the popular memoir, Kaffir Boy, 
Carter’s “appointment of Andrew Young as UN ambassador brought tremendous joy and hope to 
blacks and infuriated and frightened the government and its supporters.”143 
What Mathbane and other black South Africans probably didn’t know, however was that 
back in Atlanta, Young had already come into direct conflict with a younger generation of anti-
apartheid activists. Immediately after the Soweto uprisings in South Africa, Secretary of State, 
Henry Kissinger traveled to West Germany for a preplanned, friendly meeting with South 
African Prime Minister BJ Vorster – despite demands from anti-apartheid activists to cancel the 
meeting in the wake of the violence. A group of Atlanta University students led by Earl Picard 
and Adolph Reed organized a demonstration at the Federal Reserve Bank Building in Atlanta to 
protest Kissinger’s continued diplomatic ties with the South Africans. In contrast, Young, who at 
the time was serving in Congress as the Fifth District US Representative, supported the meetings 
between Kissinger and Vorster. Demonstrators told the Atlanta Constitution that they were 
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“dissatisfied and gravely concerned” with Young’s statements in support of Kissinger: “We call 
on Congressman Young to denounce the meetings between Kissinger and Vorster as residents of 
the Fifth Congressional District.”144 
Reed explained that Young had refused a meeting with this group of activists before the  
 
demonstration, but 
  
After Andy was blasted in the Constitution, he found time to meet with us….He 
met with about thirty of us in Sage Hall in a room on the AU campus. Andy 
comes in; goes around the room, glad handing and doing what they call politics. 
We hadn’t talked about it a whole lot, but we were all determined to be on our 
best political behavior - no slogans. And it got frustrating because Andy kept 
insisting that we were all on the same side as the children of light, and Kissinger 
and the National Security Council…their problem wasn’t really racism; it was 
that they didn’t understand the black mind, and that’s why we needed to have 
more black presence in the State Department. So we kept going around and 
around and he was as slippery as an eel… Still though, nobody’s talking about 
imperialism, but we’re sort of peppering him (about the relationship between 
South Africa and Israel), and then Andy says, finally, ‘Look, you can’t expect me 
to be part of a worldwide struggle against imperialism.’ This is like a direct quote. 
He was the first person in the room to use the word. And then he says, ‘Because 
for one thing I’m too much a part of the imperialist system myself.’ You could 
have heard a pin drop, we’re all just looking around at each other, like did he just 
fucking say that…Well that kind of ended it. I said, ‘Well thanks for making that 
clear. So I’ll know now when Gabriel blows his horn, I’ll just look to see which 
way you’re going, and I’ll go the other way.’145 
 
When Young made his statement about the need for a stronger black presence in the State 
Department, he likely already knew that he would receive an appointment in Carter’s 
administration, if Carter won the election the following Fall.  According to Reed, Young 
prepared for the appointment by trying to “invent himself as an African specialist.” Although 
Young, as the youngest ever US Ambassador to the UN, did not have any formal diplomatic 
experience prior to his appointment, he had previously traveled to over thirty countries around 
the world, and had established friendships and contacts in many African governments. Young 
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and Carter made improving U.S. relations with Africa a major focus. Establishing a strong 
diplomatic connection with Nigeria was one of Young’s main accomplishments as Ambassador, 
and he made several trips to West African nations. However, much of Young’s energy and 
attention were given to issues in Southern Africa. Young worked to negotiate peace and majority 
rule in Rhodesia and independence for Namibia. While he didn’t see success in either of these 
arenas during his tenure as Ambassador, Young’s efforts were steps in the right direction.146 
Several main themes emerge when Young’s statements on South African apartheid over 
the years are examined together. None of the three is surprising given some knowledge of 
Young’s background and political philosophies. First, as an ardent champion of capitalism, 
Young believed that business interests in South Africa could have a positive influence on race 
relations in the country and that the free market would assist in stimulating political reform. 
Second, Young consistently compared and connected the South African fight for liberation to the 
American civil rights movement in which Young himself had actively participated in the 1950s 
and ‘60s. Finally, Young’s statements and views on divestment and economic sanctions were 
either inconsistent or evolving over the ten plus years that his opinions on South Africa remain in 
the spotlight. 
In connection with his concern for Namibian independence, Young began more clearly 
and vocally to articulate his position on the apartheid government of South Africa.  Despite the 
fact that the UN had approved Namibian independence in 1966, South Africa had refused to 
withdraw from the country, which it had occupied since World War One. In April 1977, Young 
traveled to South Africa for meetings on how to end apartheid. At this point, Young opposed 
comprehensive economic sanctions and divestment by U.S. businesses, a different position than 
that taken by most black South Africans as well as the overwhelming majority of American anti-
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apartheid activists. Young believed that the United States should continue its diplomatic relations 
with the South African apartheid government.
147
  
During his time in South Africa, Young frequently compared the anti-apartheid struggle 
in South Africa to the American fight for civil rights.  He believed that black and white South 
Africans could negotiate an end to apartheid and create a multiracial democracy. These 
comparisons alienated both the white South African government and the black masses; both 
groups interpreted his statements as an indication that Young was naïve and did not fully 
understand the unique situation in South Africa. While the South African government continued 
to view Young with suspicion, Steve Biko, popular leader of the Black Consciousness 
Movement in South Africa shunned Young by refusing to meet with him. Biko argued that 
Young was simply a capitalist whose race shielded him from criticism: “‘Carter uses Andrew 
Young’s color as a passport to the Third World, but Young has no program except the 
furtherance of the American system.”’ Young was indeed a capitalist sympathizer, as would 
become evident during his tenure as Atlanta’s mayor. He believed that business leaders could 
and should play a leading role in ending apartheid. During his visit to South Africa, he 
emphasized that incorporating black South Africans into the world economy was in the financial 
interest of the white elite. Workers are less likely to engage in armed rebellion when they have 
something significant to lose.
148
  
Young did speak out strongly against the apartheid system. He characterized the South 
African government as “illegitimate” and said, “I hate anything to do with that government.” In 
August 1977, Young attended an anti-apartheid conference in Nigeria. The conference was 
jointly sponsored by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity in cooperation 
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with the ANC and the PAC (Pan African Congress). There, Young delivered an address to the 
attendees, which included representatives from over 100 nations. Young began his speech by 
addressing criticism of U.S. policy that he had heard from other conference speakers. He pointed 
out “the fact that we are probably much more condemned by the government of South Africa 
than we have been by this conference.” Young went on to emphasize that the Carter 
administration’s stance was not at all pro South African government: “Recent rhetoric coming 
from Pretoria charges that the United States is trying to pull the rug out from white South Africa; 
that United States policy in South Africa gives no chance for survival and that the United States 
is trying to force South Africa to negotiate for its own destruction.” At this conference Young 
also conceded that while he personally favored nonviolent forms of protest, he would not 
condemn liberation movements that chose to use force as a method to achieve their goals: “I 
don’t believe in violence. I fought violence in my own country. I am determined that the United 
Nations continue as one institution that is devoted to peaceful change. And yet, I have never 
condemned another man’s right to take up arms in pursuit of his own freedom.”149 
During the Lagos Conference, Young was certainly aware that the United States was not 
likely to pass strict sanctions against South Africa, given that the apartheid government was still 
a Cold War anti-communist ally. Thus, Young countered his call for liberation in South Africa 
by pointing out: “Many of us share these objectives, but it is inevitable that we will differ on 
tactics and methods of achieving them. Our unity must depend on our mutual respect for the 
diversity of our approaches.” He went on to state that “It would not make much sense for us to 
make agreements here that would be refuted by our congress or repudiated by our people.” These 
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statements foreshadowed a divide that would soon emerge between several Western powers and 
the members of the Organization of African Unity.
150
 
When Steve Biko was killed by South African police a month later in September 1977, 
violence in South Africa intensified, and forty-nine African nations petitioned the United Nations 
to pass strict sanctions against South Africa.  Following Carter’s directive, Young voted against 
sanctions that would have banned foreign investment, nuclear cooperation and arms production 
within South Africa. Young’s veto was joined by that of representatives from France and Britain. 
Young did vote in favor of a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, and with his 
support, the measure passed. In Young’s statement to the UN Security Council, he did not 
address his reasons for vetoing the stronger sanctions bill. Rather, he emphasized the necessity 
for and potential impact of the arms embargo: 
My government has reluctantly but firmly concluded that the international community 
must now take steps to ensure that the flow of arms into South Africa does not add to a 
level of tension which is already endangering international peace…In the interest of 
encouraging South Africa’s leaders to embark on a new course, President Carter now has 
authorized me to state that the U.S. is prepared to join with the other members of this 
council in imposing a mandatory arms embargo. 
 
Still, during this October 1977 United Nations meeting Young continued to suggest that South 
Africans should and would take the lead in ending the oppression of apartheid: “The outside 
world can help, but the answers to South Africa’s problems must be found by South Africans 
themselves.  A dialogue must be started among all the peoples of South Africa with a view 
towards achieving a more just and stable society.”151  
The following year Young was forced to resign from his position as Ambassador to the 
United Nations when controversy ensued following a meeting between Young and a 
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representative from the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Overall, the Carter administration 
was willing to challenge Pretoria over its apartheid policies and to use confrontational rhetoric. 
This tone marked a departure from previous U.S. presidential administrations which generally 
turned a blind eye to South Africa’s racial policies. President Carter, Vice President Mondale, 
Ambassador Young, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, Richard Moose all were willing to demand progress from South Africa in the form of 
ultimatums. However, because this administration was not prepared to support comprehensive 
economic sanctions or to escalate the pressure on South Africa through other methods, the result 
was stalemate. By the end of the Carter presidency notable progress had not occurred in South 
Africa.
152
 
Young returned to Atlanta to work as a private consultant for international businesses. 
Two years later, in the fall of 1981, he was elected mayor. With his election Young succeeded 
Maynard Jackson, Atlanta’s first black mayor who urged Young to run for election, as did 
Coretta Scott King and other civil rights leaders. During Young’s campaign and his early years 
as mayor he focused on cultivating relationships with Atlanta’s white-led business community. 
He hoped that creating such ties with business leaders would entice corporations from outside of 
Atlanta to invest in the city. As anti-apartheid activism increased in Atlanta as the decade 
reached its midpoint, Young was frequently called on to take a stand on this important issue by 
appearing at demonstrations and speaking at rallies and other events.
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As an official voice of the United States, Young had adopted a tone and style which was 
viewed by many Americans as too confrontational towards the South African government. On 
the other hand, back home in Atlanta where a grassroots anti-apartheid movement was building 
momentum, Young took a position which seemed almost conciliatory. Any leadership he 
provided the movement was symbolic in nature and not without reservations. Earl Picard, student 
activist from Atlanta University’s Political Science department commented on his interactions 
with Young:  
Even in the civil rights movement, Andrew was always the one to take the path of 
least resistance, not muddy the waters.  So that was pretty much the counsel that 
he was giving; that we need to negotiate and do these behind the scenes kind of 
things, and not get out here and be disruptive and cause Coke and these other 
people to have a black eye. So we had interaction with him, but it was always 
very frustrating because Andy was Andy. He was Andy and he was never going 
to be a radical. Even Martin Luther King said, ‘Andy you just a capitalist.’154 
 
Within Atlanta city government, city council members took on the anti-apartheid cause 
without significant leadership from Young. This approach characterized the city council’s 
approach to most legislative issues during Young’s administration. As then-President of the 
Atlanta City Council, Marvin Arrington writes, “Andy freely admits that he didn’t work well 
with the city council. He took for granted that everybody in city government was working for the 
same people and for the same goals. He didn’t lobby the city council, and he didn’t cut deals 
with council members. His many absences from the city, even though his travel was vital for our 
financial success, hurt him on local issues.” In June 1985, Councilmen Bill Campbell and John 
Lewis introduced a resolution that directed the city to “sever ties with local banks that have 
outstanding loans to the South African government.” The Atlanta Journal reported on June 13 
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that the measure was unanimously approved by the Finance Committee and would be soon be up 
for vote from the full council. On the same day, the Atlanta Daily World elaborated by 
explaining that “the legislation is in the form of both a resolution and an ordinance.”  At the time 
of this legislation, the City of Atlanta did not have any investments in South Africa,  and 
Campbell and Lewis explained that “‘this legislation is designed to ensure that no future 
investment be made that in any way support the apartheid policies.”’ Campbell and Lewis gave 
credit to an organization called The Progressive Alliance for drafting the legislation.
155
 
            The next month, the full council unanimously approved the legislation as a resolution. 
The Resolution states that “the City of Atlanta should not and does not wish to support the policy 
of Apartheid by investing or maintaining deposits in enterprises or financial institutions doing 
business with the Republic of South Africa or Namibia.” Thus, no funds controlled by the City 
should be “invested in the stocks, securities, or other obligations of any business, corporation, 
banks, financial institution or other for profit enterprise doing business with the Republic of 
South Africa or Namibia or their state controlled instrumentalities.” In August, the Council took 
the July resolution a step further by passing an ordinance that required city pension funds to be 
invested “in entities without South African interests and to provide for the severing of banking 
relationships with those banks that have outstanding loans to South Africa.” This Ordinance was 
approved by the Council with twelve yes votes and two nays.
156
  
Councilwoman Myrtle Davis commented, “We, of course were criticized for doing that, 
that we needed to take care of our own business and stay out of the politics of international 
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affairs.” Davis’s experiences were not the first or last time that Atlanta city government officials 
were criticized for having an opinion on apartheid South Africa. Mayor Jackson took a stand 
against the South African government as early as 1974. Jackson refused to meet Van Niekerk, 
chief of the South African information agency, and his chief of staff explained that “the mayor’s 
policy is not to receive visitors from South Africa.”Jackson was immediately ridiculed in an 
Atlanta Journal  editorial: “Atlanta…has now entered the heady realm of those few cities who 
have their own separate foreign policies…Atlanta’s foreign policy at the moment relates only to 
South Africa, but after all the new city administration has only been in office for a few months 
and there may well be upcoming foreign policy positions.”157   
During his two terms as Atlanta’s mayor, Andrew Young frequently received this type of 
criticism. Young spent much time away from Atlanta during his time in office, traveling 
extensively throughout the United States and abroad. During the first three months of 1984 for 
example, Young visited five foreign countries and ten U.S. cities, spending half of his weekdays 
away from Atlanta. Criticism came from the media, his constituents, and his Republican rivals. 
Republican Representative Newt Gingrich went on the attack after Young traveled to Angola in 
1986: “He ought to be coming up to Washington and lobbying for more money and more jobs 
for Atlanta and Georgia. But instead of rolling up his sleeves and doing the job a mayor out to 
do, he’s acting like an associate secretary of state. I’m frankly just disgusted with it.” Young 
didn’t seem to mind the criticism though, commenting “They joke that we are a city that tries to 
have its own foreign policy.” In a speech to the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce Young also 
joked that “All I have to do is go around the world bragging about what we are doing – what you 
are doing, because I probably am not here long enough to do much of anything.” Young never 
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had any intentions of responding to his critics by changing his globe-trotting ways. Upon 
beginning his second term as Mayor in 1986, he commented: “I really don’t think I’ve traveled 
much at all. Last term I think I traveled too little.”158  
Much of Young’s travel was intended to bring business to Atlanta and to turn the city into 
a legitimate international city. He also used his travels and far flung contacts as a way to criticize 
President Reagan’s Cold War policies in Central America and voice his opinions on South 
Africa’s apartheid government. Doing so likely helped Young to connect with and gain the trust 
of African political and business leaders. The trip to Angola that drew the criticism from 
Gingrich was an opportunity for Young to meet with government officials and learn more about 
South Africa’s efforts to undermine Angola’s Marxist government. According to Young, South 
Africa worked to create instability throughout the region in hopes of keeping the Reagan 
administration convinced that only continued support for South Africa’s apartheid regime could 
prevent all of Southern Africa from falling into communist hands.
159
   
Young ultimately supported the passage of comprehensive economic sanctions against 
South Africa, and he argued that that banning commercial flights between the U.S. and South 
Africa would be a particularly useful measure. Young argued that a commercial air ban was 
appealing because it would have a minimal impact on participating countries and because “‘An 
airline sanction doesn’t destroy property, it doesn’t hurt anybody.”’ Young went on to explain 
that such a ban would shift the balance of power between South Africa and its neighboring 
countries, as well as “force rich whites in the country ‘to share some of the inconvenience’ of 
apartheid.” Young spoke about a potential shutdown of airline traffic to South Africa during a 
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1987 visit to neighboring Zimbabwe. Young’s trip to Zimbabwe followed a 1983 visit from that 
country’s controversial leader, Robert Mugabe. Young was criticized for receiving Mugabe in 
Atlanta, as Mugabe was a viewed as a leftist and had a poor human rights record. Young 
countered his critics by saying, “I don’t defend the human rights practices of Zimbabwe. I just 
think that Robert Mugabe is the best hope we have.”160 
Young’s focus on restricting airline travel was interesting because he counted the 
expansion of Atlanta’s Hartsfield International Airport as one of the great successes of his time 
in office.  Throughout the 1980s, Atlanta vied with Chicago for the title of busiest airport, and 
cited new direct flights to Atlanta from Switzerland, Italy and Japan as indicators of international 
business that he had generated for the city. Young believed that increasing international business 
and investment was crucial for Atlanta’s continuous economic growth. Young called his 
approach to economic development, “public purpose capitalism,” meaning that private business 
projects would serve the interest of the public. Although Young criticized Reagan’s foreign 
policy, his belief that the benefits of economic growth would trickle down from the business elite 
to the African American masses had much in common with Reagan’s neoliberal economic 
policies.
161
  
In May 1985, Young testified before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
regarding U.S. policy towards South Africa. In his testimony, Young recalled the arms embargo 
that he approved during his tenure at the United Nations:  
Sanctions do work, and I would say that the sanctions against South Africa, 
specifically the arms embargo, brought a phenomenal change not only in the 
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South African Government’s behavior but in total relationships in southern 
Africa. It was on the heels of the tragic death of Steve Biko that shows sanctions 
and the arms embargo sent a message from the U.S. Government that the U.S. 
Government did not tolerate that kind of behavior. 
 
Young did not acknowledge the fact that in 1977, when he voted to approve the arms embargo 
against South Africa, he had at the same time, vetoed sanctions that would have banned foreign 
investment in South Africa.  By this point, Young’s views on the efficacy of sanctions had 
changed from those he voiced during 1977.
162
 
During his testimony Young portrayed the South African business community as more 
progressive on racial issues than were South African government leaders. Young claimed that the 
Afrikaner Chamber of Commerce was calling for an end to the apartheid system, and that “even 
within the context of South African white society there is some question about whether or not the 
majority, if given the freedom to choose, would now choose the system of apartheid that requires 
the rigid military backing of the Government in order to maintain its enforcement.”  Thus, 
Young believed that the passage of comprehensive economic sanctions by the United States 
would send a strong message from the U.S. government and that progressive elements within 
South Africa “could use this as a means of doing things that they know they have to do.” Again, 
Young drew on his experience from the civil rights movement in the South, reminiscing about 
Southern politicians who knew that if they supported school desegregation they would be voted 
out of office and were actually relieved when the courts stepped in to enforce bussing and other 
measures: “In difficult matters of social change, some outside authority is needed. I think the 
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U.S. Senate in this case becomes that kind of authority…to say to the people of South Africa that 
they must change and they must change quickly in order to avoid chaos and bloodshed.”163 
Later that summer Young elaborated on the statements he made to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in a lengthy interview with the Atlanta Journal Constitution’s Steve 
Harvey. Here Young emphasized that the sanctions being considered by Congress would stand as 
a “complete repudiation of Reagan’s constructive engagement policy.” By this point, most 
Americans acknowledged that Constructive Engagement had failed. As Young explained, 
“Constructive engagement was interpreted by the South Africans as meaning you can do 
anything you want, we’re with you.” Young also pointed out that even when the Carter 
administration spoke out against apartheid, the U.S. Congress had stayed silent. Passing 
comprehensive sanctions would be an excellent way for Congress to make a major statement 
against South Africa’s apartheid government. 164 
As he did in his testimony before the Senate, Young stressed the importance of the 1977 
UN arms embargo. He argued that “The government killings stopped for the remainder of the 
Carter administration following the embargo…But the first year Reagan was in office I think 
there were eleven (deaths related to the unrest), then about thirty in 1982 and a total of about 300 
by 1984. There have been about 1,000 to date.” Again Young connected the racial situation in 
South Africa to that in the Deep South during the 1950s and ‘60s. He believed that the United 
Nations and the U.S. needed to become a moral authority for South Africa, the way that the 
courts acted to force desegregation in the South several decades earlier. Young again argued that 
the business community in South Africa could be a positive force for change, as were business 
leaders in Birmingham who responded to demands for integrated lunch counters. Elsewhere 
                                                          
163“U.S. Policy towards South Africa” a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 1985, 
Testimony of Andrew Young; accessed via ProQuest. 
164
 Steve Harvey, (no headline), Atlanta Journal Constitution, July 21, 1985, C1. 
113 
 
Young used the phrase, “enlightened self interest” to explain how the market economy could 
create change in South Africa.
165
 
Young did express two opinions that differed from those held by most anti-apartheid 
leaders. First, when asked if he supported disinvestment, Young replied, “I have to be in favor of 
it because that’s the only way to get business to be in any way socially responsible. But I don’t 
actually expect anybody to pick up and go. My position has always been selective disinvestment, 
in the sense that I don’t believe you can ever make a general boycott work. But I think you can 
be selective. You can pick a specific company.” Young’s remarks here were confusing. As a 
consistent friend of capitalism, he had stated many times that he believed that businesses could 
serve the public good, but did that mean only if consumers force them to be socially responsible? 
Also, why did he not “expect anybody to pick up and go?” Many Americans absolutely expected 
for U.S. based corporations to leave South Africa. At times Young himself called for economic 
sanctions. Perhaps in this case Young was aligning himself with the Sullivan Principles, 
suggesting that American businesses could be a force for change by continuing to operate in 
South Africa rather than by pulling out. By supporting selective disinvestment, Young may be 
affiliating himself with those activists who called for companies whose products directly 
supported South Africa’s police state to withdraw, while allowing more companies who provided 
more benign products to stay. For example, IBM should no longer provide computers to the 
South African military, but Coca Cola could continue to provide sugary beverages to the masses. 
Many would argue that this logic was flawed because even those companies whose products did 
not directly contribute to the oppression of the South African masses, were indeed profiting from 
the apartheid system as long as they stayed in South Africa.
166
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Tyrone Brooks gave Young the benefit of the doubt when analyzing why the Mayor may 
have been hesitant to fully support full disinvestment: “I think he had mixed feelings about the 
impact on Africans who lived in South Africa. I think he was concerned about the harm that 
could be done. But we always said, ‘there may be some temporary harm for the greater good.’ 
Just like here in America, we had to boycott and sometimes it would impact our people in a 
negative way - short term, but we were looking at the long term goal of ending an oppressive 
system.”  Before his untimely death at the hands of the South African police force, Biko 
expressed a similar opinion about Young more emphatically. When discussing whether South 
African liberation groups should be accepting Soviet assistance, Biko said,  
Look, I’m not starry eyed about the Russians, and I reject their basic ideology – 
it’s just that their brand of intervention has been more beneficial in Africa. Of 
course it is to suit their own cynical ends – but it is of more practical assistance 
than the oratory of an Andrew Young. The Andy Youngs are nice enough guys, 
but their approach is doing us no damn good. If we are to have a peaceful solution 
here, the Andy Youngs must stop talking and really get tough…sanctions, 
blockades if necessary, the lot. We blacks reject the theory that sanctions will 
harm us more. It’s always whites who say that. If people want to be our friends, 
they must act as friends, with deeds.
167
 
 
Further, Young, who had just recently filmed a debate with South African Foreign 
Minister Pik Botha for ABC’s “Nightline,” emphasized the need to facilitate communication 
with white South African leaders: “I’ve always figured that anytime a South African, black or 
white, wants to come into my office and see how a multiracial society works, I am open to them. 
To maintain a dialogue doesn’t support apartheid, it supports change.” This stance differed from 
that of many Americans, including former Atlanta Mayor Maynard Jackson who had refused to 
meet with a representative from South Africa. Most socially conscious Americans argued that 
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there was nothing to discuss with South African leaders so long as political dissidents such as 
Nelson Mandela remained in prison. 
168
 
During his time as mayor of Atlanta, Young’s most significant contribution to the anti-
apartheid movement was most likely his frequent presence at rallies and other anti-apartheid 
events around the city. Young often spoke at such events, and the support of a respected elected 
official probably provided these events with increased legitimacy among Atlanta’s mainstream 
political community. At the same time, speaking at an anti-apartheid rally allowed Young to 
retain the support of his African American constituency, without which he could not win 
reelection in 1985. Brooks explained Young’s pragmatism: “I don’t think he wanted to be a 
leader… But he understood that this was a larger movement that he or I could impact, but were 
not going to stop it. It was just a movement whose time had come. Even though he was not a 
leader of it; he was not a proponent of it, but he understood that it was something that he either 
had to support or get out of the way because the movement was going to continue. He wasn’t 
going to stop it.”169 
As anti-apartheid efforts increased in frequency in 1985, Young appeared at a March 22
nd
 
rally called Bi-partisans Against Apartheid, held in Atlanta’s Central Park. At the rally Young 
spoke to the crowd of about 100, as did Brooks, SCLC President Joseph Lowery and Georgia 
Republican Chairman Bob Bell. The rally was held to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary 
of the Sharpeville Massacre in which sixty black protestors were killed in South Africa. Young 
exclaimed to the crowd, “The government of South Africa must recognize the citizenship of 
Blacks in that country.”  When Bell spoke, he emphasized the history of the Republican Party’s 
contribution to civil rights and the need for a bipartisan movement to confront apartheid in South 
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Africa. The event was covered in the Atlanta Daily World, an African American owned and 
operated newspaper with a conservative bent.
170
 
In August of that year the Alpha Phi Alpha fraternity held their annual national 
convention in Atlanta. More than 1,000 fraternity members participated in a march to the King 
Center for Nonviolent Social Change. Young, a member of that fraternity, led the marchers after 
offering a speech to kick off the rally. As was his typical approach, Young compared apartheid in 
South Africa to segregation in the Jim Crow South. Coretta Scott King also spoke at the 
gathering, connecting Martin Luther King’s legacy to the anti-apartheid cause. Jackson urged the 
fraternity members to voice their opinions to President Reagan and the U.S. Congress. Jackson’s 
call was timely given that the same day, activists of the Free South Africa Movement in 
Washington DC, demanded that President Reagan end all diplomatic and economic relations 
with the South African government.
171
  
Several weeks later on August 27
th
, 2,000 Atlanta University students gathered to hear 
several notable speakers address the crisis in South Africa. In addition to Tandi Gcabashe and 
Young, students heard from Bernice King, daughter of Martin Luther King Jr and Mpho Tutu, 
daughter of Bishop Desmond Tutu. Much of the focus of the gathering was repudiating the 
recent remarks from conservative evangelist Jerry Falwell. Upon returning from a visit to South 
Africa, Falwell praised that country’s apartheid government and encouraged American 
companies to continue to invest in South Africa. Young took great offense to the fact that 
Falwell, a fellow Christian and preacher would “take sides against Moses and in favor of 
Pharaoh.” Young argued that American companies would be best served to invest elsewhere as 
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South Africa’s economy was likely to become increasingly unstable: “Even if you don’t believe 
in morality, and you don’t believe in sanctions, but you love your money, you ought to tell Jerry 
Falwell to go to hell.” These statements fit with Young’s concept of “enlightened self 
interest.”172 
By 1986 Young’s call for divestment and disinvestment had become stronger. Young 
held his strong line in favor of divestment at a January 1986 MLK day rally to protest apartheid. 
This gathering was part of an NAACP sponsored march which began in Los Angeles seven 
months earlier.  In Atlanta, a group of seventy people joined the twenty-five participants who 
had already walked across the country. Together the group walked from Martin Luther King’s 
grave site to city hall where they were greeted by Mayor Young. There Young called for U.S. 
corporations to set a specific time table for their withdrawal from South Africa. When Spelman 
College held an assembly in April of 1986 to determine whether the school should divest (as 
discussed in chapter one), Young attended the gathering and spoke to Spelman trustees, 
administration, faculty and students. Young urged Spelman trustees to shift investments from 
companies operating in South Africa to more benevolent institutions such as the African 
Development Bank: “You have a choice in divesting in oppression and investing in feeding the 
hungry and clothing the naked.”  However, he also continued to emphasize the positive potential 
that business leaders have to create social change by connecting the present situation in apartheid 
South Africa to the historical context in the U.S. South: “It wasn’t politicians that turned around 
the South. It was the business community…In Birmingham, 100 businessmen decided they were 
going to desegregate because they weren’t making any money.”173 
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Meanwhile, Tyrone Brooks was also sought after as a speaker at various anti-apartheid 
events around Atlanta. Former student activist Earl Picard commented on Brooks’ contributions: 
“At least he continued his activism once he got elected. He was an activist that went into politics, 
as opposed to a politician that became an activist.” Brooks did indeed have a long history of 
challenging U.S. support for South African apartheid. In 1976, in the wake of the Soweto 
uprising, Brooks traveled to Washington DC, along with fellow then-SCLC president Ralph 
Abernathy, Atlanta civil rights veteran, Hosea Williams and political activist and comedian, Dick 
Gregory. Brooks credits Gregory with the idea for the demonstration.  According to Brooks, 
Gregory said, “Why don’t we go to Washington on Thanksgiving Day; and why don’t we protest 
at the Whitehouse, demanding that the Whitehouse and the administration intervene and do 
something? And after that, why don’t we go around to the South African Embassy and protest 
and demand and end to apartheid and the release of Nelson Mandela?” The group traveled to 
DC, “picketed the White House.” Brooks describes the scene, “We were out there on 
Pennsylvania Avenue for hours, and then we went down to the South African Embassy and we 
picketed there for a while.  And all of a sudden, Dick Gregory said, ‘Why don’t we block the 
driveway, so nobody can leave or come in?’  So we did, and once we blocked the driveway, we 
were arrested and taken to the District of Columbia jail and held for several hours and then 
released.” Brooks believes that he and his comrades were the first Americans to be arrested for 
protesting South African Apartheid and that years later Randall Robinson’s inspiration for the 
daily demonstrations at the South African Embassy came from the event on Thanksgiving Day 
1976.
174
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Brooks attended the Bi-Partisans against Apartheid gathering described above and was 
arrested at a demonstration outside an IBM stockholders meeting at the Atlanta Civic Center in 
April of 1985. Others arrested included Gcabashe and Atlanta University professor Mack Jones, 
as well as then-City Councilman Lewis. The group explained to the Atlanta Constitution that 
IBM was the main computer supplier to South Africa, and that the demonstration was intended to 
persuade the company to stop doing business with South Africa. Brooks commented that the 
IBM protest was the only time that he and fellow veteran civil rights organizer, Lewis were ever 
arrested together. Brooks also spoke at a November 1986 rally at the state capitol organized by 
the Student Coalition Against Apartheid and Racism (described in chapter one). The rally’s focus 
was on protesting the Georgia Board of Regents’ relationship with companies doing business in 
South Africa. At this event, student leader, Dwayne Redding announced that Brooks planned to 
introduce a divestment bill to the Georgia General Assembly.
175
  
On January 15, 1987 Brooks did indeed introduce House Bill 84 which stated that “no 
funds of the State of Georgia shall be invested or deposited in any financial institution which 
directly or through its subsidiaries has outstanding loans to the Republic of South Africa.” 
Brooks had been elected to the Georgia House of Representatives in 1980 around the same time 
that he met Gcabashe and began working with her extensively. Brooks reminisced, “When I was 
elected here in 1980, Tandi Lutuli Gcabashe and I teamed up and we began to travel America. 
We went to the UN Security commission in 81. We went to Harvard University in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and did seminars and activities all around campuses, and we began to do a lot of 
work in New York.” Brooks explained the inspiration for his 1987 divestment bill: “Tandi and I 
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were communicating with Mel King in Massachusetts who was in the legislature. And Mel King 
and Governor MichaleL Dukakis had passed the first divestment legislation in the country, and 
we took that and used it as a model. It really was the Massachusetts legislation that started all of 
this.”176 
Brooks knew that in Georgia he faced an uphill battle to educate his colleagues in the 
legislature as well as the general public about the need for divestment legislation. He explained, 
Most people didn’t understand the global impact of apartheid….didn’t understand 
the connections between their country and South Africa, the global economy, the 
sale of the Krugerrand, all of the things that impact our economy. They were kind 
of like, ‘help me understand why we should do this.’ And once we began to 
articulate the violence and the fact that this small minority was oppressing this 
large majority; we pointed out example after example after example. The violence 
and the fact that children were murdered; families being torn apart, the 
tremendous brutality against those who opposed this brutal system, black and 
white…So it took some time; a lot of people live in their own world and they 
don’t want to venture outside of that, but you have to educate them. Once you 
educate them, they will move. So that was a challenge, really educating people 
about why they should be a part of that movement.
177
 
 
One method that Brooks used to educate his colleagues about the realities of apartheid 
was by creating passbooks that replicated the passbooks that black South Africans were forced to 
carry at all times. He and Gcabashe together created the passbooks with the help of New York-
based American Committee on Africa. Brooks remembered, “I put them on the desks of my 
colleagues, and I said, ‘I want everybody in here to keep this on you because if you don’t have 
this on you, you could be arrested and detained. Just think about that, if you were South African, 
and you were black, if you were Indian, if you were a person of color, and you were stopped, you 
could go to jail. I want you to keep this in your pocket as a reminder of what life is like for black 
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folks and minorities in South Africa.’” According the Brooks, these efforts began to have some 
impact.
178
 
House Bill 84 was referred to the Rules Committee.The Committee created a 
“substitute,” which expanded the initial wording and intent of the bill. The substitute bill stated 
that, 
No funds of the State of Georgia shall be invested or deposited in any financial 
institution which directly or through its subsidiaries makes loans to the Republic 
of South Africa; to provide that no such funds shall be invested in the stocks, 
securities, or other obligations of any company doing business in or with the 
Republic of South Africa; to provide that no such funds shall be used for the 
purchase of any goods, materials, or services from certain business having certain 
relationships with the Republic of South Africa. 
 
The bill called for state funds to be “reinvested in some other manner” by January 1, 1988. While 
this substitute became part of the bill as it was ultimately voted on by the General Assembly, 
another substitute was proposed by Democratic Representative Terry Lawler and rejected. 
Lawler’s substitute would have required that the limits on investment not just apply to South 
Africa, but also to the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, Cambodia, North Korea, Nicaragua, Libya, 
Iran and others. The Committee on Rules recommended that the House approve HB 84. 
However, when the bill went to the floor, it received eighty-one votes in favor and thirty-nine 
votes against. But since the Georgia House has 180 representatives, the bill fell ten votes short of 
passage. It is likely that many representatives abstained from voting because they did not want to 
be on record either as supporting or rejecting this controversial measure.
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Upon the defeat of HB 84, Brooks declared that would reintroduce divestment legislation 
for the State of Georgia “at the proper time.” Brooks did have significant support for such 
legislation from the public. The Bishop Tutu Task Force on South Africa circulated a letter 
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urging Georgians to contact their Representatives in support of the legislation, and the AFSC 
held a public hearing on the “damage and destruction done to the interests of the lives and civil 
rights of the South African majority by the continuation of the hated system of apartheid” with 
goal of the hearing being to “mobilize further support within the Georgia Legislature for the 
divestment legislation.”180 
Brooks continued to introduce similar bills every year until Nelson Mandela’s release in 
1990, but the Georgia General Assembly never did pass divestment legislation. Brooks lamented 
the failure of the Legislature to take a bold stance against apartheid and compared the 
commitment to anti-apartheid activism and divestment legislation in Georgia to what he 
observed in other states: “Traveling around the country I just felt like when I went into 
Massachusetts, it was more support, New York, more support.” Despite his disappointment in 
Georgia’s elected officials, Brooks does not discount the unique opportunity that the city of 
Atlanta had to influence the anti-apartheid movement. He reflects,  
I think the greatest asset we had was that this was the base of Martin Luther King 
Junior’s movement, his hometown. And the fact that we had Chief Albert 
Luthuli’s daughter Tandi Gcabashe here to provide the energy and the insight. I 
think that some of us activists that happened to live in Atlanta, that had been 
trained early in our lives by the SCLC, the NAACP or the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee, those of us who had that history of activism, I just think 
we felt a responsibility and an obligation to be a part of this movement, and we 
were determined to bring the community along with us whether they wanted to go 
or not. They might have been reluctant, but we were determined to bring our 
political positions and our colleagues in these political positions into this 
movement. We were determined to do it, just like we were determined to end Jim 
Crow segregation in the South. We knew it was an uphill battle, but we were not 
going to stop…We just knew that this was something that was connected to our 
movement here in America in so many ways, and we had a moral obligation to be 
involved.
181
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Brooks’ thoughts reflected the unique quality of the anti-apartheid movement in Atlanta 
when compared to anti-apartheid work in New York, Boston or the San Francisco Bay area 
where the movement took on a more confrontational tone. In 1980s Atlanta, the key members of 
the African American leadership class were political insiders.  In this respect, the cohort of 
potential anti-apartheid leaders was constrained as they sought to manage the anti-apartheid issue 
in a political way. In some sense, the black political regime in Atlanta tamed the anti-apartheid 
issue because they had so much to lose. On the other hand, African Americans in positions of 
political leadership were in a unique position to educate their more conservative colleagues on 
the issues surrounding South Africa, as well as to take advantage of their access to the media. 
Andrew Young is a particularly interesting case study, as his political career spanned local, 
national and international scales. Comparing Young’s position on South African issues with 
those of Tyrone Brooks illustrates the different trajectories that two civil rights veterans and 
elected political officials took within the anti-apartheid movement. 
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CHAPTER 6: “COKE SWEETENS APARTHEID” 
Following the Soweto uprisings of 1976, the debate regarding the role of multinational 
corporations in South Africa intensified. While a minority of observers continued to argue that 
American businesses could be a force for positive change in South Africa, most socially 
conscious Americans began to call for corporations to withdraw from South Africa. Anti-
apartheid activists first targeted companies that made products that directly aided the South 
African government, police force and military. IBM provided computers to South African 
security forces; General Motors produced police vehicles, and Kodak sold cameras that were 
used to implement the hated “pass system” in which black South Africans had to carry identity 
cards at all times. Eventually, companies that produced more benign products came under fire as 
well. This chapter will discuss the presence of the Coca-Cola Company in South Africa and the 
boycott of Coca-Cola products led by Tandi Gcabashe, the Georgia Coalition for Divestment and 
the American Friends Service Committee. 
Coca-Cola was invented in Atlanta in 1886. Under the leadership of Asa Griggs Candler 
during the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries Coca-Cola became a popular beverage across the 
United States, and the Coca-Cola Company began to see great financial success. Candler 
incorporated the Coca-Cola Company in 1896, and Coca-Cola’s rapid growth can be attributed to 
Candler’s aggressive marketing of the product, an approach which continued into the modern era 
of the Coca-Cola Company. Candler also began the long history of Coca-Cola executives making 
large philanthropic donations, as he contributed huge sums of money that allowed Emory 
University to move from Oxford, Georgia to its current campus in Atlanta. Thus, several of the 
characteristics of the Coca-Cola Company during the anti-apartheid era, including the company’s 
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desire to create an image of being a good corporate citizen, emerged very early in the company’s 
history.
182
 
The role of the Coca-Cola Company in Atlanta politics and culture cannot be overstated. 
During the 1940s and 1950s, Coca-Cola President Robert Woodruff was the most powerful 
figure in Atlanta politics, despite never holding an elected position. In Atlanta: Race, Class and 
Urban Expansion, Larry Keating argues that an emphasis on marketing and public relations has 
shaped Atlanta’s business-dominated government. Keating connects this characteristic of city 
government to the fact that “Atlanta’s major corporate citizen is Coca-Cola.” According to 
Keating, “Much of Coke’s worldwide success has come from marketing, and the core of the 
company is a public-relations operation. It is hardly surprising that city leaders have been heavily 
influenced by Coke’s highly image-conscious corporate culture.”183 
During the civil rights movement, Coca-Cola worked hard to avoid alienating either their 
white or black consumers. As Coca-Cola hired their first black executives and introduced 
African Americans actors into their mainstream advertisements, profits and the bottom line 
always remained at the forefront. The 1963 advertising shift was a response to a threatened 
boycott from the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE).  That same year Atlanta-based Operation 
Breadbasket demanded that Coca-Cola hire more black production line workers. Upon being 
again threatened with a boycott, Coca-Cola responded to the demands.  By the following year, 
the pragmatic Coca-Cola president, Robert Woodruff, had become a voice for racial moderation. 
When Martin Luther King Jr won the Nobel Peace Prize, Atlanta’s Mayor Ivan Allen planned to 
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host a biracial banquet in King’s honor. At first, the city’s white elite balked at attending such an 
event. However, when Woodruff pledged his support, the rest of Atlanta’s business community 
followed suit. By the 1980s, Coca-Cola was a significant financial contributor to various 
mainstream civil rights organizations and community groups including the NAACP and all of the 
local black colleges. In 1981 Rev. Jesse Jackson’s and his organization, People United to Save 
Humanity (PUSH) called for Coke to do more in support of the continuing African American 
struggle for equality in the United States. As Coca-Cola historian Mark Pendergrast writes, 
“Jackson chose Coke not so much because of any glaring corporate abuse, but because the firm 
was so temptingly vulnerable due to its cherished image.” Jackson called for a boycott and 
claimed that Atlanta’s black ministers were prepared to announce this action in Sunday services. 
To avoid a potential public relations nightmare, Coca-Cola’s Chief Operating Officer Don 
Keough appeared alongside Jackson at a press conference to announce a new “moral covenant” 
and pledge thirty-four million dollars to African American causes. Atlanta Mayor Andrew 
Young was among those applauding in the audience.
184
 
By 1980, the Coca-Cola Company earned 65 percent of its profits from outside of the 
United States. Coca-Cola first appeared in South Africa during the 1930s. South Africa became a 
profitable market for Coca-Cola because it combined cheap black labor and a white population 
with disposable income. A key aspect of Coca-Cola’s marketing strategy in South Africa was to 
sponsor events that would link the company to the South African community, which made local 
consumers view Coca-Cola as their own. While white South Africans were arguably Coca-
Cola’s primary target audience in that country, black South Africans, who made up 80 percent of 
the population, could not be ignored as potential consumers. Coca-Cola advertised in black 
communities throughout South Africa. By the end of the 1960s, Coca-Cola had thirty-seven 
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bottling plants in South Africa and used these operations as a base for expanding the beverage’s 
presence throughout the continent.
185
 
In 1977, in the wake of the Soweto uprising, Rev. Leon Sullivan, an African American 
civil rights activist and a member of the board of directors of General Motors, created a list of 
principles to guide corporate behavior in South Africa. These principles called for multinational 
corporations operating in South Africa to pledge a commitment to provide racially integrated 
working facilities and equal employment practices. By 1983, 146 companies had endorsed the 
Sullivan Principles – about half of the total number of American-based companies operating in 
South Africa. Coca-Cola signed the Sullivan Principles in 1980. From the outset, Sullivan’s 
Principles had critics who became more vocal during the early 1980s, as the push for 
disinvestment, economic disengagement and comprehensive sanctions intensified. They were 
quick to point out that the Principles lacked an effective compliance and failed to address the 
fundamental structure of apartheid which denied political rights to black South Africans. Critics 
argued that the corporations had used the Sullivan Principles as a way to deflect criticism 
without losing their profitable foothold in South Africa, and that by the early 1980s the 
Principles themselves had become part of the problem in South Africa.
186
 
This stance was embodied by the Georgia Coalition for Divestment in South Africa. The 
Georgia Coalition was founded around 1982. AFSC’s Tandi Gcabashe placed an ad in a local 
newspaper announcing a public meeting to discuss apartheid in South Africa. The meeting was 
held in the First Congregational Church on Courtland Street in downtown Atlanta. This church 
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was an ironic venue for such a gathering. While the Congregationalists had taken a leading role 
in anti-apartheid work nationwide, in Atlanta “First Church” had a unique place in history. The 
church’s pastor, African American Rev. Henry Proctor, was a racial accomodationist who acted 
as a broker between the black community and the white power structure in the years following 
Atlanta’s 1906 race riot. Reverend Proctor’s approaches foreshadowed the workings of Atlanta’s 
governing regime of the second half of the twentieth century in which middle class African 
American leaders allied with the white business elite, in a partnership that successfully 
maintained racial calm but persistently failed to address Atlanta’s severe structural inequality.187 
  Gcabashe was thrilled when approximately thirty people showed up. Among those in 
attendance were Gloria Gaines and Mack Jones, who would become co-chairs of the newly 
formed Georgia Coalition for Divestment in South Africa. Gaines became first became 
politicized as a student at Albany State University, and moved to Atlanta to work for John Lewis 
in the early 1970s. After earning a graduate degree in Public Planning at Georgia State, Gaines 
had the opportunity to move to Nigeria for two years. Gaines reflected,  
It was there that I began to understand what was happening in Southern Africa…I 
learned so much about what was going on there because the entire continent was 
involved. So when I was preparing to leave to come back in ’81, they made me 
promise that I would connect with the anti-apartheid movement when I got back 
here. And the opportunity came in ’82 when I saw a little article…about Tandi 
Gcabashe and the American friends Service Committee. They were having a 
meeting at the first Congregationalist Church…This was I believe in October of 
’82, and I went to the first organizing meeting…of the American Friends Service 
Committee and other activists, that was the first effort to organize a response for 
Atlanta. And it was at that meeting that I met Tandi Gcabashe and Mack Jones.
188
 
 
Mack Jones was a Professor of Political Science at Atlanta University. Jones came to Atlanta in 
the late 1960s and immediately became active in domestic and international human rights 
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movements. The contributions of his Political Science Department to the anti-apartheid 
movement are discussed in Chapter One.
189
 
Gaines and Jones began to work closely with Gcabashe to build an anti-apartheid 
movement in Atlanta. As Gcabashe was in charge of the AFSC’s Southern Regional South 
Africa Peace Education Program, the Coalition inherently had close ties with the AFSC. AFSC 
documents describe the Georgia Coalition as “a quasi project of the AFSC’s Southern Africa 
Program” and mention that “there has been overlap in membership of the Coalition and the 
AFSC’s Southern Africa Program Committee.” The same document concludes that “there has 
been a mutually supportive relationship.” When the Georgia Coalition launched the Coke 
Campaign, Georgia Coalition entertained the idea of separating from the AFSC and 
incorporating itself as a nonprofit. It is not clear that this step ever occurred.
190
 
In 1984, the Georgia Coalition decided to focus on corporate disinvestment as their 
primary method for fighting apartheid. Disinvestment refers to an action by a corporation 
withdrawing its operations in South Africa through sale or abandonment. Coca-Cola was one of 
several companies that the Georgia Coalition named as an important target, and over the next 
year demonstrations were held at Coca-Cola headquarters, as well as at IBM, Holiday Inn, Ford, 
General Motors and Westin International. In early 1985, the Coalition began to look into the 
viability of launching a national campaign against Coca-Cola. Building on the victory it had 
secured through negotiations with M&M Products. M&M Products was an Atlanta based, 
African American owned, black hair care company that sold its products throughout Southern 
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Africa. M&M Products agreed to end its relationship with its distributor in South Africa 
following pressure from the Georgia Coalition. This success likely boosted the confidence of the 
Coalition members as they considered taking on Coca-Cola.
191
  
In September 1985 after much discussion and planning, the Georgia Coalition and the 
American Friends Service Committee officially launched a national boycott of Coca-Cola: “The 
Georgia Coalition for Divestment in South Africa has deliberated for over two years, weighing 
both the pros and cons of such a campaign (particularly coming out of Atlanta – a Coke 
stronghold).” The Boycott Committee members agreed that a national (rather than a local 
campaign) was necessary because of the “power and influence of Coke.” Committee members 
worried that, at least in Atlanta, the Coca-Cola Company “could block media coverage and stifle 
our ability to get the word out to build the campaign.” In a funding proposal to AFSC board 
members, the Georgia Coalition explained, “Currently, the GCDSA (Georgia Coalition for 
Divestment in South Africa) supports the withdrawal of the more than 300 U.S. companies in 
South Africa, thereby ending their complicity in the oppression and murder of the South African 
people. Because of practical limitations, we cannot as a group address all U.S. corporations 
doing business in South Africa; therefore we have chosen Coca-Cola as our focus for a consumer 
action.” At the time of the boycott launch, Coca-Cola’s assets in South Africa were estimated at 
over $60 million with total annual sales over $260. Each year, the Coca-Cola Company paid 
approximately 40 percent of its South African profits in corporate taxes to the apartheid regime, 
thus contributing financially to the continued repression of South Africa’s black majority.192 
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As Tandi Gcaashe pointed out in a 2013 interview, corporate disinvestment was also 
important because multinational corporations in South Africa actively worked as collaborators 
with the government to enforce the apartheid laws. According to Gcabashe, Coca-Cola and other 
companies, helped to “enforce apartheid laws because you have to check, you are the policemen 
who will check the pass book of your workers and whether it was properly adhered to; then to fill 
out when you started work, whether it was time for you to go back to the homelands; did you 
come into the city legally or illegally? So they were like the policemen for the apartheid system. 
So it was taxes and moneys, but very important also they were active collaborationists with 
apartheid.” The full complicity of multinational corporations with the security and surveillance 
apparatus of the South African regime explains why that many anti-apartheid activists dismissed 
the usefulness of the Sullivan Principles.
193
  
The Coalition chose to target Coca-Cola because Coca-Cola “is one of the most visible 
consumer products in the world, making it possible for people from all walks of life, nationally 
and internationally, to relate to the campaign.” Perhaps even more importantly, the Coalition 
emphasized that “the boycott will need to take on the Coke image,” as Coca-Cola promoted itself 
as “pro-people,” and “supports and contributes to humanitarian and educational causes in the 
U.S.” The Coca-Cola Company’s obsession with its squeaky clean public image, made the 
corporation an attractive target for a disinvestment campaign. The Coalition believed that if 
Coca-Cola was to withdraw completely from South Africa such an action “would be a dramatic 
challenge to other corporations and would thereby impact U.S. foreign policy.”194 
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The specific objectives of the campaign, as stated in the official AFSC proposal were 
four-fold. The first goal was to carry out a public education program to educate Americans about 
divestment and disinvestment. Second, the campaign would “examine and challenge the role of 
U.S. corporations in providing economic support for apartheid. Third the campaign aimed “to 
pressure Coca-Cola to totally disinvest in South Africa” Finally, by doing so, the base of support 
for the anti-apartheid movement overall would be expanded and strengthened. The proponents of 
the boycott believed that “the deepening cycle of violence in South Africa strongly indicates the 
need for the intensification of our efforts in the U.S. in two areas: public education and the 
promoting of the divestment/disinvestment campaign/movement. There is a great need for 
American citizens to challenge corporate support for the South African government.”  The 
specific objectives of the Coke Campaign were in line with these broader goals.
195
 
The methods that the Coalition and the AFSC planned to use to accomplish these stated 
goals included producing and distributing educational materials, as well as conducting forums, 
seminars, conferences and teach-ins. The participants hoped to engage in negotiations with Coca-
Cola representatives as well as hold a public debate with Coca-Cola officials on the company’s 
role in South Africa. A sticker campaign with slogans such as “Coke Sweetens Apartheid,” was 
also planned. While the campaign would be national in scope, the Committee recognized the 
strategic importance of its home city: “The Atlanta base will serve as a clearinghouse for all 
activities, as well as provide information and organizing/mobilizing strategies for the various 
aspects of the educational work and the consumer action.” Finally, the committee emphasized 
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the need to include and work with diverse groups on this campaign. The organizers believed that 
the campaign must build a base of support among “grass-roots people” as well as “big names,” 
as the “grassroots people…will be less vulnerable to attack or being bought off by Coke.”196 
Coca-Cola’s point man on the South Africa issue was an African American executive 
named Carl Ware. Ware was a prominent and powerful Atlantan not just because of his position 
as a Coca-Cola vice president, but also because he was a former president of the Atlanta City 
Council and served as the Chairman of the Board of Trustees at Clark College.  In later years, 
Ware would become the President of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, President of Coca-
Cola’s Africa Group, and a member of the board of directors at Chevron and Georgia Power. 
While Ware did remain in frequent communication with Tandi Gcabashe and others in AFSC 
leadership positions, he was not above using covert action to respond to the campaign. The 
experiences of Georgia Coalition co-chairs Mack Jones and Gloria Gaines indicate the power 
that Ware and Coca-Cola attempted to wield to silence such criticism. Gaines recalled,  
The Georgia Coalition was treading some really thin waters…I was working for 
MARTA, and the deputy general manager got a call from Carl Ware, and I got 
called in and asked what I was doing because they didn’t know. The deputy was a 
black guy and he half way knew that I was something of a rebel. He knew that 
there were two sides to me. I have a professional side but I also have an 
unquenchable desire for change…but this guy got the call, the deputy general 
manager and calls me to his office, and like I said, he was black, and he used to be 
in SNCC so in the end he said, ‘The only thing I can say to you is be careful.’ 
And that was it. He just kind of turned his head and let it happen. That’s 
indicative of the kind of, I guess the power that Coke had. And how they had 
woven themselves into the black leadership in Atlanta. But they weren’t able to 
stop this because we really had some young people who didn’t care. 
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Jones, a Political Science Professor at Atlanta University had a similar experience:  
We had also gone down to the Coke headquarters and he (Carl Ware) had met 
with us, and I guess he thought he had placated us, but we really were not taking 
any of it. And I remember that because he had called the president of the 
university and sort of leaned on the president to discipline us, and the president 
called me and told me what had happened and that he was not bothered by it at 
all, but I’m sure Carl thought that his phone call to the president would get us to 
back off. That I remember.
197
 
 
According to Gaines the divestment campaign was able to resist corporate pressure 
because of the autonomy of the AFSC. Not only did AFSC not have a financial relationship with 
Coca-Cola, but it also had a policy of refusing all corporate money so as to maintain its 
independence and integrity. This financial independence allowed the AFSC to take a bolder 
stance than was possible for the various community organizations that depended on Coca-Cola’s 
financial support. Gaines and Jones were also fortunate in having employers who refused to bow 
to pressure from Coca-Cola. Allegedly, Coca-Cola was also placing calls to various religious 
leaders in Atlanta instructing them to dissuade their congregations from supporting the boycott. 
For instance, SCLC president Rev. Joseph Lowery forbade his staffers from participating in a 
1985 demonstration outside of Coca-Cola’s headquarters. At this demonstration, Mack Jones 
spoke, thanking the one hundred protestors for their support despite “the fact that Coca-Cola did 
everything it could to prevent people from coming. This shows that no one person or group can 
control anybody. When the people speak, people with money tremble.” At the rally AFSC 
member Sababa Akili addressed the ties that bound Coca-Cola to many African American 
community organizations in Atlanta and beyond: “We will continue to demonstrate against 
Coca-Cola, even though they are giving money to institutions. We must let Coca-Cola know that 
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blood money is not something that we relish.” Finally, Jones pointed out that Coca-Cola’s effort 
to establish a black-owned distributorship outside of Johannesburg had been thwarted by the 
apartheid regime: “No matter what Coke wants to do, they have to listen to the South African 
government.” Jones told the crowd that disinvestment was the only remaining moral option for 
multinational companies.
198
  
In September 1986, the Coca-Cola Company announced that it would make a statement 
against the apartheid regime by selling its bottling operations in South Africa. Coca-Cola 
President and Chief Operating Officer, Donald Keough told The Atlanta Constitution: “Our 
decision to complete the process of disinvestment is a statement of our opposition to apartheid 
and of our support for the economic aspirations of black South Africans.” Atlantans from Mayor 
Andrew Young to the mainstream media lauded Coca-Cola’s decision. The Atlanta Constitution 
called the move “shrewd and farsighted” and praised Coca-Cola for being the “first mega-
corporation to declare explicitly its contempt for South Africa’s policy of apartheid.” Although 
many other companies had announced divestment decisions, most of them cited financial reasons 
rather than abhorrence for racial inequality. SCLC president Lowery also praised Coca-Cola’s 
disinvestment and took partial credit, mentioning to the Atlanta Constitution that he had been in 
negotiations with Coca-Cola executives to convince the company to pull out of South Africa. 
Lowery admitted that the SCLC was under pressure from other anti-apartheid groups to boycott 
Coca-Cola, but he attributed his organization’s reluctance to take action to Coca-Cola’s “‘history 
of social sensitivity’ toward the black community.” Lowery held frequent meetings with Carl 
Ware who assured him that Coca-Cola was progressing towards divestment. Coca-Cola 
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spokesmen, however did not attribute credit to either the SCLC negotiations or the Georgia 
Coalition-led boycott. Rather, Coca-Cola representative, Randy Donaldson emphasized that the 
decision to leave South Africa was one reached internally: “I don’t think it would be fair to say 
we felt any pressure. We did what was the right move for Coke.” In a 1991 interview with Mark 
Pendergrast, the author of For God, Country and Coca-Cola, Carl Ware was a bit more candid in 
giving credit to anti-apartheid organizers: “I think that the pressure that brought about sanctions 
in this country worked. I think that strategy worked extremely well. We wouldn’t have had the 
U.S. government and the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act had it not been for that pressure. And we 
probably would not have disinvested.” 199 
Coca-Cola spokesmen informed the public that the company would sell its bottling 
interests in South Africa to a multi racial consortium of business executives, a move intended to 
expand the South Africa’s miniscule black middle class: “We will disinvest in a way that creates 
significant, multiracial equity participation in the South African soft drink industry…Our goal is 
to structure the transactions in a way that improves the prospects of black South Africans and 
increases their ability to invest in their country’s economy.” Andrew Young, who had built a 
successful career brokering business deals in the name of black entrepreneurship, commented 
that a great benefit of Coca-Cola’s strategy was that it would increase the stake black South 
Africans had in capitalism, thus lessening their willingness to support a Communist takeover. 
The Atlanta Inquirer, representing the progressive wing of Atlanta’s African American press 
heaped praise upon Coca-Cola’s announcement: “So in one stroke, Coca-Cola pulls out, yet 
                                                          
199
 Connie Green, “Coke to Sell its Assets in South Africa,” Atlanta Constitution, September 18, 1986, A1; Cynthia 
Tucker, “Coke Divestment Shrewd, Farsighted,” Atlanta Constitution, September 19, 1986, A18; “Coca Cola to Sell 
off South Africa Holdings,” Atlanta Daily World, September 19, 1986, pg 1; Connie Green, “Lowery: Refusal to 
Boycott Coke Right Approach,” Atlanta Journal, September 18, 1986, A5; Transcript of Carl Ware interview with 
Mark Pendergrast, May 7, 1991; Box 9, folder 49, Mark Pendergrast Research Files; Manuscripts, Archives and 
Rare Books Library, Emory University. 
137 
 
leaves value and goodwill behind for the Black majority. U.S. corporations can use Coca-Cola’s 
example a model for orderly, enlightened withdrawal.”200  
The U.S. State Department, under the Reagan administration, condemned the Coca-Cola 
pull out, which ran counter to Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker’s Constructive 
Engagement policy. This condemnation in itself may have helped Coca-Cola win favor among 
opponents of Reagan and Constructive Engagement. Cynthia Tucker, the Atlanta Journal 
Constitution’s liberal African American columnist, whose views closely lined up with those of 
the entrepreneurial mayor and the accomodationist SCLC president, lavished praise on the Coca-
Cola Company while condemning U.S. Government policy: “Coke’s move is not just protest for 
protest’s sake. It is a genuinely helpful response to a grave and complex set of circumstances – 
and certainly deserved better than to be officially regretted by the U.S. State Department. The 
Real Thing did the right thing.” Although The Atlanta Constitution was the city’s “liberal” daily, 
in Atlanta that term has often meant a shameless support of pro-business policies, particularly in 
regards to the city’s flagship corporation, Coca-Cola. For Tucker, the opportunity to applaud 
Coca-Cola, for ostensibly making a human-rights-motivated decision in South Africa was a win-
win.
201
 
Other observers were not immediately impressed by Coca-Cola’s actions. While not 
speaking specifically about Coca-Cola, State Representative Tyrone Brooks commented shortly 
after Coca-Cola’s divestment announcement, “some of these divestments are only public 
relations games…Some are literally selling out and packing up, but some are not legitimate…I 
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don’t think we should jump and cheer every time somebody says they are pulling out.” Coca-
Cola made clear from its initial announcement that it would continue to sell its syrup to the 
newly owned South African bottling plants. Thus, Coca-Cola would likely retain its 75 percent 
share of the soft drink market in South Africa. This fact gave pause to some anti-apartheid 
leaders.
202
 
AFSC and Georgia Coalition leaders were quite surprised by Coca-Cola’s divestment 
announcement. During their frequent communication with Coca-Cola executives, Gcabashe, 
Gaines and others were given the impression that Coca-Cola had no intention to change its South 
African policy. Thus they were at first not sure how to respond to Coca-Cola’s divestment news: 
“Coca-Cola’s sudden and unexpected announcement of its disinvestment action from South 
Africa has taken most of us by surprise and, consequently we find ourselves, at least as a group, 
unprepared as to what is a proper response.”  Perhaps Coca-Cola’s motivations for keeping local 
anti-apartheid leaders in the dark about the company’s divestment plans were to prevent these 
leaders from taking credit for the policy change. Speaking at a national meeting for the AFSC’s 
Women’s Program, Gcabashe commented, “Coca-Cola announced…that they had disinvested. 
This was a surprise to us because we had been negotiating with them, and they were saying that 
they would never pull out of South Africa.” During the ensuing search for a proper response to 
Coca-Cola’s actions, at least one AFSC board member – Rob Vitale – cautiously suggested that 
AFSC should consider withdrawing the boycott campaign: “I think it is absolutely essential that 
we contact trusted black resistance leaders in South Africa as soon as possible to understand how 
Coke’s disinvestment action is interpreted from their perspective.” Vitale went on to write,  
Although with further information we may find Coke’s disinvestment deficient or 
less than satisfactory on some points…it seems to me that we should withdraw 
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our boycott campaign. The company was a much better than average citizen to 
begin with and it will in fact disinvest as we have asked it to do…If we should 
want to press further in this direction, I believe their (sic) are many other 
companies that should take priority in our efforts to seek change. 
 
In his memo, Vitale pointed out that complete economic collapse was neither the goal of 
divestment, nor compatible with Quaker values of peace and nonviolence. Rather, the goal of the 
divestment campaign was to increase pressure to the point where the South African government 
decided that continuing to deny political, economic and human rights to the majority of the 
population was no longer tenable.
203
 
The Georgia Coalition arranged to have a “distinguished team of independent fact 
finders” meet with Coca-Cola representatives Ware and Brant Davis to learn more about Coca-
Cola’s disinvestment actions. During the meeting, Ware and Davis argued that the method of 
their disinvestment contributed to black economic empowerment and emphasized the 
contributions of the newly formed Equal Opportunity Fund on which South African anti-
apartheid leaders Desmond Tutu and Allan Boesek served as board members. The Equal 
Opportunity Fund pledged ten million dollars to support education and other causes for South 
Africa’s black population. Tutu and Boesek agreed to serve on the board of the Fund under the 
condition that they retain their right to continue to call for full economic disinvestment by 
multinational corporations and economic sanctions enforced by the United Nations. Carl Ware 
continually emphasized the independence of the foundation. However, members of the fact 
finding team expressed concern that the Fund could never be truly independent because it would 
be bound by the limitations of the apartheid state. At one point Bill Howard, former President of 
the National Council of Churches, demanded that Coca-Cola “Stop trying to make people believe 
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the support for your disinvestment plan and the (Equal Opportunity) Fund are not connected” – 
an accusation to which Ware did not respond.
204
  
One of the members of the fact finding team participating in this meeting was Quaker 
Friend and local businessman, Britt Pendergrast. Pendergrast reflected on Coca-Cola’s actions 
and how the Coalition and the AFSC. Pendergrast began his remarks by outlining the four 
options that Coke faced in South Africa, which ranged from maintaining the status quo to 
initiating full economic disengagement:  
Coca-Cola believes that it has chosen the one that is in the best interest of South 
African Blacks. By relocating the manufacture of concentrate to Swaziland, it will 
deny the South African government a tax base that has existed previously. By 
putting its bottling, canning and distribution facilities to Black ownership, it 
believes that it is helping in the creation of a Black middle class and developing 
the executive and managerial skills that will be needed in the future when Blacks 
have the opportunity to run or participate in running the government.
205
 
 
Pendergrast recommended that the Georgia Coalition and the AFSC maintain cordial 
relations with Coca-Cola while continuing to explore future joint actions with the Coke 
leadership. Pendergrast argued that total economic disengagement from South Africa by Coca-
Cola would only be useful if Coca-Cola could work out an agreement with its competitors to 
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remove all soft drinks from South Africa, “then and only then would the soft drink portion of the 
tax base be reduced and the government weakened.”206 
Other participants of the fact finding team, such as William Booth, interpreted the 
meeting differently. William Booth was a representative from American Committee on Africa, 
an organization founded in 1953 to provide support for African liberation struggles. Booth 
reflected, “It is my opinion that the meeting with Coke made clear that their so-called 
disinvestment is not, as they would have us believe, ‘a blow against apartheid.’” Bill Howard 
concurred, “It is very difficult for me to accept Coca-Cola has withdrawn or is withdrawing from 
South Africa in any meaningful sense…My impression is that Coke has gone on the offensive 
and very cleverly designed an approach to the issue of disinvestment which makes Coke a 
difficult target.”207 
Ultimately, the Georgia Coalition and AFSC’s response aligned more closely with the 
opinions of Howard and Booth than those of Vitale or Pendergrast. The AFSC continued to call 
for corporate disengagement, defined as “an action by a corporation severing all business 
relationships with South Africa. The term encompasses withdrawal from in-country marketing 
and distribution, licensing or franchising arrangements, trade relationships – including third party 
arrangements.” An AFSC internal memo titled “Definitions and Talking Points on Corporate 
Withdrawal From South Africa,” explains that divestment and disinvestment must be seen as 
steps toward complete corporate disengagement. The AFSC justified this stance by emphasizing 
that “The South African economy is that of a major industrialized nation. If South Africa finds 
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that disinvestment or disengagement deprives it of needed products, the government can make 
choices and redirect its internal resources to compensate for the loss. To do so in any substantial 
way would require reallocation of resources now devoted to military spending and 
the…destructive policies of apartheid.” Thus, the AFSC aim was not total economic collapse in 
South Africa, as Vitale feared, but rather that intensifying world wide economic pressure against 
the apartheid laws.
208
 
Gcabashe, Gaines and other supporters took to the media to educate the public regarding 
on what they viewed as Coca-Cola’s sham divestment. Gcabashe held a press conference 
announcing that the AFSC would continue the Coke boycott, expose the limitations of Coca-
Cola’s “divestment,” and meet “the new challenge to reveal this ploy to the general public who 
truly want no part in bolstering apartheid.” A month later, the Atlanta Inquirer quoted Gcabashe 
as saying, “Our own scrutiny prevents us from believing that the Coca-Cola Company 
disinvested from South Africa.” Gcabashe and other supporters expressed concern that selling 
the bottling plants to multiracial investment groups would create an extremely small class of elite 
black South Africans who would be invested in the maintenance of the apartheid system: “It 
must be remembered that the object of the disinvestment campaign is not to change the color of 
people who finance apartheid whether black or multiracial.” Gcabashe recognized that black 
entrepreneurship within the apartheid state would only exacerbate class differences. Unlike much 
of Atlanta’s “liberal” political establishment, Gcabashe did not view capitalism, 
entrepreneurship, and the free market as an instrument of liberation.
209
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Gcabashe emphasized that apartheid was not something that could be reformed, but 
rather the system was an evil that called for complete destruction. The Georgia Coalition 
produced flyers and leaflets calling for mass participation in the Coke boycott and emphasizing 
that Coca-Cola was still available for sale in South Africa. While Coca-Cola’s supporters hoped 
that the company’s method of divestment might become a model for other multinational 
corporations in South Africa, its critics feared that this model would create a new obstacle in the 
path of the anti-apartheid struggle. Atlanta activist and longtime member of the Marxist-Leninist 
Workers World Party, Dianne Mathiowetz wrote in 1989, “Under increasing pressure from the 
anti-apartheid movement to disinvest from South Africa, Coke was a leader in developing the 
phony divestment schemes now being employed by many U.S. multinationals – to sell off their 
plants and facilities to South Africa allies who continue to produce profits for them.”210 
Speaking to the Atlanta Inquirer, Gcabashe expressed surprise and confusion by SCLC 
President Reverend Lowery’s praise for Coca-Cola and his characterization of the announcement 
as “an unconditional victory.” While Lowery was Gcabashe’s minister at the United Methodist 
Church at that time, and while the two remain friends to this day, she reflected: 
It’s a complicated issue. You know when you are engaged in a coalition of any 
kind, and you work with people coming from diverse backgrounds, diverse 
political organizations and beliefs, you will find that sometimes you may agree on 
the principle – to eliminate apartheid and some aspects of how you go about it – 
but not everything. And I had to accept that… So it is true that SCLC, Mrs. King 
(and others), did not support the Coca-Cola boycott, but you have to understand 
that is where they get their funding for their organizations. And also understand 
that I’m sure Coca-Cola was talking to them at the same time: ‘You dare not’, in a 
nice way, but still saying, ‘You dare not.’ So that was really a drawback for 
us…The mandate from the ANC was not just sanctions...but also boycotts 
whenever you can. So it was sanctions and boycotts, so we were quite in line with 
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the mandate. But then some people, - you don’t force people to do what is against 
their beliefs or their interests at the time, and that is why we are still friends 
today.
211
 
 
Gcabashe and Ware disagreed over whether Coca-Cola was still paying taxes to the 
apartheid government, and both used their stance as evidence of whether or not Coca-Cola had 
truly disinvested from South Africa. Coca-Cola’s official statement made clear that by moving 
its concentrate plant to Swaziland and selling its shares in the remaining South African bottling 
plant, Coca-Cola would no longer be required to pay corporate taxes to the South African 
government: “We no longer have assets or employees in South Africa, and we pay no taxes to 
the South African government.” Critics of the move, however, argued that since Coca-Cola was 
still sold throughout South Africa, and each eighty cent can of Coca-Cola was taxed ten cents, 
Coca-Cola’s operations would continue to finance the repression of South Africa’s black 
majority. Coca-Cola did not have any plans to cease marketing its products in South Africa. In 
his 1991 interview with Mark Pendergrast, Ware stated clearly, “We don’t’ view the protest 
about disinvestment or that debate to be relevant anymore.”212  
The AFSC took the opportunity to explain more clearly what full disinvestment and 
economic disengagement should mean. An AFSC press release stated, “Total disinvestment by 
Coca-Cola or any other foreign company must mean the cessation of all economic operations and 
connections, including license, trademarks, factories, suppliers and distributors.”  Movement 
leaders feared that Coca-Cola’s current actions would serve as a screen for other American based 
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corporations feeling the heat from anti-apartheid activists and the general public regarding their 
operations in South Africa:  
As a major U.S. firm with very high name-recognition and as a firm which has 
distinguished itself through its highly visible public consciousness, (Coke) is 
uniquely situated to showing leadership to the business community of this country 
and of the world. Conversely, its failure to respond or its responses which tend 
more to protect its profits than to withdraw its economic support, also provide 
models for other corporations, as the similarity of response from IBM and 
General Motors demonstrates.
213
 
 
As this passage makes clear, the Georgia Coalition continued to see Coca-Cola as an ideal target 
for a continued boycott.  Since the beginning of the struggle, the AFSC national board focused 
its energies on Coca-Cola because of the company’s worldwide visibility. It continued to hold 
Coca-Cola’s leaders accountable for “reconciling their support for humanitarian and educational 
causes at home with their support of apartheid in South Africa.” The Georgia Coalition and the 
AFSC recognized that continuation of the Coke campaign in the aftermath of Coca-Cola’s 
divestment announcement would require a renewed emphasis on public education, as many 
individuals and organizations initially took Coca-Cola’s announcement at face value.214 
In 1987 the Coke Campaign was again in full swing. In February campaign organizers 
launched a nationally distributed monthly newsletter titled Corporate Watch: Eye on Coke, 
which focused on a wide range of multi-national investment in South Africa while paying 
particular attention to the Coca-Cola Company. In June, a rally took place in which boycotters 
marched to the Coca-Cola corporate headquarters. The event was scheduled for June 16
 
to 
commemorate the eleventh anniversary of the 1976 Soweto uprisings in which about six hundred 
black South African youths were killed during protests over apartheid education policy. 
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Protestors in Atlanta wore shirts and carried signs that said “Coke Sweetens Apartheid.” About 
sixty-five individuals participated in the event, which was co-sponsored by a coalition of about 
forty organizations. Campaign organizers noted the significance of the Atlanta Journal 
Constitution covering the event, “in light of the lack of coverage of boycott activities in the 
past.” The news article acknowledged that while Coca-Cola did sell its bottling operations in 
South Africa, the company continued to ships its syrup to South Africa. The following month, 
over 1,500 people came together in Philadelphia at the Call to Conscience March and Rally. The 
event protested U.S. and South African racism as well as U.S. foreign policy, and the Coke 
boycott “was very visible at the march and rally.” Finally, in 1987 the Coke Campaign also 
gained support from the American Federation of State and Municipal Employees. This group 
was one of the leading labor unions in Atlanta and under the guidance of James McKinney, the 
AFSCME distributed fact sheets on the Coke Campaign to thousands of members.
215
 
The relationship between renowned South African anti-apartheid leaders Tutu and 
Boesek on the one hand, and the Coca-Cola Company on the other, continued to be a source of 
confusion and concern for Americans. When Tutu and Boesek agreed to become trustees for 
Coca-Cola’s Equal Opportunity Fund, they stated in writing that “The establishment of the 
proposed trust cannot be divorced from the divestment debate and we would desire that it be 
abundantly clear that we are not lending support to any effort aimed at relieving pressure for 
change on the South African government.”  In 1989 Tutu reiterated that he and his colleagues 
“agreed to serve as Trustees of this Fun only if we retained our right to continue to call on United 
States corporations, including Coca-Cola to disinvest. We entered into a written agreement 
guaranteeing our right to do so.” However, Coca-Cola emphasized the support of Tutu and 
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Boesek as a way to convince the American public that Coke’s divestment was indeed legitimate 
and that company was actively contributing to the elimination of apartheid in South Africa. For 
example, a Coca-Cola Company newsletter quoted Boesek speaking about the Equal Opportunity 
Fund in 1989: “Control and responsibility are totally in the hands of the black community. We 
have direct decision-making ability in terms of the real needs of the community and funding for 
programs essential to the process of empowerment.” While the Coke Campaign praised Coca-
Cola’s contributions to worthy causes in the United States and acknowledged its ten million 
dollar Equal Opportunity Fund in South Africa as a step in the right direction, it emphasized that 
the impact of this fund on the lives of most South Africans would be miniscule. These 
contradictions indicate why the Coke Campaign felt the need to focus most of its efforts to public 
education as a way of minimizing the potential damage caused by the willingness of black 
leaders in Atlanta and South Africa to collaborate with Coca-Cola.
216
  
The Atlanta-based Coke Campaign was unable to build upon the gains of 1987. 
According to a Fall 1988 AFSC quarterly report, the membership and participation in the 
Georgia Coalition for Divestment in South Africa “has greatly reduced over time.” The 
newsletter described this decline as a “serious concern, in that, the Coke Campaign is a project of 
the Georgia Coalition.” The decline in participation in the Georgia Coalition was symptomatic of 
a general decline in American commitment to ending South African apartheid during the last 
third of the 1980s.  After the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, many 
Americans believed their work was done. The Free South Africa Movement and other national 
campaigns of the early and middle years of the decade had focused primarily on calling for the 
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U.S. government to pass economic sanctions against South Africa. Once that goal had been 
achieved, the movement lost its initial focus. Many activists merely became observers as they 
waited to see what effects the Sanctions laws would have on the apartheid regime. But these 
shifts at the national level should not cause us to underestimate the critical role played by certain 
segments of black leadership in Atlanta and South Africa.  Certainly the Coca Cola Company’s 
skillful efforts to recruit renowned civil rights leaders like Lowery and Young, and anti-apartheid 
figures like Tutu and Boesek were a factor in the campaign’s failure to grow 217 
Gcabashe worked tirelessly to keep the boycott going and to call attention to Coca-Cola’s 
continued presence in South Africa. The boycott and education campaign achieved two small 
successes far from Atlanta. In Los Angeles, the city government refused to contract with Coca-
Cola, IBM and General Motors, which was significant because these corporations had announced 
their official withdrawal from South Africa. However, according to city of Los Angeles legal 
counsel, Mark Fabiani, “None of the actions taken by IBM, GM or Coca-Cola would satisfy our 
contracting policy, which defines ‘doing business’ as selling or licensing products, as well as 
producing them in South Africa. All three of those companies are still doing business and doing 
significant business in South Africa. Even if they’ve sold off assets, they’re continuing to sell 
products there.”218 
A second victory came in Boston, where high school and college students voted in early 
1989 to have Coke machines removed from their campuses in protest of apartheid policy. In 
January Cambridge Rindge and Latin High School hosted a debate between Gcabashe and Ware. 
While Ware argued that “The lack of a Coca-Cola product is not going to change apartheid,” 
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Gcabashe criticized him for failing to consult with the ANC to find out what the participants in 
the South African liberation movement thought was best. Boston Globe reporter Derrick Jackson 
noted the significance that Coke “took Rindge and Latin so seriously that it sent a vice president 
from Atlanta to its debate.” No such public debate ever occurred in Atlanta. The student vote 
followed shortly after the debate, and 70 percent of students called for Coke machines to be 
removed from campus. Nearby Mount Holyoke College students became the first to vote Coca-
Cola off a college campus. Student Reehanna Raza commented, “We don’t expect to put Coke 
out of business or really stop them in South Africa. But we wanted to take symbolic action to get 
other colleges involved.”219 
In early 1990, following a twenty-eight year imprisonment and an international campaign 
for his freedom, Nelson Mandela was released from prison. The events that followed Mandela’s 
release – to be discussed in detail in a subsequent chapter – further complicated the public’s 
understanding of the role of Coca-Cola in South Africa, and thus put the Coke Boycott 
Campaign on increasingly shaky footing. In 1992, Gcabashe issued a statement urging the 
continued boycott of Coca-Cola products and condemning the Bush administration for “the 
premature lifting of sanctions.” While negotiations for democracy in South Africa had begun, 
progress was slow and most of the apartheid laws remained in place. Gcabashe quoted Mandela 
calling for continued the continued economic isolation of South Africa: “‘We would like 
sanctions to be reimposed.’” But a year later, in July 1993, the AFSC officially ended its support 
for the campaign, and in September of that year Mandela began to urge multinational 
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corporations to reinvest in South Africa as the country moved towards its first democratic 
elections.
220
  
In conclusion, the Coke boycott campaign was somewhat successful in creating a broad 
based movement with nationwide support. The visibility of Coca-Cola as a consumer product 
made the beverage an ideal target because refusal to purchase or consume Coca-Cola was an act 
in which anyone could participate and thereby express solidarity with the South African anti-
apartheid struggle. The relentless efforts of Gcabashe to promote the boycott and educate the 
American public on South African issues were certainly a significant factor in the support that 
the Coke Campaign achieved. However, while the initial pressure on Coca-Cola likely 
influenced the company’s 1986 “divestment” actions, the continued boycott in the second half of 
the decade was not able to pressure the Coca-Cola Company to into further curtailing its 
involvement in South Africa. This failure was likely due to the company’s skillful presentation 
of their self proclaimed noble actions in South Africa. The Coca-Cola Company was able to use 
their world class marketing to convince much of the public that their creation of the Equal 
Opportunity Fund and the program’s support from Tutu and Boesek indicated that the company 
stood on the side of South Africa’s black anti-apartheid leadership. Gaining support from 
Atlanta’s black political leadership, including Young, as well as the mainstream media also 
shielded Coca-Cola from criticism. Further, Coca-Cola’s history of philanthropic donations and 
support for community programs in the U.S., as well as the Coca-Cola Company’s powerful 
status within metro Atlanta made many groups, even some progressive ones, like the SCLC, 
reluctant to condemn the Coca-Cola Company. Finally, Coca-Cola’s continued willingness to 
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refuse to complete their divestment in the face of public criticism and boycott is somewhat 
surprising given the company’s obsession with their corporate image and the resulting 
capitulations to public pressure during threatened boycotts from the 1960s through the early 
1980s.  
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CONCLUSION 
In February 1990, after twenty-seven years in prison for actions, activism and armed 
struggle against the apartheid government of South Africa as a leader of the African National 
Congress , Nelson Mandela gained his freedom and reentered the world. For black South 
Africans and thousands of impassioned observers around the world, it seemed to indicate the end 
of an era and the beginning of a promising future of continued change. The world-wide “Free 
Mandela” campaign had been one of the largest humanitarian movements of the 20th century. 
The termination of Mandela’s prison sentence indicated that the movement had met with success, 
though much of South Africa’s future remained uncertain.  
Shortly after his release, Mandela embarked on a whirlwind tour of the United States to 
mobilize popular support and urge the American government to continue to enforce economic 
sanctions against South Africa until the apartheid system was fully dismantled. This trip was part 
of a forty-five day journey through twenty-one diverse countries. During his eleven days in the 
US, Mandela visited eight cities, one of which was Atlanta. Here I use Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference papers and five different news publications to recount the events of 
Mandela’s time in Atlanta. I will explain why he chose to include Atlanta on his itinerary and 
analyze the media coverage of and public response to his visit. The controversies surrounding 
Mandela’s time in Atlanta have much in common with the debates that shaped anti-apartheid 
activism and politics in the city during the 1980s. Thus, examining Mandela’s presence in 
Atlanta serves as a useful conclusion for this project. 
As the 1980s drew to a close South Africa teetered on the brink of civil war as violence 
escalated throughout the country. At the same time, as the Soviet Union collapsed, the apartheid 
government’s claim to be protecting South Africa from a communist onslaught lost credibility. 
153 
 
The New National Party leader and South African President FW de Klerk realized that change 
was inevitable. On February 2, 1990 de Klerk lifted the ban on the ANC and other opposition 
groups. Just over a week later, Mandela was released from prison. By this point, Mandela was 
viewed as godlike by his South African supporters, a perspective shared by untold numbers of 
black Americans. By June 20
th
 Nelson Mandela was in New York City where 750,000 New 
Yorkers lined the streets to greet him.
221
  
Mandela’s visit to the United States was coordinated by TransAfrica, the Washington DC 
based lobbying group that took a major leadership role in the anti-apartheid movement in the US, 
as well as a newly formed organization called the “Mandela Welcome committee.” 
TransAfrica’s Randall Robinson and Roger Wilkins teamed up with local representatives in each 
of the city’s on the tour to finalize the itinerary and plan Mandela’s appearances.222 
Some cities like New York and Washington seemed obvious choices for destinations during 
Mandela’s US Tour. Mandela visited the United Nations while in New York , met with President 
Bush at the White House, and spoke before a joint session of Congress. Furthermore, these East 
Coast cities had been the center of the American anti-apartheid movement from campus 
divestment efforts to the Free South Africa movement and the call for economic sanctions from 
the US government.  
The main reason that Mandela chose to include Atlanta on his first tour of the United 
States was not because of this city’s international business community or because Atlanta had a 
black mayor – though certainly Mayor Young’s ceaseless promotion of Atlanta internationally 
may have played a role. Primarily though, Mandela chose Atlanta because this was the place to 
link the struggles of Africans and black Americans. It was the place to forge a living link to the 
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legacy of Martin Luther King. This link too, was continuously promoted by Mayor Young who 
never tired of reminding people of his roots as a close colleague of King’s during the civil rights 
movement. The new mayor, Maynard Jackson, in office for only six months at the time of 
Mandela’s visit, was also no stranger to using the rhetoric of the civil rights movement and 
Atlanta’s special place within that history to promote the city and his career.  
King’s widow and President of the King Center for Nonviolent Social Change, Coretta 
Scott King issued a statement that made the connections between King and Mandela explicit: 
“Martin Luther King Jr’s views on what to do about apartheid were identical to Mandela’s 
positions today. An early and ardent proponent of global economic sanctions against the 
apartheid regime, King called Mandela a ‘great leader’ in a 1964 speech in London.” During his 
visit to Atlanta, Nelson Mandela ceremoniously laid a wreath on Martin Luther King’s grave in a 
symbolic effort to link Mandela, the ANC and South Africans with MLK and the US civil rights 
movement. Historian Jennifer Bratyanski has argued that efforts – particularly by the American 
media – to connect the South African anti-apartheid movement with African Americans’ historic 
struggles for racial justice resulted in a romanticizing and sanitizing of both movements. John 
Saul, author of “Liberation Support and Anti-Apartheid Work as Seeds of Global Consciousness: 
The Birth of Solidarity with Southern African Struggles,” takes Bratyanski’s critique a bit further 
by lamenting the failure of American anti-apartheid activists to launch critiques of capitalism and 
imperialism: “In the long run, for all its importance and all its accomplishments, ‘antiapartheid’ 
tended to muffle a necessary understanding of global realities, rather than serve as a step towards 
it.”223  
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As Mandela’s arrival in Atlanta approached there was a flurry of media attention in all of 
the city’s news outlets. The Atlanta Journal Constitution, the city’s mainstream daily newspaper, 
published an article comparing the strategies and ideologies of Mandela to those of Dr. King, 
emphasizing both men’s reverence for the teachings of Gandhi and acknowledging the different 
circumstances that led Mandela to condone armed struggle in South Africa. Even among several 
black-owned newspapers, the diversity in type and tone of press coverage given to Mandela’s 
time in Atlanta demonstrates that a tremendous range of opinions could be found within the local 
black press. At the Atlanta Voice, a religiously inspired black newspaper founded in 1963 to 
support the burgeoning Civil Rights Movement, the response to Mandela’s visit can only be 
described as euphoric. The weekly newspaper published an entire special edition to celebrate 
Mandela and his presence in Atlanta, and to inform readers of the history and current situation in 
South Africa. The issue, titled “Our Struggle is One,” included welcome statements from the city 
of Atlanta, Fulton Country, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Atlanta Branch of 
the NAACP, and the Martin Luther King Jr Center for Nonviolent Social Change, as well as 
reprints of speeches from Malcolm X and Paul Robeson speaking about racial injustice in South 
Africa. The editors of The Atlanta Voice also included a letter urging Mandela to observe that 
conditions in the black community in the United States may not be so different from those in 
South Africa. The Atlanta Voice continued unyielding support for Mandela when he faced 
criticism from Miami’s Cuban population for declaring solidarity with Fidel Castro. The author 
lamented that this pettiness and misplaced focus indicated that Mandela’s visit to the US will not 
result in real and permanent social change.
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The Atlanta Daily World is the longest running continually published black newspaper in 
Atlanta. From the time that CA Scott took over the publication in 1934, The Daily World 
represented a more conservative and consistently Republican position often at odds with the 
perspective of most of Atlanta’s African American community. While the paper published the 
requisite articles on Mandela’s plans for his time in Atlanta, The Daily World also included an 
editorial that continued to question the efficacy of economic sanctions, despite the fact that 
Mandela and other black South African leaders called for them. The Daily World’s argument 
echoed that of the Reagan administration and American corporate leaders who suggested that 
American businesses should use their leverage to foster change from within South Africa and 
that black workers bore the brunt of the effects of sanctions. 
A third African American newspaper, The Atlanta Inquirer, also established during the 
Civil Rights era and originally published by Atlanta University Center activists, broke the news 
that Mandela’s stop in Atlanta was almost canceled at the last minute. According to The Atlanta 
Inquirer’s Hal Lamar: “Inside sources say that for over eight hours Coretta King, Joe Lowery, 
Harry Belafonte and others sat around attempting to convince the organizers not to cancel.” The 
author suggests that a Coca-Cola controversy was to blame for the potential cancelation. The 
Coca-Cola Company offered Mandela the use of a corporate jet for this tour. Mandela and the 
ANC rejected the offer because the company continued to sell its soft drink concentrate in South 
Africa despite claiming to have fully disinvested from the South African economy. As discussed 
in Chapter five, Tandi Gcabashe continued to argue, “This company is still profiting from 
apartheid and hence we cannot have any relationship with it, even if it’s on humanitarian 
grounds.” Although Coca-Cola divested its bottling plants in South Africa in 1986, it continued 
to ship its concentrate to South Africa and enjoy a large share of the South African soft drink 
157 
 
market. An ANC representative worried that Coca-Cola’s involvement might taint Mandela’s 
reputation. However, despite ANC wishes Coca-Cola still profited from Mandela’s tour, as the 
company owned the soft-drink concession at several stadiums hosting Mandela appearances, 
including the Grant Field Stadium at Georgia Tech. 
The Atlanta Journal Constitution published an editorial condemning the ANC’s rejection 
of Coca-Cola, calling the decision “emotional” and “irrational.” The author calls Coca-Cola a 
“corporate ally in the fight against apartheid,” emphasizing Coca-Cola’s divestment as well as 
the establishment of the endowed equal opportunity foundation which provided scholarships for 
South African youth. This article marked the first time that the AJC had acknowledged that 
controversy still existed regarding Coca-Cola’s involvement in South Africa since before the 
company’s alleged divestment five years earlier. In all the Atlanta Journal Constitution 
published thirteen articles about Mandela’s 1990 visit to Atlanta, most of them supporting the 
ANC leader’s mission and relishing his presence in the city.  
On several scales, competition emerged for attention during Mandela’s visit. On the 
national level, the city of Chicago felt slighted that Mandela did not include a stop in the nation’s 
third largest city. Observers alleged that the rejection of Chicago’s invitation was due to Mayor 
Daley’s lack of support for economic sanctions against apartheid South Africa. Within Atlanta, 
white city council members were angered when initially only black representatives were 
provided invitations for preferred seating at the Grant Field Mandela Rally. Although the slight 
was corrected, some council members were still upset that they did not have more significant 
access to Mandela.
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The mass rally at Georgia Tech was the highlight of Mandela’s time in Atlanta. A sold 
out crowd of 50,000 plus people turned out to honor Mandela and hear him speak. Again he 
made the connection between US civil rights struggles and South Africa’s, this time by quoting 
King’s “I have a dream” speech. Many of those who had the opportunity to see and hear 
Mandela in person were overcome with emotion: “I can’t even describe the feeling,” said Wendy 
Truitt…”It’s tears and joy and excitement all at the same time.” African Americans across the 
United States felt proud and inspired by Mandela’s presence. A pastor from Detroit stated, 
“Whatever the Pope means to Catholics, that’s what Mandela means to us.” Atlantan, Dorothy 
Clements hoped that Mandela’s visit would “bring black Americans together.” As many 
observers reflected that the energy surrounding Mandela’s visit was reminiscent of the civil 
rights movement, some hoped that Mandela might “put younger blacks in touch with their 
heritage.”226 
Atlanta’s civil rights vanguard echoed these sentiments. Corretta Scott King stated, “Now 
we have the physical manifestations as we can touch and feel the people who have been involved 
in the struggle and they can feel us…For the children that will be here and who will get a chance 
to just get a glimpse of this man, maybe, and who will hear some of his words, it’s very 
important.” Reverend Lowery emphasized the importance of exposing Americans to a positive 
image of an African man: “The only examples of African manhood known to most Americans 
are Idi Amin and Tarzan.”227 
Emory Sociology student and activist, Randy Blazak shared in these observer’s 
enthusiasm, “it was very exciting; I sat way up in the top and screamed and yelled. It was 
incredible because we didn’t think it would happen. You know, when he was released it was just 
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one of those snapshot memories…It was very emotional.” On the other hand, as Blazak reflected 
on his memories of that day, he also commented: 
  The one feeling I had was, there was a large African American turnout to see him, 
  and I thought,  where were these people when we were protesting? I think people  
  of color of course knew about South Africa for a long time. In the 60s people  
  were protesting in the United States against  apartheid. But I just remember  
  thinking, you know, I wish they would have come out (to protests) instead of  
  these goofy white kids from the university.”228  
 
Others remained outside the stadium in protest. A small group of Ku Klux Klan members 
convened with plans to burn an ANC flag until they were threatened with arrest. Civil rights 
veteran Rev Hosea Williams led a protest against the five dollar ticket fee until he and several 
others were arrested trying to force their way into the stadium. Williams connected his 
opposition to the ticket fee to a larger issue developing several miles away, downtown. Homeless 
people had occupied the abandoned Imperial Hotel, demanding that the city provide affordable 
housing. Although not originally involved with this protest, Williams attempted to recruit the 
homeless demonstrators for a march to the Georgia Tech campus. Williams was generally critical 
of Mandela’s entire experience in Atlanta, accusing Joseph Lowery and Coretta Scott King of 
using Mandela to enhance their own public image: “I almost expect corporate America to exploit 
Mandela; it’s these so called black leaders that I don’t understand. The same things they’re 
advocating for South Africa, they’re not doing right here in Vine City and Cabbagetown.” 
Williams had recently run against Jackson in the 1989 mayoral race, and would likely have 
argued that Mayors Young and Jackson also used Mandela’s presence as an opportunity to 
promote their own careers.
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Sidewalk vendors were another group positioned outside the stadium. Despite official 
requests that “merchandising aspect of this visit…express the importance and dignity of Mr 
Mandela’s visit,” and the urging to “do everything possible to assure good taste and high quality 
in officially authorized merchandise,” unauthorized sellers hawked t-shirts, mugs, bumper 
stickers and posters. “Right now Mandela is real hot,” said Bayyinah Shaheed who operated a 
souvenir stand near Underground Atlanta. It’s unlikely that t-shirts featuring a brown-skinned, 
green and red clad Bart Simpson, proclaiming “Mandela, the dude’s my hero!” were what 
Mandela’s handlers had in mind when they urged good taste in souvenirs. His time in Atlanta 
declared a success, Mandela flew on to Miami, Los Angeles and Oakland before returning to 
South Africa.
230
  
Three years later Mandela returned to Atlanta. Again on a US tour, Mandela’s goals in 
1993 were quite different than they had been in 1990. While Mandela focused on rousing public 
support on his first tour, in 1993 on the eve of South Africa’s first democratic elections, Mandela 
sought corporate and other financial support for the ANC to aid in the transition from the group’s 
history as a protest movement to its future as a viable political party. While in Atlanta Mandela 
attended a special ceremony in which he was granted an honorary degree from Clark Atlanta 
University, and he gave interviews for CNN and the Atlanta Journal Constitution. This time 
though, he also spent time with Coca-Cola executives, and in fact his trip was sponsored by the 
company that he had snubbed on his first trip to Atlanta, famously drinking Pepsi on camera and 
requesting that Coke machines be removed from the floor of his hotel. Now, Mandela flew on a 
Coca-Cola plane and shared meals with the Coca-Cola Company’s top management.  
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What had changed? Mark Pendergrast, author of the self proclaimed definitive history of 
the Coca Cola Company argues that African American Coke executive Carl Ware befriended 
Mandela and persuaded the ANC to call off the Coke boycott. Meanwhile the company worked 
behind the scenes to ease the transition to democracy. Carl Ware, head of the board of trustees at 
Clark University, stood on stage while Mandela received his honorary degree. Mandela gave a 
public thank you to Ware for his “commitment to the problems that bear on our country.”231 
Clearly, many of the trends and parties that shaped the Atlanta’s anti-apartheid movement 
continued their presence during Mandela’s short time in the city. Mandela’s visit in 1990 
galvanized public support and left many African Americans with high hopes that the enthusiasm 
generated from his presence might result in tangible progress for the black community in 
Atlanta, which continued to struggle against the legacy of southern racism. 
This dissertation has examined Atlanta as a place where local, national, and transnational 
organizations and tactics intersected and interacted in the context of the international anti-
apartheid movement. I have argued that due to the historical, political and social dynamics of 
Atlanta, the anti-apartheid movement of the 1980s took on different characteristics in this city 
than it did in elsewhere. During the 1980s Atlanta was a city with a local political regime in 
which African American politicians eagerly partnered with corporate interests. Yet, the city still 
hosted a grassroots anti-apartheid movement. My project contributes to the literature on 
movement building by emphasizing the need to acknowledge both local dynamics as well as 
international or national forces to construct an accurate understanding of how a social movement 
manifests in given locality.  
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